JUDGMENT 1. This is an appeal against the decision of the learned District Judge in an execution proceeding in which he decided that the Plaintiff decree-holder was entitled to a large number of properties. The decree which was to be executed was one which declared the Plaintiff to be entitled to properties set out in Sens. 1 and 2 to the plaint in a suit which was brought in 1880 in so far as they were claimed in the plaint in the present suit. There was considerable difficulty in identifying the various properties because they were differently described in the schedules to the earlier plaints in the two suits, and moreover the to Uzi numbers of various properties have been changed from time to time. The learned Judge having heard the evidence came to the conclusion that the properties to which he has held the decree-holder entitled fell within the description of properties he was declared entitled to under the decree in suit. Two objections have been taken to the judgment on behalf of the Appellant, the first is that there is in fact no judgment, because the learned Judge who heard the case had taken leave before he put his judgment into writing and had it read by his successor in office. We do not think that objection is well-founded. Sec. 199 of the CPC provides that a Judge may pronounce a judgment written by his predecessor but not pronounced. This judgment was written by the predecessor of the Judge who pronounced it. It seems to us that he comes within the words of sec. 199, and we do not think it right to accede to the argument of the Appellant who asks us to place a limited construction on that section and to say that the judgment should be written by the Judge before he had taken leave or left the post which he was occupying when he heard the case. Our attention was drawn to certain cases of which only one seems to be directly in point, namely, the one of Musstt. Parbutty v. Musstt. Higgin 17 W. R. 475 (1872)., and that case supports the view which we express. We think that the objection is ill-founded and that the Judge was entitled, having heard the evidence, to write his judgment and to send it to his successor for delivery under the provisions of sec. Parbutty v. Musstt. Higgin 17 W. R. 475 (1872)., and that case supports the view which we express. We think that the objection is ill-founded and that the Judge was entitled, having heard the evidence, to write his judgment and to send it to his successor for delivery under the provisions of sec. 199, C. P. C. 2. The next objection taken is that if it be a judgment properly pronounced still it has been founded on what is not evidence and therefore ought to be set aside and the case remanded in order that it may be decided on proper evidence. This objection is founded on the fact that the Judge had before him the evidence of witnesses who had examined the Collectorate records and Collectorate registers for the purpose of proving the history of the various properties to which the Plaintiff alleged he was entitled under his decree in showing that the properties which were mentioned in the earlier plaint were the same ones which were mentioned in the later plaint. The Judge had before him the evidence of the Record-keeper and the clerks who examined the records and had before him the information slips which embodied the results of their examination of the records and registers. The objection made by the learned Counsel for the Appellant is that the C'ollectorate registers and records are public documents and that, therefore, under the provisions of sec. 65, cl. (e) of the Evidence Act, certified copies of the documents are the only secondary evidence which can be given of them. But the learned Judge has found as a matter of fact that those documents could not be conveniently examined in Court. He has found the facts which bring them within cl. (g) of sec. 65, and enable the result of the examination of the documents to be given by witnesses who are skilled in the examination of those documents. It does not appear to have been contended in the Court below that the C'ollectorate records and registers were documents which could have been conveniently examined in Court. It does not seem to have been argued that they did not thereby fall within the provisions of cl. (g) of sec. 65 of the Evidence Act. But it appears to have been contended as it has been in this Court that whether they fall within cl. It does not seem to have been argued that they did not thereby fall within the provisions of cl. (g) of sec. 65 of the Evidence Act. But it appears to have been contended as it has been in this Court that whether they fall within cl. (g) or not, if they were public documents within the provisions of sec. 74 of the Evidence Act, then the only secondary evidence which could be admitted was the certified copies of the documents in question. 3. We do not agree with the argument which has been addressed to us by the Appellant. We think the true view to take is to see on what ground the evidence was admitted and for what object. In this case secondary evidence was admitted not because the documents in question were public documents but because the documents were such as could not be conveniently examined in Court, and because the fact that had to be proved was the general result of an examination of these numerous documents. That being so, under that section evidence might be given as to the general result of the documents by a person who had examined them and who was skilled in the examination of those documents and the general result was given by the Record-keeper and the clerks who gave evidence before the learned Judge. 4. The learned Counsel of the Appellant would have been in a much stronger position if the ground on which secondary evidence was admitted was that the documents were public documents. That was not the ground, and the object was not to prove the contents of each particular document which was referred to by the Record-keeper and the clerks, but to prove the general result of the examination of the whole of the record and registers as showing the history of the different estates in question. 5. For these reasons, we think that the point is an unsound one and that the judgment of the learned Judge cannot be upset on the ground. 6. 5. For these reasons, we think that the point is an unsound one and that the judgment of the learned Judge cannot be upset on the ground. 6. We may observe that it is a very remarkable circumstance that though the learned Judge has found that the decree-holder is entitled to have a very large number of properties there has not been made a single suggestion that his judgment is erroneous as to any single property, or that the examination of the original records or registers shows that his view as to any single property is wrong. We think that his judgment is right and the appeal must be dismissed with costs. 7. Appeal No. 44 must also be dismissed with costs. 8. We assess the hearing fee in both these appeals at Rs. 300. The Orders, Nos. 222 and 380 of 1907 are discharged.