JUDGMENT 1. This is a rule to show cause why an order under sec. 118, Cr. P.C., passed against the Petitioner, Chintamon Singh, a resident of village Matihari within the jurisdiction of the Forbesgunj Thana of the Araria Sub-Division of the District of Purnea, should not be set aside. The order complained of is dated the 12th July 1906 and requires the Appellant to execute a bond for Rs. 500 with two sureties for Rs. 500 each, to be of good behaviour for a period of three years. The Sessions Judge has by his order, dated the 20th April 1907, affirmed the order of the Sub Divisional Magistrate. We are now asked to revise these orders on the following grounds :-- (1) That the information on which Mr. Lea, the District Magistrate of Purnea, passed an order under sec. 112, Cr. P.C. does not give the necessary details; (2) That the enquiry having been begun by Mr. Lea, he had no jurisdiction, after the examination of 109 witnesses, to transfer the case to the file of Mr. Reid, the Sub-Divisional Magistrate of Araria; (3) That the trying Magistrate was wrong in not allowing the defence, in accordance with the provisions of sec. 256, Cr. P.C., to recall and recross-examine the prosecution witnesses; (4) That the Petitioner was not allowed to cross-examine two Police officers, viz., Mr. Macnamara and Babu Ram Sadoy Mukherjee, who were summoned by the Appellate Court under sec. 540, Cr. P.C., on matters not referred to in their examination-in-chief; (5) That the trying Magistrate was wrong in restricting the examination-in-chief of the defence witnesses, after 46 witnesses had been examined, to 30 hours time; (6) That the trying Magistrate was wrong in refusing to examine about 1,000 witnesses whom the Petitioner desired to cite and examine; (7) That the evidence of repute given by the witnesses for the prosecution is not of a nature to justify the order passed, and (8) That mere association with a number of supposed bad characters cannot justify an order under sec. 118, unless the associates are themselves shown to be men of bad character and suspected of committing the dacoities the Petitioner is alleged to have instigated. 2. Other minor points were raised in the course of argument, but they appeared to us to be of no importance. 3. The Petitioner is an employee of Mr. 118, unless the associates are themselves shown to be men of bad character and suspected of committing the dacoities the Petitioner is alleged to have instigated. 2. Other minor points were raised in the course of argument, but they appeared to us to be of no importance. 3. The Petitioner is an employee of Mr. Forbes, an influential landholder of the District of Purnea, and holds the position of a sirman or rent collector on the Sultanpur Estate, which Mr. Forbes manages as executor under the Will of the late Mr. A.J. Forbes. 4. The proceedings against the Petitioner were initiated as follows:--A report (Ex. (sic)), dated the 2nd August 1904, was made by a Police officer, Mr. Tucker, to Mr. G.H. Lea, the District Magistrate of Purnea, on receipt of which the latter recorded an order under sec. 112, Cr. P.C., to the effect that he had received information from the Assistant Superintendent of Police, Araria, that the Petitioner was by habit a robber, that he habitually protected and harboured dacoits and habitually committed mischief and extortion and abetted the commission of these offences and that he was of so desperate and dangerous a character as to render his being at large without security being required of him hazardous to the community. The order accordingly directed him to show cause why he should not be called upon to execute a bond of Rs. 500 with two sureties of Rs. 500 each for his good behaviour for a period of three years. 5. The hearing of the case began before the District Magistrate, who, after the examination-in-chief of a number of witnesses, postponed the case, on the application of the Petitioner, who had moved this Court for a transfer of his case from the file of that officer. A rule was issued, but it was discharged on the 28th September 1904, and the case was resumed by the District Magistrate on the 10th November. The District Magistrate after the examination-in-chief of 109 prosecution witnesses and the cross-examination of one of them on the 6th February 1905, transferred the case to the file of Mr. C.H. Reid, Sub-Divisional Magistrate of Araria. 6. It was proceeded with regularly by Mr. Reid from the 19th June 1905, till the 12th July 1906. 7. By the 30th September 1905, the prosecution had examined altogether 52 witnesses. C.H. Reid, Sub-Divisional Magistrate of Araria. 6. It was proceeded with regularly by Mr. Reid from the 19th June 1905, till the 12th July 1906. 