JUDGMENT 1. This is an appeal from an order of the District Judge of Dinajpur refusing Probate of a Will alleged to have been executed by one Nabin Chandra Saha. The Will is dated the 4th March 1899, and was registered at the Sub-Registry Office at Dinajpur on the same day. The testator was identified by one Rash Behary Saha who signed his name at the time of registration below the registration endorsement. Rash Behary says that he identified Nabin and that Nabin admitted before him the fact of his having executed, the document. Three of the attesting witnesses have been examined, namely, Monohur Lall Roy, Rai Kanta Saha and Mohini Mohun Saha. Rai Kanta is interested as he is nearly related to the remainderman under the Will and the applicant for probate. Monohur, who was; a pleader's Taid, says that Nabin signed the Will in his presence and he signed name in the presence of Nabin. In his cross-examination, he says that the other witnesses did not sign in his presence. But he was not further cross-examined, and it does not appear that he remained at the spot where the transaction took place after he put his own signature. He might have gone away; but the other witnesses say that the Will was executed in their presence and that they signed in the presence of the testator. The learned Judge is not very decisive in his opinion, but it is obvious having special regard to the fact that the Will was registered and that the testator died five years after the execution, that the Will was properly attested. The fact that the Will was executed and was properly attested was not very seriously disputed. The only matter with reference to which the learned Judge thought that probate should not be granted was that, in his opinion, the execution of the Will had been obtained by such importunity as took away the free agency of the testator. He concludes his judgment by referring to sec. 48 of the Indian Succession Act, and he thought that the testator was induced by importunity to make a Will in favour of his son-in-law in reversion to his widow. 2. Now, it does not appear that the testator was ill at or about the time the Will was executed. It does not also appear that he was a man of weak intellect. 2. Now, it does not appear that the testator was ill at or about the time the Will was executed. It does not also appear that he was a man of weak intellect. There is no evidence to show that he was pressed in any way to make the Will. But even if under pressure from his son-in-law, whom he had kept as ghur jamai, he executed the Will in his favour in reversion to his wife to whom he gave a life-estate, we do not see why the Will would be invalid on that ground alone. " Importunity, in its legal acceptation," says Sir Roland Williams. " must be in such a decree as to take away from the testator free agency; it must be such importunity as he is too weak to resist; such as will render the act, no longer the act of the deceased, the free act of a capable testator, in order to invalidate the instrument." In Hall v. Hall L. R. 1 Pro. and Div. 481 (1868), it was held that " importunity must be such as the testator has not the courage to resist the moral command asserted and yielded to for the sake of peace and quiet or of escaping from distress of mind or social discomfort." The case that one must make out under the last part of sec. 48 is that the testator had not free volition. There is no evidence to prove that the testator was not a free agent and that such a pressure was put upon him as he was unable to resist. 3. Illus. (g) and (h) to sec. 48 of the Indian Succession Act practically lay down the rule which should guide all Courts on the question of importunity. These illustrations indicate the law as stated in Williams on Executors and Administrators. An attempt has been made by the learned vakil for the Respondent to show that the Will has not been proved to have been executed by the testator at a time when he was free from coercion or undue influence. The question of onus probandi, however, does not arise in this case. Evidence has been gone into in this case on both sides. The question of onus probandi, however, does not arise in this case. Evidence has been gone into in this case on both sides. The testator was in good health and capable in mind and, as has been pointed out by the Judicial Committee in the case of Rash Mohini Dasi v. Umesh Chandra Biswas ILR 25 Cal. 824 (1898) if the allegation be that the testator was incapable of making a Will, or that pressure was put upon him, it is ordinarily for the person making such allegation to make it out. If the testator was in a sound state of body and mind the presumption is that he executed the Will without coercion or undue influence. Moreover, in this case, the testator had legal advice, and the pleader Rai Kanta Saha says that he made the draft after hearing from the mouth of the testator. We are, therefore, of opinion that the judgment of the lower Court cannot be sustained, and we direct that probate be granted to the applicant. The appeal is accordingly decreed with costs. We direct that the costs both in the lower Court and in this Court come out of the estate. We assess the pleader's fee at two gold mohurs.