JUDGMENT Caspersz, J. - The subject of this litigation is a mehal, or certain landed property, called mehal noabad taraf Joy Narain Ghosal situated in. the district of Chittagong. Noabad, means, literally, newly cultivated land; but, in the district of Chittagong, it has acquired a peculiar significance; for there it means all lands not measured in the original measurement of 1126 Maghi corresponding with 1764 A.D. So, also, the word "taraf" which implies a permanently settled estate with reference to the Permanent Settlement of Lord Cornwallis means, in Chittagong, an estate measured, in 1126 Maghi (1764 A.D.) and afterwards permanently settled under the Regulations of 1793. Joy Narain Ghosal, the name appearing in the expression noabad taraf Joy Narain Ghosal, was the original owner of the property in the Eighteenth Century. The history of this mehal may be gathered from Vol. II, pp. 156 to 162 of the Reports of Select Cases determined in the Sudder Dewany Adawlut-the judgment of that Court, bearing date the 30th August 1815, having been passed in a suit against Government instituted by certain members of the family of the said Joy Narain Ghosal,-and our attention has been called to Mr. H.J.S. Cotton's memorandum of the Revenue History of Chittagong (1880) and to a volume of correspondence on the settlement of the noabad lands published by the Bengal Government in the year 1889. We have, also, referred to a decision of this Court in the case of Prosunno Coomer Boy v. The Secretary of State for India in Council ILR 26 Cal. 792 (1899), which, though it deals with the resettlement of a certain taluk or tenure, in thana Ramoo not forming part of the property now in suit, and cannot in any way conclude the determination of the questions arising in the present appeals, does afford some assistance in dealing with the revenue peculiarities of the district. 2. The district of Chittagong was ceded to the East India Company under the 5th Article of the treaty concluded with Meer Cassim on the 22nd September 1760: a Council was constituted for the administration thereof with Mr. Harry Verelst as its chief; and Gokul Chandra Ghosal, uncle of Jay Narain Ghosal, was the Dewan of the first Chief of Chittagong. The district of Chittagong was ceded to the East India Company under the 5th Article of the treaty concluded with Meer Cassim on the 22nd September 1760: a Council was constituted for the administration thereof with Mr. Harry Verelst as its chief; and Gokul Chandra Ghosal, uncle of Jay Narain Ghosal, was the Dewan of the first Chief of Chittagong. On the 12th May 1761, the Chittagong Council resolved, and issued a proclamation to the effect that, in order to reclaim the vast quantity of wast a lands in the district, special terms would be granted to whatever person would undertake the clearing of such lands. On the 19th September 1763, as it appears from the proceedings of the same Council, Joy Narain Ghosal attended and informed the Council that he had undertaken the clearing and cultivation of lands in many different places agreeably to the several different sanads granted to him for that purpose and the Council "agreed that, as an encouragement to his industry all such lands as have been cleared by the aforesaid Joy Narain Ghosal be made a zamindari, and be, in future, designated the noabad lands, forming part of the zamindari of Joynuggur, ordered also, that a sanad be given to him for the same." We should here mention that at the time in question Joy Narain Ghosal was also the proprietor of certain tarafs, the revenue of his tarafs having been permanently fixed from the time of the Moghul Government. It so happened that the family of Gokul Chandra Ghosal claimed the whole of the waste lands in the district of Chittagong as part and parcel of the Joynuggur zamindari to which we have just referred, and the origin of their claim was a sanad purporting to have been granted by Mr. Verelst, in May 1760, to the said Joy Narain Ghosal, nephew of his Dewan. The newly cultivated lands were periodically measured and the jama or rental payable in respect of such lands continued to increase though the revenue of the torafs remained constant, and, in the year 1791, Joy Narain Ghosal executed one kistibundi for all his lands, whether tarafs or noabad. Such was the position of affairs when the Permanent Settlement was effected. 3. Such was the position of affairs when the Permanent Settlement was effected. 