7. By the 30th September 1905, the prosecution had examined altogether 52 witnesses. The prosecution then presented a petition stating that it did not desire to examine any more witnesses in consequence of the extreme length of the cross-examination to which the witnesses already examined had been subjected. The prosecution closed its case on the 15th November 1905, Mr. Forbes, the employer and counsel of the Petitioner, objected that the Court could not put his client on his defence before he had again cross-examined the witnesses for the prosecution. The Magistrate, Mr. Reid, refused to allow the further cross-examination of the prosecution witnesses on the ground that Mr. Forbes's application was made only for the purpose of vexation and delay and to defeat the ends of justice. Mr. Forbes then announced that he intended to apply on the following Monday for an adjournment in order to move the High Court for a transfer of the case. An application to quash the proceedings or in the alternative to transfer the case was subsequently made to this Court and refused on the 5th December 1905. 8. The examination-in-chief of the defence witnesses commenced on the 7th December 1905, and in the course of 68 sittings the evidence of 48 witnesses was recorded. On the 2nd February 1906, the trying Magistrate passed an order limiting the time for the examination-in-chief of further witnesses for the defence to 30 hours, i.e., to 6 or 7 days more. 9. The reason for this order was that Mr. Forbes for his client had put in a list of 1760 witnesses, out of which altogether 741 witnesses were examined. It may be mentioned as showing to what an extent the proceedings in this comparatively unimportant case were protracted that the District Magistrate held 9 sittings and the Sub-Divisional Magistrate 228 sittings. There were thus altogether 237 sittings. The record has swollen to most portentous dimensions. The evidence recorded by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate alone covers 6500 foolscap pages. The case proceeded before Mr. Reid for over 14 months and a period of nearly two years elapsed from the beginning of the proceedings till the final order of the Magistrate. The appeal to the Sessions Judge lasted 17 days. Mr. The evidence recorded by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate alone covers 6500 foolscap pages. The case proceeded before Mr. Reid for over 14 months and a period of nearly two years elapsed from the beginning of the proceedings till the final order of the Magistrate. The appeal to the Sessions Judge lasted 17 days. Mr. Forbes not only conducted the defence in the Magistrate's Court but himself gave evidence for the defence, 5 days being occupied in recording his deposition. He appears to have so identified himself with the case of his client that it is impossible to resist the conclusion that he regarded the institution of proceedings against Chintamon Singh as a personal affront to himself and as derogatory to his prestige. This seems to us to account for the great length of these proceedings which were protracted to the extent they have been only for the purpose of preventing any final order being passed. We now proceed to discuss the points of law urged by Mr. Hill. The first is as to the want of the necessary materials in the order of the District Magistrate under sec. 112, Cr. P.C. We consider that the order of the Magistrate gives all the necessary information required by the section. This section enacts that when a Magistrate, acting under sec. 110, Cr. P.C., deems it necessary to require any person to show cause, he shall make an order in writing setting forth (1) the substance of the information received, (2) the amount of the bond to be executed, (3) the term for which it is to be in force and (4) the number, character and class of the sureties required. All the above four matters are distinctly stated in the order in question. It has been contended that no list of witnesses is to be found either in the report to the Magistrate or in the order of the Magistrate under sec. 112, Cr. P.C. The law no-where requires that any list of witnesses should be so given. 