JUDGMENT 1. The Plaintiff in the suit out of which this appeal arises claimed to be entitled as Raja of Porahat to resume the lands in suit consisting of the whole of four mouzahs, Padampur, Thengaposhi, The-shapar and Nagbera, and certain lands in Mouzah Danda on the allegation that they formed the khorposh babuani (maintenance) grant made by his ancestor to the ancestor of the Defendants and that the Defendants had forfeited their right to the same by a refusal to discharge certain babuani services which he at the same time stated he did not require them to render, and because the Defendant No. 1 by a registered deed of sale of the 30th March 1898 had conveyed to Defendant No. 6 the lands in Mouzah Danda. It was asserted in the plaint that the maintenance grant made by the holder of the Raj carried with it the condition that the grantees should perform to the grantor and members of his branch of the family certain services when required, and that the failure or refusal to discharge those services entailed a forfeiture of the grant. It was also asserted that the lands covered by the grant were inalienable, and that an alienation of any portion by the grantee entailed forfeiture of all the lands covered by the grant and conveyed no title on the transferee. The suit was brought to have it declared that Defendant No. 6 acquired no title by his purchase and to obtain a decree for resumption of all the mouzahs and lands covered by the grant from all the Defendants on the ground that they had forfeited all right to them. The defence set up was that the grant of the properties in suit was unconditional and permanent. It was denied that the lands covered by the grant were inalienable and liable to resumption at the option of the grantor or his successor to the Raj. It was also denied that the giant was made subject to the condition that certain babuani services were to be rendered to the grantor or his successors, and it was alleged that such services had never been rendered by the predecessors of the Defendants. It was also denied that the giant was made subject to the condition that certain babuani services were to be rendered to the grantor or his successors, and it was alleged that such services had never been rendered by the predecessors of the Defendants. Pleas were also raised that the suit was barred by the general and special rules of limitation; and it was asserted that, as the Defendant No. 1 had a right to alienate the lands in Mouzah Danda, the Defendant No. 6 had acquired a good title by his purchase. Further, it was asserted that after the purchase the Plaintiff had recognised Defendant No. 6 as the transferee of those lands by receiving payment of road-cess from him and by registering his name in his sheristha and so was estopped from denying his title. It was also alleged that Raja Arjun Singh, the father of the present Plaintiff, having been deposed by Government in 1858 for complicity in the Mutiny and his Raj having been confiscated by Government and held by Government for 38 years till 1895 and the Raj having then been granted to the present Plaintiff subject to certain conditions and limitations, any right which the original grantor or his successors might have had under the terms of the grant lapsed, as a new grant of the properties to the ancestors of the Plaintiff was made by Government when it took possession of the Raj. 2. Plaintiff's case further was that the Raj Estate of Porahat was prior to its confiscation by Government a Tributary Native State, in the nature of an impartible and inalienable Raj, the succession to which was regulated by the rule of primogeniture, that maintenance grants were made by the holder of the Raj to the younger members of the family for their support, that such grants were made free of rent, but on condition that the grantees should discharge bubuani services to the grantor and his successors, that the lands covered by the grants were inalienable and that the grants were liable to resumption at the option of the grantor or his successors. When the Raj was restored to the Plaintiff by the sanad granted on the 4th October 1895, which under its terras took effect from the 1st April 1891, it was given back with all the rights and incidents attaching thereto as they existed prior to the confiscation in 1858 with certain specified exceptions, and that as the grant made to the ancestor of Defendants was not so specially excepted, the Plaintiff acquired the same rights against the Defendants as successors of the original grantee as the original grantor had against the original grantee. It was alleged that notices had been served on the Defendants in December 1903 requiring them to give up possession of the properties in suit and as they had failed to do so the cause of action arose on the 4th January 1904. 