3. In the year 1796, the claims preferred by the family of Gokul Chandra Ghosal came under strict scrutiny, and, on the receipt of certain information from the Collector of the District, the Board of Revenue required the production of the original sanad. A sanad was accordingly produced by the son of Gokul Chandra Ghosal. It was then discovered that this sanab was a forgery and, eventually, the whole of the noabad lands in the district were resumed in the year 1800. This resumption led to a suit in the year 1804 the Plaintiffs being the widow of Gokul Chandra Ghosal and the three widows of his three sons. They claimed to recover "the lands designated noabad forming part of Pergunnah Joynuggur in the district of Chittagong, comprising 906 mouzas and measuring 11,583 doons " odd. The suit was eventually decreed in the year 1815, but for an area of 3,501 doons, 11 gundas, 2 cowries only; and the Court, after mentioning this area, went on to observe as follows:-"The original Jarib and Jamabandi of 1126 Maghi and the copies thereof have not been received by this Court. Therefore, the area of lands to which the Respondents (Plaintiffs) are entitled cannot be definitely found out unless the Jarib and Jamabandi of the said year, which are in the Collector's office, are examined. After making an enquiry thereabout such lands as shall on taking into consideration the above points, specially the provisions of sec. 2, Reg. III of 1793 and sec. 2, Reg. II of 1805, be found to be hasila (cultivated and khila (waste) land of the disputed noabad land and to belong according to the Jarib made in 1126 Maghi corresponding to 1764 A.D., i.e., before the Dewani of the E.I. Company to the zamindari Joynuggur, shall be the property of the Respondents. III of 1793 and sec. 2, Reg. II of 1805, be found to be hasila (cultivated and khila (waste) land of the disputed noabad land and to belong according to the Jarib made in 1126 Maghi corresponding to 1764 A.D., i.e., before the Dewani of the E.I. Company to the zamindari Joynuggur, shall be the property of the Respondents. It is, therefore, decreed and finally ordered that the decree of the 2nd Judge of the Provincial Court of Jahangirnagar, dated the 18th February 1813 A.D., "be modified and amended; that such of the hasila and khila lands out of the lands in dispute as may according to the Jarib of 1126 Maghi be found to appertain to the zamindari Joynuggur and to have been in the possession of the ancestor of the Respondents be given to the Respondents in execution of this decree and that the Respondents be put in possession thereof; that the Respondents will duly collect rents from the Talukdars in the mofussil and pay the revenue to the E. I. Company. If, in the decennial settlement in which the settlement of the disputed and other lands of the zamindari Joynuggur is included, a separate permanent settlement at ten years' jama has been made according to the law in respect of the land which under this decree has become the right of the Respondents and has been put in the possession of the Respondents, then such settlement shall remain intact; but if no separate settlement has been made in respect of the land awarded to the " Respondents, then the Collector of the district of Chittagong will, according to law, assess revenue thereon." 4. Pausing here for one moment, we observe that the measurement of 1126 Maghi, or 1764 A.D., to which the Sudder Dewany Adawlut referred, is an admitted epoch in the land revenue history of the district. It was effected within four years of the arrival of the Chittagong Council: the quantity of noabad land then ascertained to be in the possession of Joy Narain Ghosal was 3,501 doons, 9 cawnies, 3 cowries, and the Government dues on those lands, after deduction of certain proprietary perquisites, amounted to Arcott Rs. 5,781 at Rs. 11-2-10 per hasila drone. 5. We pass over what happened during the years 1815 to 1841. 5,781 at Rs. 11-2-10 per hasila drone. 5. We pass over what happened during the years 1815 to 1841. It is sufficient to say that the decree of the Sudder Court in favour of the Ghosals remained unexecuted, though thana Ramoo was settled in the year 1838. But, in the year 1841, Government resolved to carry out a complete survey and settlement of the Chittagong district excluding thana Ramoo, in order that both the decree might be executed and the revenue administration of the district placed on a proper footing. In the resolution of Government, dated the 14th February 1841, the objects with which the survey and settlement operations were undertaken were expressed to be the following: 1st.-To mark off and separate and assess and settle with the Ghosals the Joynuggur noabad lands measured in 1764 as their property; that is, to execute the decree of the Court of Sudder Dewany Adawlut passed in their favour on the 30th August 1815. 2ndly.-To mark off and separate, as well from the above lands as from the permanently settled mehals or tarafs with which they had been fraudulently incorporated, the noabad lands belonging to the Government under the decree of 1815 above alluded to, or under the interpretation put upon it, and to assess and settle those lands with the occupant Jungleboore Talukadrs. 3rdly.-To record finally the extent and boundaries of the permanently settled mehals or tarafs. 4thly.-To ascertain and define all rent-free holdings, valid and invalid, and to resume the latter and settle them with the occupant lakhirajdars under the rules in force. 