10. Mr. Hill's second plea impugns the power of the District Magistrate to transfer the case. Secs. 192 and 528, Cr. P. C., deal with the powers of a District Magistrate to transfer and withdraw "any case" to and from the file of any Subordinate Magistrate. It is to be observed that the expression used in sec. 192, cl. 4 C.W.N. 821(1900), Cr. Secs. 192 and 528, Cr. P. C., deal with the powers of a District Magistrate to transfer and withdraw "any case" to and from the file of any Subordinate Magistrate. It is to be observed that the expression used in sec. 192, cl. 4 C.W.N. 821(1900), Cr. P.C., is "any case," and not any "criminal case." It has been contended that sec. 192, Cr. P.C., applies only to criminal cases, as it is part of a chapter which deals with offences, and the preceding section relates to the cognizance of offences. The words are, however, quite wide enough to include cases under Chap. VIII of the Criminal Procedure Code. We may also point out that in the Code of 1872, sec. 44 which is the section corresponding to sec. 192 of the present Code, provided only for the transfer of "criminal cases." By the amending Act XI of 1874 the word "criminal" was struck out and it has been omitted from all subsequent enactments. The words "criminal case" are intended to be used in a limited sense and not to apply to every case cognizable by a Criminal Court. But when the words "criminal case" have been altered to "any case," it is clear that the Legislature intended that the power of transfer should not be restricted to criminal cases only, and extended the power of transfer to cases of every description. We, therefore, think that the District Magistrate had ample power to transfer this case to the file of Mr. Reid under sec 192, Cr. P.C. If the objection with regard to the transfer had any force, even then it could not be regarded as vitiating the whole proceedings; as the action of the Magistrate in transferring the case could only amount to an irregularity which would be covered by the provisions of sec. 529, cl. (f). Cr. P.C. [See Akbar Ali Khan v. Domi Lal ILR 23 Cal. 621 (1895)]. 11. Mr. Hill's third plea is as to the right of cross-examination under sec. 256, Cr. P.C. The claim set up by the defence for a second cross-examination of all the prosecution witnesses appears to us most unreasonable, considering the inordinately lengthy cross examination of those witnesses before that claim was made. 621 (1895)]. 11. Mr. Hill's third plea is as to the right of cross-examination under sec. 256, Cr. P.C. The claim set up by the defence for a second cross-examination of all the prosecution witnesses appears to us most unreasonable, considering the inordinately lengthy cross examination of those witnesses before that claim was made. The unreasonably protracted cross-examination of those witnesses relates to so many irrelevant matters that the inference is unavoidable that as observed by the Sessions Judge "even if Mr. Forbes was not deliberately maneuvering to drive the Court to fix some time limit, he certainly deliberately omitted to call any important witness in those thirty hours." Apart from the consideration as to whether the application for a second cross-examination of the prosecution witnesses was or was not for the purpose of vexation or delay or to defeat the ends of justice, we consider that sec. 256, Cr. P.C., has no application to the present case. Sec. 256 occurs in Chap. XXI of the Code, which relates to the trial of warrant cases. Sec 251 of that chapter provides that "following procedure shall be observed by the Magistrates in the trial of warrant cases." Sec. 252 relates to the evidence for the prosecution, sec. 253 to the discharge of the accused, sec. 254 to the framing of the charge, sec. 255 to the plea of the accused and sec. 256 to the defence of the accused. No doubt, under sec. 117, Cr. P.C., the enquiry into bad livelihood cases should be made as nearly as may be practicable in the manner prescribed for conducting trials and recording evidence in warrant cases. But we do not think that the provisions of sec. 256, Cr. P.C., indicate that the person called upon to show cause under sec. 110, Cr. P.C., has a right to further cross-examine the prosecution witnesses under sec. 256, Cr. P.C., inasmuch as the provisions of this section relate to cases where a formal charge, as required by sec. 254, has been drawn up and the accused has been called upon to meet that charge. In cases under sec. 110, Cr. P.C., the order of the Magistrate under sec. 112, Cr. P.C., is equivalent to a charge. The object in giving the substance of the information in an order under sec. 112, Cr. 254, has been drawn up and the accused has been called upon to meet that charge. In cases under sec. 110, Cr. P.C., the order of the Magistrate under sec. 112, Cr. P.C., is equivalent to a charge. The object in giving the substance of the information in an order under sec. 112, Cr. P.C., is that the person called upon to show cause may clearly understand the matter that he has to meet in his defence, and a Magistrate has no power to go beyond the requirements of his order under sec. 112, Cr. P.C. In warrant cases a charge sheet is prepared for similar purposes. In the above view the cross-examination of witnesses in a proceeding under sec. 110, Cr. P.C., is tantamount to their cross-examination after charge. It cannot be contended that in