Judgement Appeal by special leave from a decree of the High Court (August 21, 1902), affirming a decree of the District Judge of South Arcot (October 23, 1900), which dismissed the appellants suit with costs. The suit was brought, under the circumstances stated in the judgment of their Lordships, for a declaration that the Vadagalai inhabitants of Tiruvendipuram are entitled to the right that no public worship or procession of Manavala Mahamuni or any other Tengalai idol shall take place in any of the streets of Tiruvendipuram, and consequent injunction. They alleged that a suit brought in 1828 by some Vadagalais, some of whom were ancestors of the plaintiffs, against the Tengalais for a similar injunction was followed by a decree dated October 12, 1840, which established their right practically as claimed by their present suit, and had the force of res judicata. The District Judge observed "Briefly plaintiffs claim may be summarized thus— " (a) The Vadagalai community has the absolute ownership of the village site of Tiruvendipuram. “ (b) If this is not proved it has, by special custom, a right to prevent the public worship of any antagonistic deity within the limits of the village site, including procession in streets. “ (c) Under the judgment (October 12, 1840) the dispute is irrevocably decided, at all events in so far as the deity Mahamuni is concerned.” With regard to (a), the learned judge decided that the Vadagalai community had failed to prove that they had the absolute ownership of the village site. With regard to (b), he held that the facts proved by the plaintiffs did not establish such a custom as the law, as it is now interpreted, would enforce. With regard to (c), he ruled that there was not that identity of parties and reliefs necessary to make the judgment dated October 12, 1840, operate as res judicata in the present suit. The High Court (see I. L. R. 26 Madr. 376) agreed with the District Judge that the appellants had not proved that the Vadagalais were the original owners of the village; that the custom set up was not reasonable nor valid in law; and that the matter was not res judicata. They said that a complete resume of the dispute was given in Sadagopachari v. Krishnamachari. (( 1889) I. L. R. 12 Madr. They said that a complete resume of the dispute was given in Sadagopachari v. Krishnamachari. (( 1889) I. L. R. 12 Madr. 356.) With regard to the custom relied on they said The plaintiffs " contend that such a custom is in accordance with Hindu feeling and the Shastras, and that it was recognized by the decree of the Sudder Adawlut in 1840, and that, since then, they have, until a few years ago, resisted every attempt of the Tengalais to conduct such processions and worship. The decree of the Sudder Adawlut was based on the opinion of the Hindu Pandits as to the Hindu law applicable to the case, but it cannot be denied that the law of British India, as laid down in later cases, is opposed to the view of the Pandits. As pointed out by this Court in Parthasaradi v. Chinna Krishna (( 1882) I. L. R. 5 Madr. 304-9.), following the decision of the Sudder Court—Sambalinga Moorty v. Vembarry Govinda Chetty (M. S. D. 1857, p. 219.)—the right to conduct religious processions in th« public streets is a right inherent in every person, provided he does not thereby invade the rights of property enjoyed by others, or cause a public nuisance, or interfere with the ordinary use of the streets by the public, and subject to such directions or prohibitions as may be issued by the magistrate to prevent obstructions to the thoroughfare or breaches of the public peace. In the present case it is not suggested that the plaintiffs have been prevented from exercising any right, or obstructed in the exercise of any right, by the defendants, nor is it alleged that the plaintiffs have suffered any injury or damage, save, perhaps, such moral or sentimental injury as might result from seeing a religious pro cession which one would rather not see, In the Full Bench case Sundram Chetti v. The Queen, Ponnusami Chetti v. The Queen (( 1883) I. L. R. 6 Madr. 203.) Turner C. J. is reported to have said With regard to privileges claimed on the ground of caste or creed, I may observe that they had their origin in times when a State religion influenced the public and private law of the country, and are hardly compatible with the principles which regulate British administration, the equal rights of all citizens, and the complete neutrality of the State in matters of religion. The members of one caste have not been allowed to restrict members of other castes from the free use of public thoroughfares. The pariah in Malabar is no longer excluded from Courts of justice. These are innovations, but the superseded usages are obviously condemned by the spirit of our laws. When anarchy or absolutism yield place to well-ordered liberty, change there must be, but change in a direction which should command the assent of the intelligence of the country. With regard to processions, if they are of a religious character, and the religious sentiment is to be considered, it is not less a hardship on the adherents of a creed that they should be compelled to intermit their worship at a particular point, than it is on the adherents of another creed that they should be compelled to allow the passage of such a procession past the temples they revere. But the prejudices of particular sects ought not to influence the law. A man may have just ground of complaint if he is compelled to recognize the sanctity claimed for a place as the seat of worship he believes to be false; he has no just ground of complaint if he is compelled to recognize the civil right of his fellow citizens to be protected from disturbance when they are assembled for public worship, unless indeed all recognition of public worship is repugnant to him. Again, assuming that the Courts were satisfied that a privilege had been duly acquired and that it was competent to them to recognize it, it must be remembered that it is based on custom and that custom is sound only when and so far as it is reasonable. It would