6. We think it important to repeat that -as appears from the report of the case of Prosunno. Coomer Roy v. The Secretary of State for India in Council ILR 26 Cal. 792 (1899) one thana, namely, Ramoo had, previous to 1841, namely, in the years 1834-35, been surveyed, and the settlement resulting thereupon having been duly submitted to Government for sanction was sanctioned accordingly The orders on the subject were communicated to the local authorities on the 16th June 1838. It is necessary to keep this fact in view by way of differentiating the case of thana Ramoo from the survey and settlement of the rest of the district which, as we have already stated, was undertaken in the year 1841. The officer conducting the latter proceedings was Sir Henry Ricketts, Commissioner and Sudder Board, 16th Division. It is necessary to keep this fact in view by way of differentiating the case of thana Ramoo from the survey and settlement of the rest of the district which, as we have already stated, was undertaken in the year 1841. The officer conducting the latter proceedings was Sir Henry Ricketts, Commissioner and Sudder Board, 16th Division. 7. In the final report of Sir H. Ricketts, No. 566, dated the 2nd September 1848, it was mentioned that, in accordance with certain orders on the subject of this very Joynuggur mehal passed in the year 1837, it was determined that the rate per droon of assessment adopted in 1129 Maghi (1768 A.D.) Rs. 11-2-10 plus Rs. 4-13-2 malikana, total Rs. 16 should be maintained and " that such portion of the original lands as might not be capable of identification from the existing chittas of 1126 (1764 A.D.) should be made up by an equal portion from the Government noabad lands." The proposals of Sir Henry Ricketts- which were duly sanctioned-had the ultimate effect, as will appear hereafter, of fully executing the decree of 1815,- the rate of assessment adopted in respect of the lands of the Joynuggur noabad mehal being Rs. 12-10-9 instead of Rs. 16 though certain charges in the nature of malikana were calculated, on the higher rate, in the manner explained in the 22nd para. of the Final Report. Sir Henry Ricketts also proposed, and that proposal was approved, that the period of the lease should be for fifty years. But, as a matter of fact, the settlement was not completed until the 6th December 1852, and even subsequent to that date certain small modifications in the jama were introduced. 8. The kabuliyat bearing date the 6th December 1852 was executed by two ladies, one Tarak Nath Bose on behalf of Srimati Bama Sundari Debi and Sreemati Sarashibala Debi, heiresses to Ladli Mohon Tagore who then represented the estate of the decree-holders, that estate being also in the charge of a Receiver of the Supreme Court who executed an ekranama in favour of Government signifying his assent to the kabuliyat. The kabuliyat recited the decree of 1815 and purported to be in the nature of a complete satisfaction of that decree. It concludes with these words:-"This settled jama will continue for a term of fifty years from the Bengali year 1259 to the Bengal year 1308. The kabuliyat recited the decree of 1815 and purported to be in the nature of a complete satisfaction of that decree. It concludes with these words:-"This settled jama will continue for a term of fifty years from the Bengali year 1259 to the Bengal year 1308. The profits which will be increased at our exertion during this term will be ours; Government will have no concern with the same." We should also mention that the kabuliyat purported to confirm the enjoyments and possession of the mehal to the lessees and their sons and grandsons and others by succession. To the same effect is the ladabinama, of the same date, wherein the same two ladies admitted that they had obtained full satisfaction of the claim they had against Government by virtue of the decree of 1815. 9. We pass on to the sale certificate, dated the 6th July 1880, and the rubakari of the Collector of Chittagong dated the 1st December 1880. It appears that, on the 29th March 1880, the mehal in question, which is described in the sale certificate as " mehal noabad taraf Joy Narain Ghosal decree of Rajeswari Debya and others," and belonging to the Hindustan, China and Japan Bank, was sold for arrears of revenue under Act XI of 1859 and Act VII of 1868 and purchased by Ram Kamal Saha, the predecessor-in-interest of the present Plaintiffs. 