JUDGMENT 1. The question raised in this rule is one of considerable importance as well as difficulty, namely, what is the Court competent to entertain and try a first appeal in a suit for restitution of conjugal rights instituted in the Court of a Subordinate Judge and valued by the Plaintiff without objection by the Defendant at a sum less than one thousand rupees. Before the decision of this Court in Aklemunnssa Bibee v. Mahomed Hatim 8 C. W. N. 705: s. c. I. L. R. 31 Cal. 849 (1904) was published, i.e., before 1904, Suits for restitution of conjugal rights were instituted in and entertained by the Court having jurisdiction under sec. 18 or sec. 19 of the Bengal, North-Western Provinces and Assam Civil Courts Act (XII of 1887) according to the relations bond fide made by the Plaintiffs. For fiscal purposes, the Court-fee is a fixed sum under the Court Fees Act irrespective of valuation for the purposes of jurisdiction and jurisdiction was determined by the value put by the Plaintiff, if the valuation was not unwarrantably and obviously improper. The Court to entertain an appeal was the Court which was declared competent by sec. 21 of the Bengal, North-Western Provinces and Assam Civil Courts Act, according to the valuation indicated by the Plaintiff or determined by the Court entertaining the original suit. Such appear to have been the uniform practice almost throughout British India and this was pointed out by Aikman, J., in Zair Husain Khan v. Khushed Jan. It was undoubtedly the practice in Bengal for at least fifty years. The opinion expressed by the learned Judges, who decided Aklemunnessa Bibee v. Mahomed Hatim S. C. W. N. 705 : 8. c. I. L. R. 31 Cal. 849 (1904), though it was merely an obiter dictum for the strict purposes of the case, has considerably impaired the legality of the practice which we have mentioned. The learned Judges declined to give effect to the objection, raised before them by the Defendant as to the jurisdiction of the first Court, because they were of opinion that sec. 11 of the Suits Valuation Act (VII of 1887) precluded the Defendant from raising the question in appeal, but they nevertheless went into the question raised-a course which with deference, we think, could have been avoided. 11 of the Suits Valuation Act (VII of 1887) precluded the Defendant from raising the question in appeal, but they nevertheless went into the question raised-a course which with deference, we think, could have been avoided. Their decision on the point is not, therefore, as binding as it would otherwise have been, and even if we differed from it, we could not refer the question to a Full Bench. 2. A Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court (Zair Husain Khan v. Khurshed Jan I. L. R. 28 All. 545 (1906) already cited) has arrived at a contrary decision and has adhered to the old practice which, in our opinion, is certainly more just and convenient to suitors who are not wealthy, and it should be remembered that the majority of suits of this nature are instituted by comparatively poorer Plaintiffs. 3. The Plaintiff in the present case followed the rule pronounced to be correct in Aklemunnessa Bibee v. Mahomed Hatim S. C. W. N. 705: s. c. I. L. R. 31 Cal. 849 (1904) and instituted his suit in the Court of the Subordinate. Judge notwithstanding its low valuation. The decree of that Court was against him and as the learned Judges of this Court did not express any decided opinion as to the Court competent to entertain an appeal, the Plaintiff, presented his appeal to the District Court. That Court declined jurisdiction and returned the memorandum of appeal for presentation to this Court. The question now is whether we should entertain the appeal or direct the District Court to entertain it? We cannot direct it to be registered here as an appeal from original decree unless we are satisfied that the District Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the appeal. 4. The precise question raised before us has not been answered either in Aklemvnnessa Bibee v. Mahomed Hatim S. C. W. N. 705: s. c. I. L. R. 31 Cal. 849 (1904) or Zair Husain Khan v. Khvrshed Jan I. L. R. 28 All. 545 (1906), though the tendencies of the opinions expressed by the learned Judges lead to opposite conclusions. 5. 849 (1904) or Zair Husain Khan v. Khvrshed Jan I. L. R. 28 All. 545 (1906), though the tendencies of the opinions expressed by the learned Judges lead to opposite conclusions. 5. Unaided by any precedent directly bearing on the point, we think that the opinion we are bound to pronounce should be in favour of retaining the long-standing practice that an appeal in such cases lies to the District Court and not to us, a practice which has not been satisfactorily shown to be illegal. The High Court here has not yet made any rules under the authority given to it under sec. 9 of the Suits Valuation Act, and so far as we have been able to ascertain, none of the other High Courts have done so. In the Central Provinces only rules have been made by the Judicial Commissioner. 6. Secs. 18, 19 and 21 of the Bengal, North-Western Provinces and Assam Civil Courts Act and the Suits Valuation Act contemplate the valuation of every suit for the purposes of jurisdiction, even if it is not capable of a satisfactory money estimate, and in the absence of any rules framed under sec. 9 of the Suits Valuation Act we think the safest and the most convenient course to follow is to hold that for the purposes of sec. 21 of the Bengal, North-Western Provinces and Assam Civil Courts Act, the valuation made by a Plaintiff of his suit should be prima facie considered as the true value. A Plaintiff, it seems to us, is bound to value his suit, and if, from improper motives, he either undervalues or overvalues it, the Court must decide what should be considered to be the proper value. 7. In Golam Rahman v. Fatima Bibee I. L. R. 13 Cal. 232 (1886) and Mowla. Newaz v. Sajidunnissa I. L. R. 18 Cal. 378 (1891), it has been held that a suit for restitution of conjugal rights is incapable of valuation, but those cases turned on the construction of statutes which contemplate a strict money value and not merely a valuation by a Plaintiff for the purposes of ordinary jurisdiction. There may not be any pecuniary value of the subject matter of a suit-a mere sentiment, a benefit, or a feeling outraged may not possess a pecuniary value. There may not be any pecuniary value of the subject matter of a suit-a mere sentiment, a benefit, or a feeling outraged may not possess a pecuniary value. A suit to recover damages for loss of reputation on a sentimental wrong is certainly incapable of valuation in one sense. A suit based on the ground of a wife's adultery is incapable of satisfactory valuation but the Plaintiff has still to value the relief he claims' in our Courts. We must, as pointed out by Alkman, J., read the words " incapable of valuation " as meaning incapable of satisfactory valuation, if we have to give effect to the obvious intention of the framers of the Bengal, North-Western Provinces and Assam Civil Courts Act and the Suits Valuation Act. 8. Sec. 21 of the Bengal, North-Western Provinces and Assam Civil Courts Act lays down " that an appeal from a decree of a Subordinate Judge shall lie to a District Judge where the value of the original suit in which the decree was made did not exceed five thousand rupees." It cannot be said in the present case that the value of the suit as laid by the Plaintiff exceeded five thousand rupees. An appeal lies to the High Court, if the value exceeds five thousand rupees and in no other case. As the section is worded, we regard an appeal to the High Court as exceptional and in this case it has not been attempted to be shown that though incapable of satisfactory valuation, the valuation made by the Plaintiff is erroneous. 8. We are, therefore, of opinion that the District Judge ought to have, entertained the appeal presented to him and we accordingly direct him to re-admit the appeal and try it if the appeal is otherwise in order. The rule is made absolute in the above terms with costs which we assess at two gold mohurs. Let the memorandum of appeal be sent down to the District Judge with a copy of this judgment.