the present instance the Appellant had no information as to the matters which he would be required to meet. In trials of warrant cases, it is when a charge sheet is drawn up that the accused is for the first time informed as to the offences that have appeared from the evidence against him to have been committed by him, and, hence, it is only right that the accused should in warrant cases be given an opportunity to cross-examine the prosecution witnesses after a charge has been framed. In summons cases the accused is informed in the summons as to the charges against him and hence the Legislature does not require the preparation of any formal charge, as in warrant cases, nor any second cross-examination. For the above reasons we think that the Petitioner had no right to any further cross-examination, especially when the prosecution witnesses had already been cross-examined to a very unreasonable length. 12. The Petitioner's fourth plea relates to the limits put on the cross-examination of Mr. Macnamara and Babu Ram Sadoy Mukherjee in the Sessions Court. These witnesses were summoned by the Appellate Court under sec. 540, Cr. P.C., as Court witnesses and as such both parties were equally entitled to a full cross-examination of these witnesses on matters relevant to the enquiry. From the record of their evidence we find that both parties were allowed to cross-examine them. In the recorded evidence of Babu Ram Sadoy Mukherjee we find the following note near the end of the cross-examination by Mr. From the record of their evidence we find that both parties were allowed to cross-examine them. In the recorded evidence of Babu Ram Sadoy Mukherjee we find the following note near the end of the cross-examination by Mr. Norton for Crown: "The cross-examination is to be confined to the subjects on which I examined the witnesses." There is no such note in the cross-examination of this witness by Mr. Gregory, counsel for the defence. The above order of the Sessions Judge may have reference to the whole cross-examination of that witness. But no such restriction appears to have been made with reference to the cross-examination of Mr. Macnamara. At all events there is no such note by the Sessions Judge, as we find in the cross-examination of the other witnesses. We have already observed that such restriction is not allowed by law. It is urged that the Appellant has been prejudiced by this restriction. But in the first place, it was the cross-examination by the counsel for the prosecution that appears to have been restricted. In the second place, the evidence of Mr. Macnamara and Babu Ram Sadoy Mukherjee relates only to the manner in which the evidence of repute was collected, and what they say cannot be treated as any evidence of bad repute. If their evidence were eliminated from the record, there would still remain abundance of evidence as to the reputed character of the Appellant. 13. The fifth and sixth objections are as to the trying Magistrate having restricted the examination-in-chief of a number of defence witnesses to a limit of 30 hours and to his not allowing the whole 1760 witnesses named for the defence to be called. The demand to examine 1760 witnesses for the defence is in our opinion preposterous. But the trying Magistrate did not reject this demand, until it was obvious that an attempt was being made to protract the examination of the defence witnesses to a most unnecessary extent so as to delay, If not to prevent, the final termination of the proceedings. Under these circumstances the trying Magistrate was not unreasonable in fixing some limit of time within which the defence should close its case. Under these circumstances the trying Magistrate was not unreasonable in fixing some limit of time within which the defence should close its case. We find that inspite of this apparently small limit of time for the examination of the defence witnesses, it was ample; for we observe that seven hundred witnesses were examined-in-chief during those thirty hours (i.e., 6 or 7 days time) allowed. But it cannot be fairly said, we think, that the defence has been prejudiced by the fact that they were not able to examine all the 1760 witnesses they had summoned. It is the quality and not the quantity of evidence that goes to establish a point. Under the circumstances the Petitioner has no reason to complain because he was not allowed to examine more witnesses. It is also made a grievance that Mr. Forbes was called on to sum up his client's case in one hour's time. But this was after he had been arguing for 15 days. 14. The seventh objection is that the evidence of repute is not sufficient to justify the order. It appears that out of the witnesses examined for the prosecution the lower Appellate Court has believed the evidence of 40 witnesses who prove the association of the Petitioner with bad characters at various times, especially in most cases immediately before the occurrence of a dacoity. 