JUDGMENT Maclean, C.J. - The questions submitted to us are the following: ILR 25 Cal. 409 (1897) " whether when the name of an assignor is removed from the record of a suit, and that of an assignee is substituted in its place, the provisions of sec. 22 of the Limitation Act are applicable ILR 5 Cal. 720 (1880). whether the case of Harak Chand v. Deonath Sahay I. L. R. 25 Cal. 409 (1897). or that of Suput Singh v. Imrit Tewari I. L. R. 5 Cal. 720 (1880). has been correctly decided?" I think that the first question ought to be answered in the affirmative, and that as between the two cases referred to in the second question, the decision in Harak Chand v. Deonath Sahay I. L. R. 25 Cal. 409 (1897). ought to prevail. If a person who has not been on the record is substituted as a Plaintiff in the place of the original Plaintiff under sec. 372 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the person so substituted must be taken to be brought on the record subject to the law of limitation applicable to the case. There is nothing in sec. 372 of the Code to exclude the operation of sec. 22 of the Limitation Act. and if We look at the latter section we find that if a new Plaintiff is substituted,-which must mean a person who has not before been a Plaintiff-" the suit shall, as regards him, be deemed to have been instituted when he was made a party." The language of the section is perfectly clear and unequivocal. The only exception is that contained in the two provisos which refer to the legal representatives of a deceased Plaintiff or Defendant, as the case may be. There is no exception in the case of an assignee. By the provisos the Legislature has pointed out that the legal representative of either a deceased Plaintiff or Defendant shall not be regarded as a new Plaintiff or Defendant: this, by implication, indicates, that in all other cases the person substituted is to be regarded as a new Plaintiff. As the case of an assignee does not fall within the provisos, I think that sec. 22 of the Limitation Act is applicable and that the questions should be answered in the manner I have indicated. As the case of an assignee does not fall within the provisos, I think that sec. 22 of the Limitation Act is applicable and that the questions should be answered in the manner I have indicated. Harington, J. In this case a suit was instituted on a mortgage bond 11 days before the expiry of the period of limitation. 2. Long after the period of limitation had expired the Plaintiff assigned his rights under the mortgage bond to Dr. Abdul Rahman and Shaikh Yad Ali and then-names have been substituted for that of the original Plaintiff which has been struck off the record. 3. The question is-are the substituted Plaintiffs barred by limitation. 4. Under sec. 22 of the Limitation Act when after the institution of a suit a new Plaintiff is substituted, the suit shall as regards him be deemed to have been instituted when he was so made a party. But it is contended for the Plaintiffs that " new Plaintiff" in this section means a Plaintiff who can set up a new case-and that inasmuch as they are bound by the case set up by their assignor and are carrying on by leave of the Court the suit instituted by him they are not new Plaintiffs. 5. If this argument were sound there would be no need for the proviso to sec. 22 which declares an exception to the rule laid down in the first para, of the section. It enacts that when a Plaintiff dies and the suit is continued by his legal representative, it shall as regards him be deemed to have been instituted when it was instituted by the deceased Plaintiff. The personal representative of a deceased Plaintiff is just as much bound by the original Plaintiff's case as is an assignee-and if an express proviso was necessary to take the personal representative out of the section-then express proviso was equally necessary to take the assignee out of the section. 6. Next it is argued that sec. 372 of the Code overrides sec. 22 of the Limitation Act. No intention that it should override sec. 22, Limitation Act, is expressed and a comparison of the other sections shows that it does not. 7. For example, sec. 6. Next it is argued that sec. 372 of the Code overrides sec. 22 of the Limitation Act. No intention that it should override sec. 22, Limitation Act, is expressed and a comparison of the other sections shows that it does not. 7. For example, sec. 365 lays down the procedure to be followed in case of the death of a Plaintiff-and directs that the Court shall enter on the record the name of the legal repesentative in place of the deceased Plaintiff, and proceed in the suit. 8. This section clearly does not override sec. 22, if it did, there would have been no need for the proviso 4 fortiori sec. 372 which provides that a suit may be continued with the leave of the Court by the assignee cannot be said to override it. 9. In effect the Plaintiff contends that an assignee is qua sec. 22 of the Limitation Act, in the same position as the representative of a deceased Plaintiff. This cannot be as the proviso to that section which saves limitation in the case of the personal representative of a deceased Plaintiff does not confer that benefit on an assignee. 10. For these reasons, I am of opinion that the suit is barred by limitation and I think that the case of Harak Chand v. Deonath Sahay I. L. R. 25 Cal. 409 (1897) was rightly decided. 11. The case of Suput Singh v. Imrit Tewari I. L. R. 5 Cal. 720 (1880) is not inconsistent with that case-because in it the Plaintiffs were added, not substituted, for the original Plaintiffs. The suit therefore could not be dismissed as barred by limitation, for the original Plaintiffs who ex hypothesis had sued within time remained upon the record. The case, therefore, is distinguishable from Harak Chand's case I. L. R. 25 cal. 409 (1897). Brett, J. 12. I agree in answering the questions in the manner in which the learned Chief Justice has answered them and for the reasons given in his judgment. Mitra, J. 13. I agree. Geidt, J. 14. So do I. THE COURT.- The result is that the appeal must be dismissed with costs including the costs of this reference.