10. The mehal was regarded by the revenue authorities as liable to resettlement in the year 1902, that is, fifty years after the date of the kabuliyat of 1852. Steps were accordingly taken to effect a resettlement. The revenue was raised to Rs. 13,176 and the Plaintiffs brought their action on the 29th July 1903. They claimed that the lands in suit were included in their auction-purchased maliki taraf Joy Narain Ghosal covered by the decree of Rajeswari Debi and others. They resisted the resettlement proceedings, denied that they were bound by the kabuliyat dated the 6th December 1852, pleaded estoppel, and, in the alternative, they prayed that the Court might declare the incidents of their estate, including the principles on which waste lands might be liable to assessment, and that the measurement effected by Government was incorrect. They resisted the resettlement proceedings, denied that they were bound by the kabuliyat dated the 6th December 1852, pleaded estoppel, and, in the alternative, they prayed that the Court might declare the incidents of their estate, including the principles on which waste lands might be liable to assessment, and that the measurement effected by Government was incorrect. The defence of the Secretary of State for India in Council, in effect, was that the mehal not being a permanently settled estate, as alleged by the Plaintiffs, was liable to be resettled on the expiration of the term of 50 years specified in the kabuliyat of 1852 which the Defendant urged was a valid and binding document. The learned Subordinate Judge has found-"the estate in question is not a permanently settled estate and Government is entitled to make a fresh assessment after the expiration of the terra of the kabuliyat of 6th December 1852, that the decree of the Sudder Dewany Adawlut does not touch the question of the permanency or otherwise of the jama fixed for the lands which were decreed to the Ghosals, that there is no estoppel and neither party is estopped from showing the true state of things as regards the liability of this estate to fresh assessment, that the kabuliyat of 1852 was validly executed and is binding on the Plaintiffs, that the effect of this kabuliyat and kistibundi as regards the liability of this estate to fresh assessment is simply to empower the Government to assess the uncultivated lands shown in the kabuliyat as they are reclaimed and confers no other right on the Government, that the lands which were cultivated lands in 1852 are not liable to be freshly assessed and that only the 2,1273/4 drones of khila or uncultivated lands mentioned in the kabuliyat are liable to be assessed at the rate of Rs. 12-10-9 minus Rs. 4-13-2 malikana or Rs. 7-13-7 per drone " as they are brought into cultivation and that rate cannot be exceeded." The learned Subordinate Judge also directed that, in view of the admitted fact that the measurement made by Government in order to assess this estate was defective, the lands would have to be measured again before a fresh assessment could be imposed. 11. 7-13-7 per drone " as they are brought into cultivation and that rate cannot be exceeded." The learned Subordinate Judge also directed that, in view of the admitted fact that the measurement made by Government in order to assess this estate was defective, the lands would have to be measured again before a fresh assessment could be imposed. 11. Both the Plaintiffs and the Defendant have preferred separate appeals to this Court, and the grounds respectively urged by them embrace the questions arising out of the history of the mehal noabad taraf Joy Narain Ghosal. 12. We desire, in limine, to correct a mistaken idea in the judgment of the learned Subordinate Judge; that officer gives his reasons for arriving at the conclusion that mehal noabada taraf Joy Narain Ghosal is a noabad taraf called by the name of Joy Narain Ghosal and that it is not a noabad mehal annexed to the taraf called by the name of Joy Narain Ghosal. The explanation, however, is opposed to the contentions of either party to this litigation. The Plaintiffs regard the property in suit as part of their permanently settled taraf; the Defendant says the mehal consists of noabad lands temporarily settled, liable to periodical resettlement like other noabad lands in the district of Chittagong, and merely 'annexed to' taraf Joy Narain Ghosal for convenience or by way of description only. It is perfectly clear to us that neither the property with which we are now concerned nor any property can be a 'noabad taraf.' The two words are repugnant to one another. They would imply the existence of a property which is both leasehold and freehold, in a class to which no other properties belong in the district of Chittagong. No doubt, the mere fact that the mehal is a noabad mehal does not necessarily attach to it the incidents of ordinary noabad properties of later creation. And the reason is not far to seek. It is the only mehal of the kind with a special history of its own and resting on the basis of the decree of the Sudder Dewany Adawlut. And the reason is not far to seek. It is the only mehal of the kind with a special history of its own and resting on the basis of the decree of the Sudder Dewany Adawlut. We are not here dealing with the shikmi or subordinate tenures held by Talukdars in noabad or taraf land under the Joynuggur zemindars; we are only dealing with the superior right of the Plaintiffs in respect of the noabad property for which they are liable to pay rent or revenue to Government. So far as the proprietary night is concerned, the various noabad properties in the district of Chittagong, including the noabad property recognized by the decree of 1815, are all on a similar footing, that is to say, the Talukdars have to pay rent or revenue to Government. But the incidents of these different holdings may vary very greatly. We have already alluded to the taluk in thana Ramoo which was dealt with by this Court in the case of Prasunno Coomer Hoy v. The Secretary of State far India in Council ILR 26 Cal. 792 (1899). There are thousands of other taluks including the noabad property which is the subject-matter of the present litigation. Having regard to the admitted facts and the pleadings of the parties in the case, we unhesitatingly hold that mehal noabad, taraf Joy Narain Ghosal, is not a taraf property nor a noabad taraf. What may be the incidents and nature of the tenure of that property, we must now proceed to determine. 