have then to be considered whether it was reasonable to require persons exercising a natural right to abstain from its exercise when passing a place where no public worship was proceeding. " We think that these observations are appropriate to the present case. It would have then to be considered whether it was reasonable to require persons exercising a natural right to abstain from its exercise when passing a place where no public worship was proceeding. " We think that these observations are appropriate to the present case. "We do not think that the custom which the plaintiffs plead is a reasonable one or such as the Courts should recognize any more than the Courts would now recognize the practice widely prevalent in Malabar by which men of the Cheruman caste are obliged to leave the public road if they meet a man of the Nair caste on it. We have not been referred to a single reported case in which such a right of one sect to interdict a rival sect from the use of the public streets has been recognized by the superior Courts in India. Even in the case of the present disputantsthe decision of the Sudder Adawlut proceeded on the ground that the Tengalais had failed to prove that their proceedings were in accordance with established usage. It did not proceed on the view that the Vadagalais had a right in themselves to regulate worship in the streets, or to interdict the use of the streets to the other sect. " The correct view, as stated in the later cases, is that every member of the public, and every sect, has a right to use the public streets in a lawful manner, and it lies on those who would restrain him in its exercise to shew some "law" or "custom having the force of law" depriving him of the privilege. (M. S. D. 1857, p. 223.) "In our opinion no such custom has been established in the present case." Cohen, K.C., and De Gruyther, for the appellants, contended that the right as claimed was established, that the custom pleaded was valid in law and ought to be enforced, and also that the decree of 1840 established the appellants contention of res judicata. The right claimed was that of procession in certain streets, not a right to prevent anyone else from exercising public worship over a large and indefinite area. The particular streets had centuries ago been dedicated as claimed, and the appellants right therefore had a legal origin, and had been acquiesced in by the respondents. They referred to Sadagopachari v. Krishnamachari (I. L. R. 12 Madr. The particular streets had centuries ago been dedicated as claimed, and the appellants right therefore had a legal origin, and had been acquiesced in by the respondents. They referred to Sadagopachari v. Krishnamachari (I. L. R. 12 Madr. 356.); Anandrav Bhikaji Phadke v. Shankar Daji Charya (( 1883) I. L. R. 7 Bomb. 323.), to the effect that the case was within the cognizance of the civil Courts; Shrikhanti Narayanappa v. Indupuram Ramalingam (( 1866) 3 Madr. H.C. Rep. 226, 229.), as to the whole body of the sect being bound by litigation in which they had been represented by a few of their number; S. Sundaram Ayyar v. Municipal Council of Madura (( 1901) I. L. R. 25 Madr. 635.), as to the effect of streets being vested in a municipality; Niha Chand v. Azmat All Khan (( 1885) I. L. R. 7 Allah. 362.); Kaveri Ammal v. Sastri Ramier (( 1902) I. L. R. 26 Madr. 104.); Madras Lands Board Act, V. of 1884, s. 3 (g), as to definition of street and the sub-soil thereof not being vested in the municipality; and to Johnson v. Barnes (( 1873) I. L. R. 8 C. P. 527.) and Tyson v. Smith. (( 1838) 9 A. & E. 406.) Reference was also made to Phillip v. Halliday ([ 1891] A. C. 228, 231.); Mayor of Tunbridge Wells v. Baird ([ 1896] A. C. 434.); Clippens Oil Co. v. Edinburgh and District Water Trustees. ([ 1904] A. C. 64.) Upon the point of res judicata they referred to Commissioners of Sewers of City of London v. Gellatly (( 1876) 3 Ch. D. 110.); Cockburn v. Thompson ((1809) 16 Ves. 331.); Parthasaradi v. Chinna Krishna. (I. L. R. 5 Madr. 304.) Ross, for the respondents, contended that there were concurrent findings that the village of Tiruvendipuram never at any time belonged exclusively to the Vadagalais. Like other portions of British India, it had belonged to the former rulers, and now to the British Government, from whom the inhabitants derive their rights. Its streets are public, and are within Madras Act V. of 1884. The use of the streets is free to all persons and sects, subject to the control of the Government, and no person or sect can acquire any legal right therein by virtue of which he can interdict their free use by others. Its streets are public, and are within Madras Act V. of 1884. The use of the streets is free to all persons and sects, subject to the control of the Government, and no person or sect can acquire any legal right therein by virtue of which he can interdict their free use by others. The custom set up by virtue of which the appellants claimed was not proved, and is not reasonable or enforceable at law. Further, the decrees relied upon do not operate as res judicata, for the parties to this suit are not the same as, nor do they represent, the parties to the former proceedings or the rival sects. The subject-matter is not the same, and the questions at issue are not the same. The relief claimed in this suit is larger than in the former. Then Mahamuni alone was named, now it is any alien deity. De Gruyther replied. