JUDGMENT Maclean, C.J. - The question which arises on this appeal is a very short one; and, I think it may be (properly stated thus, whether Lalit Mohan Mullick, who was the shebait of a certain idol was entitled to deal with it by his Will as he purported to do. It appears that the endowment of the idol was created many years ago by the Will of one Chitra Dassee, aud eventually the said Lalit Mohan became the shebait. He purported to bequeath by this Will the shebaitship after his death, first to his widow, and then to his nephew, Rajeswar Mullick, the present Plaintiff. Lalit Mohan died; and, Rajeswar now brings this suit to have it declared that he is entitled to the shebaitship. He is opposed by his brother, Gopeswar Mullick, who says that Lalit Mohan had no power to bequeath the shebaitship by his Will. That is the whole question in the suit. 2. No doubt, there are cases and authorities for the proposition that a shebait may by an act inter vivos, alienate the shebaitship; but I think I am fairly stating the result of those cases when I say that such alienations are not regarded with much favour, and that somewhat special circumstances must exist to support them. I need not go through the authorities which I think substantiate that proposition. But all of them relate to alienations inter vivos, and with the exception of one authority, to which I will refer in a moment, there is none for the proposition that a shebait can by his Will bequeath the shebaitship. On principle I do not see how he can do so; for, the question at once arises, what has he to bequeath or alienate under his Will? A shebait is a manager or a quasi trustee for the benefit of the idol. His office endures only for his life : his Will only comes into operation on his death. What is, there then for him to alienate by his Will? Nothing. In the case of Mancharam v. Praasankar I. L. R. 6 Bom. 298 (1882), on which the learned Counsel for the Appellant relies, the alienation no doubt was by Will: but the learned Judges seem to have proceeded on the view, that because in certain cases there may be an alienation by a shebait by act inter. Nothing. In the case of Mancharam v. Praasankar I. L. R. 6 Bom. 298 (1882), on which the learned Counsel for the Appellant relies, the alienation no doubt was by Will: but the learned Judges seem to have proceeded on the view, that because in certain cases there may be an alienation by a shebait by act inter. vivos, so equally there can be alienation by a shebait by his Will. But the distinction is obvious. There is nothing to pass under the Will, but there is something which can pass by an alienation inter vivos, by the then existing interest of the shebait. I am, therefore, with great respect, unable to concur in that decision, I think that there was nothing which Lalit Mohan could pass by his Will so far as relates to the shebaitship. As the title of the Plaintiff is dependent upon this supposed alienation by Lalit Mohan, his case must fail. 3. Then it is suggested that there is some usage in the family relating to the particular worship of this idol and to the shebaitship which would justify the alienation by Will. I do not think that is made out. The learned Judge of the Court of first instance did not think so. IT appears from the proceedings in this case, that attempts have been made from time to time by certain members of the family to deal with this shebaitship by Will. It is clear from the terms of the decree, dated the 26TH of August 1882, referred to in the proceedings that the alienation then made by Will failed. It is suggested that that was a case of alienation made by a Will to a stranger. That may be so: but the alienation in fact failed. As regards the other cases which are referred to, they seem to have been oases in which the bequest,--if I may rightly so Call it--was to those would have been the shebaits in the ordinary course of descent. Consequently, there was no object in challenging the Will on the point. I do not think any usage or established practice in the family has been made out to justify the alienation. 4. In my opinion, the view taken by the Court of first instance is right, and this appeal must be dismissed with costs. Mitra, J. 5. I am of the same opinion. I do not think any usage or established practice in the family has been made out to justify the alienation. 4. In my opinion, the view taken by the Court of first instance is right, and this appeal must be dismissed with costs. Mitra, J. 5. I am of the same opinion. The case is one of hereditary shebatiship both under the Will of Chitra Dasi and under the general law. The status of Lalit Mohan was that of a shebait and as such he was in the same position as a manager of an infant heir. He had no power to alienate except for necessity or clear benefit to the Thakur. No case of necesstiy or benefit to the Thakur has, however, been pleaded or attempted to be made out by the evidence. The evidence of a family usage as giving the power to bequeath shebaitship by Will is also very meagre. Lalit Mohan's right to manage as a shebait must cease with his death and he had, in fact, nothing to bequeath. Woodroffe, J. I agree that Lalit Mohan could not alienate the office of shebaitship by Will. I wish to express no opinion on the question whether the office of shebaitship may be alienated by transaction inter vivos or, if so, under what conditions and I think that the question of usage does not affect the matter which is now before us. I agree that this appeal should be dismissed with costs.