13. The case of this mehal noabad taraf Joy Narain Ghosal does not present the difficulties involved in the case of the noabad taluk in thana Ramoo because there is ample direct documentary evidence, including the decree of 1815, for our consideration. 14. The substantial contention on behalf of the Plaintiffs-Appellants, in Appeal No. 585 of 1904, is that, on the expiration of the fifty years' term imposed by the kabuliyat of 1852, the parties were relegated to their position under the decree of 1816 according to which, it is urged, the Plaintiffs are entitled to a permanent settlement similar to that bestowed on the taraf lands held by Joy Narain Ghosal in 1791 when he executed a kistibundi for the whole of his taraf and noabad lands. We, however, are unable to accept this view of the case. We, however, are unable to accept this view of the case. The decree directed a separate assessment to be made. It is impossible to obliterate the history of the mehal since the Sudder Dewany Adawlut decree was passed, to ignore proceedings and contracts, and to execute again a decree of which, sixty years ago, it was written:-" At length, then the decree of 1815, after thirty-three years of most embarrassing and harassing measures, will be executed. Though the operations have cost fifteen lakhs of rupees, nevertheless, apart from all other considerations, the settlement of the whole district was a most wise measure. The decree never could have been executed by any other means; each attempt would have been more disastrous than the proceeding; and final adjustment would have been more distant now than it was in 1816 ' (p. 9, Noabad Correspondence). In our opinion, the claim to a permanent settlement was finally set at rest by the kabuliyat and the documents leading up and arising out of the same though, doubtless, reference may be properly made to the decree and judgment of 1815 in order to ascertain what are the precise terms of the arrangement arrived at in 1852. 15. Now, it is obvious that the parties in 1852 must have had in their contemplation some further proceedings to be taken fifty years after that year: otherwise, no term would have been fixed in the kabuliyat. As we read the kabuliyat, the decree, and other papers in the case, and having regard to the familiar principles of junglebooree settlements deducible from the evidence before us, we think that the parties intended that the demise by Government would be permanent, the lessees being entitled to enjoyment and possession of the mehal with their sons, grandsons and others with the power of making gifts and alienations, that the condition as to payment of revenue at Rs. 9,226-1-7 should remain unvaried for fifty years and that, during that period, any increased profits obtained by the exertion of the lessees should go to them and their heirs; but that after fifty years, the revenue would be re-assessed. It is obvious that the parties intended that the khila (uncultivated) land brought into cultivation in the interval should be assessed by Government at the rate originally applicable to the hasila (cultivated) area. This is the view adopted by the learned Subordinate Judge. It is obvious that the parties intended that the khila (uncultivated) land brought into cultivation in the interval should be assessed by Government at the rate originally applicable to the hasila (cultivated) area. This is the view adopted by the learned Subordinate Judge. We think it is a perfectly correct view on the evidence. It is not to be supposed for one moment that though the Collector was directed by the decree of 1815 to assess revenue according to law on the lands decreed, and did so assess it, the parties meant, or were legally entitled, to have the question of the rate of assessment reopened after fifty years. If, therefore, that question was finally settled in 1852, the only other question remaining for decision after the lapse of the term of settlement, or lease, must be the question of cultivated area. To the new area under cultivation must be applied, in some way, the rate ascertained and imposed in 1852. This, as it seems to us, is the only serious point arising in the appeals before us. 16. The learned Advocate-General, however, has invited us to hold that the force and vigour of the permanent settlement regulations were completely exhausted in the