JUDGMENT 1. This is an appeal against two orders, dated the 10th and 17th November 1906, of the Subordinate Judge of Bhagalpur refusing to allow the Appellant to redeem the Respondent's mortgage. The Respondent was a first mortgagee. He sued to enforce his mortgage. The Appellant is the purchaser of the rights of the second mortgagee, the judgment-debtor, against whom the Respondent sought to execute his mortgage decree. At the time of the Respondent's application for execution, the Appellant had bought at an execution sale the rights of the second mortgagee, but the sale was not confirmed till the 9th January 1907. The Subordinate Judge in these circumstances refused to allow him to redeem the Respondent's mortgage because the Appellant had, as he said, no locus standi and the time for redeeming the Respondent's mortgage had expired. On behalf of the Appellant it is contended (1) that he had a vested title to the land, against all but "the parties to the suit and persons claiming through or under them," (2) that he had an equitable or inchoate title to the property which was perfected on the confirmation of the sale, and that this was sufficient to give him a title to redeem the first mortgage within the meaning of sec. 91 of the Transfer of Property Act. In support of this contention the cases of Dagdu v. Pancham Sing I. L. R. 17 Bom. 375 (1892). Chiddo v. Piari Lal I. L. R. 19 All. 188 (1896). Adhur Chunder v. Aghore Nath 2 C. W. N. 589 (1898). have been cited. 2. It is unnecessary for us to consider the first of these pleas, but we cannot but admit the force of the second. The Appellant had, we think, at the time of his application to redeem, an equitable or inchoate title to the property which was subsequently perfected and which equity may therefore regard as relating back to the time of the Appellant's purchase of the right of the second mortgage. 3. The Respondent's pleader urges that the time for redeeming the first mortgage under sec. 91 of the Transfer of Property Act was gone, that the Appellant can only stop the sale by paying in the decretal amount under sec. 291, C. P. C., and that the CPC has regard to legal and not to equitable or inchoate titles. 4. 3. The Respondent's pleader urges that the time for redeeming the first mortgage under sec. 91 of the Transfer of Property Act was gone, that the Appellant can only stop the sale by paying in the decretal amount under sec. 291, C. P. C., and that the CPC has regard to legal and not to equitable or inchoate titles. 4. It would seem to us that the Appellant can stay the sale and redeem the Respondents, if he can be regarded as a representative of the judgment-debtor within the meaning of sec. 244. Dr. Rash Behari Ghose for the Appellant urges on the authority of the case of Ishan Chunder Sirkar v. Beni Madhub Sirkar I. L. R. 24 Cal. 62 (1896), that the Appellant is the representative of the judgment-debtor as he is bound by the decree obtained by the Respondent against the second mortgagee. This contention would seem to be correct, for the Respondent's pleader admits that the Appellant is bound by the decree obtained by the decree-holder Respondent. Indeed, if the Appellant were held to be not so bound, there would be nothing to prevent his bringing a separate suit to redeem. 5. It being common ground to both parties that the Appellant is bound by the Respondent's decree, we think we must hold the Appellant to be the representative of the decree-holder judgment-debtor, viz, the second mortgagee, and therefore entitled to stop the sale by paying in the decretal amount with costs. 6. We are justified in the view we take by the decision in Hara Sankar Prosad v. Shew Gobind Shaw 4 C. W. N. 317: s. c. I. L. R. 27 Cal. 966 (1899). in which where in similar circumstances the purchasers of certain mortgaged property contended that they were not bound by the mortgage decree obtained by the Plaintiffs and were still entitled to redeem the property, it was held that they were bound by the mortgage decree, the principle of lis pendens applying to the case and that though their purchase of the property was not confirmed, they still could have redeemed the Plaintiffs' mortgage and as they did not do so, their right to redeem was gone. At page 972 of the report of this case it is said: "No doubt the sale to the Defendants did not, according to law, become final until it was confirmed under the orders of the Commissioner on the 11th March 1892, but there was nothing in law to prevent them from paying up the decree in favour of Hurbuns Sahai or depositing the money under protest. In that way they might have saved their equity of redemption, but they allowed the sale to take place, the result being that the Plaintiff acquired the property on the 5th March 1892." 7. We accordingly set aside the orders of the Subordinate Judge and direct him to allow the Appellant an opportunity of paying under sec. 291, C. P. C, the debt due to the Respondent as first mortgagee with costs. 8. This order carries cost which we assess at 5 gold mohurs. This rule issued at the instance of the Appellant which was ordered to be heard along with this appeal is discharged.