JUDGMENT 1. The present appeal arises out of a suit brought by the Plaintiff to recover a certain sum of money due on a mortgage-bond. The bond was executed by Defendant No. 1 as karta of the joint family governed by the Mitakshara law and it is stated in the plaint that the money borrowed under the bond was taken for the necessary expenses of the family. In the suit which the Plaintiffs have instituted on the bond, the other Defendants, who are sons of Defendant No. 1, have been made parties as required by sec. 85 of the Transfer of Property Act. In the Court of first instance the Defendants failed to put in any appearance and the suit was disposed of on the pleadings and on the evidence adduced by the Plaintiff. It was found that the bond was duly executed for consideration by Defendant No. 1 as karta of the family. It was also found that Defendants Nos. 2 to 4, the sons, had failed to support the case set up in their written statement that the money was borrowed for immoral purposes. The Subordinate Judge, therefore, gave the Plaintiffs the usual mortgage-decree against all the Defendants. 2. There was an appeal to the District Judge and he has set aside the judgment and decree of the Subordinate Judge holding that the suit was barred by limitation. The suit was in fact instituted more than six years after the due date under the bond and the District Judge has held on the authority of the case of Surja Prasad v. Golab Chand I. L. R. 27 Cal. 762 (1900) read with the Full Bench case of Luchmun Doss v. Giridhur Chowdhry I. L. R. 5 Cal. 855 (1880) that the Plaintiffs could not enforce the mortgage-bond against the Defendants Nos. 2 to 4 but could only proceed against them for breach of the contract entered into by their father, and that any suit brought against them was governed by the limitation provided by Art. 116 of Sch. II of the Indian Limitation Act. He, therefore, came to the conclusion that so far as Defendants Nos. 2 to 4 were concerned the suit was barred by limitation and he modified the decree of the lower Court by allowing a decree against the share of Defendant No. 1 alone and dismissed the suit as against the Defendants Nos. II of the Indian Limitation Act. He, therefore, came to the conclusion that so far as Defendants Nos. 2 to 4 were concerned the suit was barred by limitation and he modified the decree of the lower Court by allowing a decree against the share of Defendant No. 1 alone and dismissed the suit as against the Defendants Nos. 2 to 4. 3. Against that decision of the District Judge the Plaintiffs have appealed to this Court and it has been contended in support of the appeal that the District Judge has erred in law in holding that the limitation provided by Art. 116 of Sch. II of the Indian Limitation Act applied on the ground that the Plaintiff was not entitled under the law to enforce his mortgage against Defendants Nos. 2 to 4. It has been argued that the proper limitation for the suit was that provided by Art 132 of Sch. II of the Indian Limitation Act and that the Plaintiff was entitled under the law to enforce his mortgage against Defendants Nos. 2 to 4 as well as against their father, as they had failed to prove that the money in respect of which the mortgage-bond was executed was borrowed for immoral purposes. 4. It has been contended in support of the appeal that the law as laid down by a Full Bench of this Court in the case of Luchmun Das v. Giridhur Chowdhary I. L. R. 5 Cal. 855 (1880) is not now the law and that the decision, on which the learned District Judge relies, in the ease of Surja Prasad v. Golab Chand I. L. R. 27 Cal. 762 (1900) is not in accordance with the law as laid down by the Privy Council in later decisions. It is contended, and we think correctly, that under the law as it is to be understood from the later decisions of the Privy Council, where a debt has been incurred by the karta of a family governed by the, Mitakshara law for the purposes of the family, and the property of the family has been alienated to defray that debt, the sons cannot set up their rights against the purchaser unless they are able to prove that the money in respect of which the alienation was made was borrowed by the father for immoral purposes. The cases to which we refer are those of Musstt, Nanomi Babuasin v. Modun Mohun L. R. 13 I. A. 1 (1885) and Bhagbut Persad v. Girja Koer L. R. 15 I. A. 99 (1888). In the latter case it is distinctly laid down by their Lordships of the Privy Council that where sons claim against a purchaser of an ancestral estate under an execution against their father upon a debt contracted by him, it is necessary for the sons to prove that the debt was contracted for an immoral purpose, and it is not necessary for the creditors to show that there was a proper enquiry or to prove that money was borrowed in a case of necessity." We think that the principle laid down in these decisions of the Privy Council as applicable to cases of complete alienation must be held equally to apply to cases of partial alienations such as mortgages. We are of opinion under these circumstances that, as in this present case, the Defendants Nos. 2 to 4 failed to prove that the debt was contracted for immoral purposes, the District Judge erred in law in holding that the Plaintiffs were not entitled to enforce the mortgage-bond against them as well as against their father. 5. It has been urged on the other side that the sons would only be bound by the mortgage-bond provided it were proved that the debts for which the loan under that bond was taken were antecedent debts and it is argued that the decisions of this Court in the cases reported in Luchmun Dass v. Giridhur Chowdhry I. L. R. 5 Cal. 855 (1880), Khalilul Rahman v. Gobind Pershad I. L. R. 20 Cal. 328 (1892) and Surja Prasad v. Golab Chand I. L. R. 27 Cal. 762 (1900) support this contention It is also argued that the same view has been taken by a Full Bench of the Madras High Court in the case of Venkataramanaya Pantulu v. Vakataramana Doss Pantulu I. L. R. 29 Mad. 200 (1905). 6. We are of opinion, however, that the law as laid down by the Full Bench of this Court in the case reported in Luchmun Dass v. Giridhur Chowdhry I. L. R. 5 Cal. 200 (1905). 6. We are of opinion, however, that the law as laid down by the Full Bench of this Court in the case reported in Luchmun Dass v. Giridhur Chowdhry I. L. R. 5 Cal. 855 (1880) cannot be held to be any longer binding on us, in view of the later decisions of the Privy Council to which we have referred. It is true that the Madras High Court has taken the view that the mortgage-bond can only be enforced against the sons if it is proved that the debt under the bond was incurred to pay off antecedent debts. But we do not think that this decision is binding on us in the face of what appears to be the decision of the Privy Council in the cases to which we have referred and in which no distinction is made between debts incurred to pay, off antecedent debts and those incurred to meet present necessities. Nor do we think that we are bound by the case reported in Surja Prasad v. Golab Chand I. L. R. 27 Cal. 762 (1900) as that case does not appear to us to follow the principles laid down by the Privy Council. 7. We hold, therefore, that the grounds taken on behalf of the Respondents are invalid. We are of opinion that the view of law taken by the learned District Judge in first appeal cannot be supported and we hold that under the law the sons equally with their father are bound by the mortgage-bond executed by their father. We hold, therefore, that the limitation applicable to the case in respect of sons as well as in respect of the father was that provided by Art. 132 of Sch. II of the Limitation Act and that therfore the suit was within time. We, accordingly, set aside the judgment and decree of the District Judge and restore the judgment and decree of the Subordinate Judge with costs.