15. There had been a series of dacoities in the mouth of July 1902 and in consequence of this Babu Ram Sadoy Mukherjee was deputed to the Araria Sub-Division to trace out the dacoities, as the local Police had been unable to detect them. Mr. Tucker was at that time Superintendent of Police, Purnea, and be sent Babu Ram Sadoy Mukherjee, an Inspector of Police of the Detective Department, to Mr. Duff, Manager of the Sultanpur Estate, for assistance in the enquiries that Babu Ram Sadoy was going to set on foot. Mr. Duff deputed the Petitioner, Chintamon Singh, and another man, Janak Lal Missir, to give the required assistance to Babu Ram Sadoy Mukherjee. The first result of these enquiries appears to have been the discovery of a gang known as the Barfi Singh gang. On the 5th February 1903, Inspector Sital Prosad drew up a first information report, naming about 150 persons as members of the above gang. The first result of these enquiries appears to have been the discovery of a gang known as the Barfi Singh gang. On the 5th February 1903, Inspector Sital Prosad drew up a first information report, naming about 150 persons as members of the above gang. The names of the Petitioner, Chintamon Singh, and of Janak Lal Misser appear among the names of the accused in the first information report. But a case was instituted against only 23, for want of sufficient evidence against the rest. During the progress of this enquiry, two other dacoities took place--one at Pathordeva and the other at Balahi. These two were immediately followed by a third dacoity at Sonapur, in which one man was killed and another very seriously wounded. In 1903 there were no less than 19 dacoities, and the present Petitioner is alleged to have been connected with them. 16. The Petitioner, owing to his position as sirman of a rich estate and the protege of an influential zemindar like Mr. Forbes, who is also a Barrister-at-Law, appears to have been dreaded by the villagers and they were naturally afraid to publicly denounce him as one of the instigators of those dacoities. Had it not been for the arrival of Ram Sadoy Mukherjee and his energetic enquiries, no trace would have been obtained of the dacoities. The energy with which these enquiries were conducted and the presence of European Police officers anxious to discover the dacoits evidently emboldened the villagers to open their mouths. Mr. Macnamara, apparently not blindly trusting his subordinates in the enquiry into the present case, seems to have made up his mind to hear with his own ears what Chintamon Singh's reputation was in the vicinity of Forbesgunj. Mr. Macnamara was engaged for three days in making those enquiries. The common people appear to have refused to give evidence unless the headmen gave evidence also. And on the 24th July 1904, Mr. Macnamara examined the headmen of Sonapur, Mirgunj and other villages. The statements made by the villagers and headmen to Mr. Macnamara disclosed the fact that Chintamon Singh was the leader of the dacoits. 17. By the evidence of 40 witnesses it is proved beyond all possible doubt that about the end of July 1904, Chintamon Singh had the reputation of being a leader of dacoits. The statements made by the villagers and headmen to Mr. Macnamara disclosed the fact that Chintamon Singh was the leader of the dacoits. 17. By the evidence of 40 witnesses it is proved beyond all possible doubt that about the end of July 1904, Chintamon Singh had the reputation of being a leader of dacoits. This reputation prevailed amongst the people in whose villages the dacoities had taken place. Under sec. 117, cl. (iii), Cr. P.C., the fact that a person is a habitual offender may be proved by evidence of general repute. In dealing with cases under Chap. VIII of the Criminal Procedure Code Magistrates ought, especially where no conviction is proved, (as in the present case), to take great care to test the evidence for the prosecution. We find that the two lower Courts in their careful and elaborate judgments have concurrently found that the evidence of general repute in the present case has satisfactorily proved that Chintamon Singh is a habitual offender. In cases like the present there should appear clear evidence that the party called upon to show cause is known to have associated with criminals; to have frequently been seen near the places where thefts and other offences have been committed, and that, immediately after his being found associated with criminals, thefts, etc, have taken place. There is abundance of evidence on the record to show that the associates of the Petitioner are criminals, that he has been seen near places where dacoities took place and that immediately after or almost immediately after his meeting with his associates these dacoities occurred. 