year 1815; that, therefore, the decree of the Sudder Dewany Adawlut could not impose, and was not intended to impose, a permanent settlement on the decretal lands; and that Government can, from time to time, assess the lands of mehal noabad taraf Joy Narain Ghosal at any fair rate found applicable according to law. We think there is considerable force in the general proposition. But it does not, in our opinion, touch or impair the position and rights (to certain ascertained lands) of the decree-holders. That position was defined, and those rights were finally determined, by the proceedings of Sir Henry Ricketts sanctioned by Government and embodied in a lease in accordance with which, and the ladabinama (of the same date), the decree was acknowledged and deemed to have been fully satisfied. As a result, neither party is at liberty to go behind the kabuliyat of the 6th December 1852, all that can be done is to complete the assessment in respect of such lands as were incapable of being assessed in the former proceedings and to give their proper effect to the principles then adopted. 17. As a result, neither party is at liberty to go behind the kabuliyat of the 6th December 1852, all that can be done is to complete the assessment in respect of such lands as were incapable of being assessed in the former proceedings and to give their proper effect to the principles then adopted. 17. In the foregoing observations, we have assumed that the kabuliyat and all its connected documents were duly and validly executed. We now record our finding to that effect. These facts have not been seriously challenged before us. The only other argument that calls for notice in this part of the case is the argument of learned Counsel for the Plaintiffs, that his clients purchased the mehal in the year 1880 as the mehal covered by the decree of 1815. This, however, was not the fact. The words covered by do not occur an the sale certificate or the rubakari of the Collector of Chittagong. What was sold was a noabad property bearing a certain number, and having its origin in "the decree of Rajeswari Debya and others." The words" decree of Rajeswari Debya and others" were put in, it appears to us, merely as descriptive of the noabad annexed to taraf Joy Narain Ghosal and not as a definition connoting the nature of the rights of the defaulter. The Collector gave no guarantee, he had no power to give any such undertaking, that the purchaser was entitled to the lands actually decreed by the Sudder Dewany Adwalut in 1815, nothing of the kind appears on the face of the sale certificate or the rubakari of the Collector. The property sold in the year 1880 was (in spite of certain small modifications in the jama) identical with the property leased in 1852 and the purchaser acquired no better title than that of the original and puisne lessees. The lease of 1852, however, provided that that arrears of revenue should be realized under Act I of 1845. The sale held in the year 1880 was in accordance with the provisions of the laws then applicable, namely, Act XI of 1859 and Act VII of 1868. The lease of 1852, however, provided that that arrears of revenue should be realized under Act I of 1845. The sale held in the year 1880 was in accordance with the provisions of the laws then applicable, namely, Act XI of 1859 and Act VII of 1868. This circumstance, and the treatment of the mehal by Government Officers who levied Dak cess on it, and in other respects regarded it as a mehal having certain affinities with the parent taraf, fortify us in the view that we have already expressed that the revenue in 1852 was fixed on the hasila area in perpetuity. To this extent therefore the argument of Mr. Sinha is justified by the facts of the case. But we cannot regard the mehal in suit as part and parcel of the real taraf Joy Nararin Ghosal which has a different number (1270) and was never sold to the Plaintiffs in 1880. The distinction was thus referred to by Sir Henry Ricketts in paragraph 36 of his report. "The noabad land found in the possession of a tarafdar has been made a separate noabad taluk distinct from the taraf. The noabad land has not been added to the taraf and made one estate, with a proportionately increased sudder jama, because such a course of proceeding would be to part with the zamindari tenure in noabad land and to assess the noabad land in perpetuity against both which measures there are orders of the Hon'ble Court of Directors, not relating especially to these noabad lands, but general orders prohibiting the sale of land, and assessment in perpetuity." 18. We now revert to a consideration of what we have already called the only serious point in this case-in what way should the area brought under cultivation since 1852 be assessed? The learned Subordinate Judge has accepted the standard rate of assessment for noabad land as Rs. 16 per droon (Rs. 2-4-6 per acre). He has also accepted the reduced rate, Rs. 12-10-9 allowed by Sir Henry Ricketts, but from that rate he has subtracted Rs. 4-13-2, by way of Malikana, and the resultant rate, namely, Rs. 7-13-7 per droon, he has declared to be assessable on the area (2,1273/4 droons) recorded as khila and culturable in the kabuliyat of 1852. 