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by LORD MACNAGHTEN. This is an appeal from a judgment and decree of the High Court at Madras, affirming the decision of the District Judge of South Arcot, which dismissed the appellants suit with costs. The High Court refused leave to appeal on the ground that the matter in dispute was below the appealable value. Special leave, however, was granted on the representation that the appeal raised questions of law of general importance touching the rights of religious bodies in India in regard to public processions, and the right of one religious body to prevent a rival sect and an alien deity from invading precincts apparently public, but devoted or appropriated from time immemorial to the observance of its own peculiar ritual and worship; and at the same time involved the consideration of the effect of previous decisions on similar questions between members of different sects of one and the same community. The suit was the outcome of a long-standing feud between Vadagalais and Tengalais—two sects of Vaishnava Brahmins residing in the village of Tiruvendipuram, in the district of South Arcot. The village contains an ancient Vaishnava temple dedicated to Devanayaka Swami. Annexed to it is the shrine of a saint named Vedanta Desika, who is held in great veneration by the Vadagalais. The Tengalais, on the other hand, worship a saint said to belong to more modern times and called Manavala Mahamuni. The village contains an ancient Vaishnava temple dedicated to Devanayaka Swami. Annexed to it is the shrine of a saint named Vedanta Desika, who is held in great veneration by the Vadagalais. The Tengalais, on the other hand, worship a saint said to belong to more modern times and called Manavala Mahamuni. In 1807 a number of Tengalais sued a number of Vadagalais for damages for having prevented them from placing an image of their saint in the temple. The suit was dismissed, and the idol which the Tengalais had set up was removed by order of the Court. In 1828 the Tengalais set up an image of their saint in a private house and began to hold processions through the streets in its honour. Then a number of the Vadagalais brought a suit against, a number of the Tengalais complaining of their having publicly worshipped the saint and carried the idol in procession through the streets. The Vadagalais alleged that the streets traversed by the procession were attached to the temple, and that the worship of the Tengalai saint was contrary to established custom and usage. Questions were then addressed to the Hindu Pandits. In accordance with their opinion, which seems to have been based not so much on legal grounds as on precepts relating to ritual and ceremonial observances to be found in ancient treatises on such subjects, the Court ordered that the service which the Tengalais had established should be discontinued, and awarded damages to the plaintiffs. On appeal to the Court of Sudder Adawlut the decree was varied to the extent of permitting worship of the Tengalai idol in private houses, while public processions in its honour were prohibited as unauthorized innovations. The feud continued. There was further litigation, and there were divers proceedings before the magistrate with varying success, until, in 1886, the then magistrate refused to prohibit the public worship of the Tengalai idol and referred the Vadagalais to the civil Court. The Vadagalais then moved to enforce the order of the Sudder Adawlut by arrest and imprisonment of certain persons who were descendants of some of the defendants in the suit of 1828. The petition was dismissed, and at last the Vadagalais brought the present suit asking for a declaration of their right to prohibit the public worship of the Tengalai idol and processions in its honour, and praying for an injunction accordingly. The petition was dismissed, and at last the Vadagalais brought the present suit asking for a declaration of their right to prohibit the public worship of the Tengalai idol and processions in its honour, and praying for an injunction accordingly. They based their claim to relief on the allegation that the Vadagalais were originally the owners of all the land in the village, and only allowed houses to be built and streets formed subject to the reservation that no worship or procession of a Tengalai idol should be permitted there. They contended that, even if strict proof of that allegation were wanting, a conditional or limited dedication of the streets to the public should be presumed, and that at any rate they had acquired, by immemorial usage and custom, the right to prevent the worship and processions of any alien deity in their streets. Lastly, they submitted that, so far as Manavala Mahamuni was concerned, the rights of the parties were concluded by the decision in the suit of 1828, and that the matter to that extent was res judicata. Both Courts have decided against the plaintiffs. It seems to their Lordships that the decision is perfectly right. There is no trace of any evidence tending to shew that the site of the village was at any time the private property of the Vadagalais. The village is an ordinary ryotwari village. The streets are public streets now vested under the Madras Act No. V. of 1884 in the local board. All members of the public have equal rights in them. If the Vadagalais had any valid objection to the streets of the village being vested in the local board, they had the opportunity] of raising the objection by appeal to the Governor-General in accordance with the provisions of the Act. Even if they had had any such rights as they claim in the present suit at the time when the Act of 1884 came into force in the village of Tiruvendipuram, it would be much too late for them to set up such a claim now. The plea of res judicata is equally untenable. The suit of 1828 was not a representative suit binding property, or even designed or framed for the purpose of binding for all time the Tengalai community, if there is any body that can be so described, and if such a suit were competent. The plea of res judicata is equally untenable. The suit of 1828 was not a representative suit binding property, or even designed or framed for the purpose of binding for all time the Tengalai community, if there is any body that can be so described, and if such a suit were competent. It was a suit against certain persons alleged to be wrong-doers in their individual capacity. The result is that the suit completely fails, and their Lordships may observe that it does not seem to involve such far-reaching issues as were put forward in the petition asking for special leave to appeal. Their Lordships will therefore humbly advise His Majesty that the appeal should be dismissed. The appellants will pay the costs of the appeal.