18. Our attention has been drawn to the case of Rai Isri Pershad v. Queen-Empress (2) and it has been contended that in accordance with this Court's rulings in that case a man's general reputation is that which he bears amongst all the townsmen in the place in which he lives and that if the state of things is that the body of his fellow townsmen who know him look upon him as a dangerous man and a man of bad habits, that is strong evidence that he is a man of bad character. In that case acts of extortion were said to have been committed in the neighbourhood of the place where Isri Prosad resided. In that case acts of extortion were said to have been committed in the neighbourhood of the place where Isri Prosad resided. It was therefore necessary that there should have been reliable evidence of bad repute given by the people amidst whom he lived. In the present case the evidence of general reputation comes from people of villages where the dacoities had taken place and in such a case this evidence is certainly to be treated as evidence of general repute as required by sec. 117, Cr. P.C. 19. It is of no avail to say that the villagers who have been examined in this case did not volunteer their evidence and that they were silent for such a length of time. In all bad livelihood cases where the accused is either himself a person of influence or is under the protection of such a person, no villager would dare to mention the name of such a man for the fear of bringing retribution down on his own head. 20. The Petitioner's eighth plea is that his associates have not been proved to have been bad characters themselves, or to have been suspected of being connected with the dacoities of 1903. But that is not so. It appears from the evidence that there are at least 20 associates of the Petitioner who had been convicted before the proceedings were drawn up against him. These convictions had taken place during the period of association. Some of these associates had been convicted once, some twice, some thrice and some four times. These convictions have been either under sec. 110, Cr. P. C., or for dacoity and theft. IN one instance, one of his associates, named Dodlu Dosadh, was hanged and six others transported for life, two have been sentenced to ten years' imprisonment and the real, for smaller terms. A man who associates with criminals of this class can hardly be regarded as a man of good character. 21. It is contended that there is no evidence on the record to show that the associates of the Petitioner had ever been suspected of any of the dacoities. But this is not so, as it appears from the evidence of the prosecution witnesses Mukund Lal, Doman, Talak Chand Sahu, Achay Lal Bhagat Kusdas and others that Chintamon's associates and he himself were always suspected of being concerned in the dacoities. 22. But this is not so, as it appears from the evidence of the prosecution witnesses Mukund Lal, Doman, Talak Chand Sahu, Achay Lal Bhagat Kusdas and others that Chintamon's associates and he himself were always suspected of being concerned in the dacoities. 22. We may add that the Petitioner's first two pleas relate to preliminary matters. They should have been taken before Mr. Lea and Mr. Reid. It appears from the judgment of Mr. Lea that he had afforded the defence before the commencement of the case facilities for putting forward any legal point. Then, in his motion to the High Court on the 5th December 1905, the Petitioner had a further opportunity of pressing these objections. In his first motion to the High Court in September 1904, the first objection raised here was not urged at all. In his motion to the High Court in December 1905, these objections were urged, but this Court declined to interfere. It is futile now to set up these objections after the Petitioner failed to urge them or urged them unsuccessfully in the preliminary stages of the proceedings. 23. We have been asked to go into the merits of the case in detail, but the concurrent findings of facts by both the Courts below render it unnecessary for us to consider the evidence at greater length than we have done. We have heard the comments made by counsel on both sides on the evidence and we consider that the lower Appellate Court was right in excluding the evidence of some of the witnesses for the prosecution as untrustworthy and acting on the evidence of others. We in no way differ from his views on this subject. For the above reasons we decline to interfere with the order of the Magistrate complained of in this case, and discharge the rule.