19. He has also accepted the reduced rate, Rs. 12-10-9 allowed by Sir Henry Ricketts, but from that rate he has subtracted Rs. 4-13-2, by way of Malikana, and the resultant rate, namely, Rs. 7-13-7 per droon, he has declared to be assessable on the area (2,1273/4 droons) recorded as khila and culturable in the kabuliyat of 1852. 19. It appears to us that the learned Subordinate Judge has misunderstood the principles enunicated by Sir Henry Ricketts in the 18th and following paragraphs of his report. No doubt, the lands allotted to the Ghosals in execution of the decree of 1815 were, in many villages, the worst lands; but Sir Henry Ricketts explained that such was not the case in every village, and his description would not apply to the khila lands; for until reclamation, it could not be said or ascertained whether they were good or bad lands. 20. We may here cite the 22nd, 23rd and 24th paras, of the report:-"22. The present proprietors have only themselves to blame if in some places bad land has been assigned to their mehal instead of good land; nevertheless, under all the circumstances of the case, especially with reference to the 10th para, of the orders of Government, dated the 29th August 1837, I propose that the loss occasioned by our assessment, being short of Rs. 16, should fall on the Government and that their income from the estate should be the same as it would have been had we imposed Rs. 16 per droon on each Talukdar, as was contemplated in 1837. The account will then stand thus:-Actual Mafussil assessment, as shown above, Rs. 18,762-7-1 Malikana to zemindar being the sum he would have had, had our assessment been Rs. 16 per droon Rs. 9,536-5-6. Government revenue Rs. 9,226-1-7 "23 The period of lease I propose to be fifty years of the waste land. Only 26 droons are reported fit for cultivation, without some unlooked for change in the value of produce should take place, no increase can be imposed on this mehal." "24. But I would grant these very favourable terms only on condition that the zemindars, within two months from the date on which the orders on this letter may reach Chittagong, file a receipt in full of all demands in the Civil Court and also in the Collectorship and take possession of the allotted lands. But I would grant these very favourable terms only on condition that the zemindars, within two months from the date on which the orders on this letter may reach Chittagong, file a receipt in full of all demands in the Civil Court and also in the Collectorship and take possession of the allotted lands. Should they fail to furnish this proof of their acceptance of these terms as a final adjustment of this long pending dispute, the question of amount of Malikana to be open to reconsideration." 21. These proposals were sanctioned by Government in the following terms: The terms proposed by you in paras. 22 to 24 of your report, in favour of the proprietors of the Joynuggur mehal, liberal as they are, will be confirmed by Government if those proprietors perform the condition annexed by you to your recommendation, otherwise the amount of Malikana to be allowed will be reconsidered. On this point, a report must be submitted hereafter. 22. In our opinion, therefore, there is no sufficient reason for departing from the standard noabad rate, Rs. 16 per droon, deliberately fixed by Government and accepted by the proprietors of taraf Joy Narain Ghosal as the rate on which their Malikana allowance was calculated at Rs. 4-13-2 per droon. The rate of assessment under the kubuliyat of 1852 was Rs. 12-10-9 per droon for the special reason that, though the rate of 1793 was Rs. 16 per droon, settlements had been made with the subordinate Talukdars at Rs. 12-10-9. The special reason for settlement at the reduced rate does not now exist with regard to lands which were khila but which since 1852 have become hasila. The rate of Rs. 16 per droon as the rate of 1793 would be the rate which was contemplated by the decree of 1815. Deducting therefore the Malikana at Rs. 4-13-2, the resultant rate would be Rs. 11-2-10 per droon which, however, must be understood to be the maximum rate. As regards the lands brought under cultivation since 1852, the Plaintiffs are not entitled to the benefit of the reduced rate which, in certain special circumstances, was fixed in the middle of the last century. We, therefore, maintain the rate of Rs. 16 inclusive of Malikana charges: The resultant rate being Rs. 11-2-10 per droon which, however, as already indicated, must be understood to be a maximum. We, therefore, maintain the rate of Rs. 16 inclusive of Malikana charges: The resultant rate being Rs. 11-2-10 per droon which, however, as already indicated, must be understood to be a maximum. Subject to this modification, both the appeals are dismissed. The parties will bear their respective costs of this Court.