3. In support of his case the Plaintiff relied on the sanad of the 4th October 1895, regranting the Raj to him and on certain Road-cess returns subsequently submitted in 1896: also on the reports made by officers of Government in certain settlement proceedings in 1860 and 1880 (Exhs. 10 and 11), in which the lands in dispute were recorded as maintenance grants. He also relied on a decision of Mr. Taylor, Settlement Officer of Porahat, dated 23rd May 1903, in which that officer held, in a case brought by the Plaintiff to canoed the sale of the lands in Danda, that the lands in suit formed a maintenance grant made to Jadu Nath.Singh and that the grant was rent-free. and, referring to Hunter's Statistical.Reporter and to a decision of the Commissioner of the Chota Nagpur Division in an appeal in respect of a maintenance grant in Kharswan, expressed his opinion that the sale of the lands in Danda was illegal; but as he had no power to deal with the question he referred the Plain tiff to the Civil Court. Witnesses were also examined by the Plaintiff on his behalf and deposition given by Defendant No. 1, Kasiram, in the Court of the Settlement Officer in 1902, was also put in. In that deposition Kasiram admitted that the lands formed the subject of a khorposh grant. 4. Witnesses were also examined by the Plaintiff on his behalf and deposition given by Defendant No. 1, Kasiram, in the Court of the Settlement Officer in 1902, was also put in. In that deposition Kasiram admitted that the lands formed the subject of a khorposh grant. 4. For the Defendant rent receipts granted by the Plaintiff to Sheo Golam, Defendant No. 6, in 1899, 1900 and 1902, together with copies of certain Road-cess returns, were filed, also a deed of sale of 1901 to Defendant No. 6 of lakhiraj lands being part of a grant in Chakra-dharpur, similar to that in the present case. Proceedings of the Settlement Officer at the time of the settlement in 1860 were also relied on, and Kasiram himself gave evidence and witnesses were examined to prove that no services had ever been rendered to the grantor by the holders of the land in suit. 5. The Sub-Judge dismissed the suit ami the Plaintiff has appealed. 6. The Subordinate Judge found that the Defendants had been holding the lands free of rent and free of services for upwards of 50 years, that the possession of the Defendant during the time the estate was under confiscation must be taken as being adverse to the Plaintiff and therefore that the suit was barred by the general rule of limitation. 7. He also held that it was barred by the special rule of 3 years' limitation under Art. 91 of Sch, II of the Limitation Act, because the suit had not been brought within 3 years from the date of the deed of sale to Defendant No. 6 which was executed in March 1898. 8. He found that the Plaintiff had failed to prove that the grant was ever burdened with babuani services, and that such services had ever been rendered. On the other hand, he found that the Defendants had made out their case that the grant was permanent, heritable and transferable, and that it was free of rent and service. Lastly, he held that by the receipt of Road-cess and by registering Defendant No. 3 the transferee in place of Kasiram Singh in respect of the lands in Danda, the Plaintiff had recognised that the grant was rent-free and transferable. 9. In support of this appeal the findings of the Subordinate Judge on the different points have been attacked. Lastly, he held that by the receipt of Road-cess and by registering Defendant No. 3 the transferee in place of Kasiram Singh in respect of the lands in Danda, the Plaintiff had recognised that the grant was rent-free and transferable. 9. In support of this appeal the findings of the Subordinate Judge on the different points have been attacked. The learned Advocate-General who appears for the Respondent has admitted that he is not prepared to support the grounds on which the Subordinate Judge has found that the Plaintiff's suit is barred by the special or general rule of limitation In the present case it was not necessary for the Plaintiff to have the deed of sale set aside, his contention being that as the lands covered by the grant were in alienable, no right passed under it to the Defendant No. 1 and under these circumstances the limitation provided by Art. 91 of Sch. II of the Limitation Act would not apply. [See the cases of Hari har Ojha v. Dastarathi Misra I. L. R. 33 Cal. 257 (1905)]. Nor would the omission to render services for over 12 years, supposing the rendering of the services to have been a condition of the grant, amount to adverse possession. To make the holding adverse there must have been a refusal to perform the services or a claim to hold the lands free of service. [See Komar Gowda v. Bhimaji Keshav I. L. R. 23 Bom. 602 (1899)]. Nor is it contended for the Respondents that if there had been on their part a denial of Plaintiff's title, supposing that he had a title, prior to suit, or a refusal to render services, supposing that the grant was subject to the condition that services must be rendered and there had been a demand for such services by the Plaintiff and refusal by the Defendants, this would not have operated as a forfeiture of the Defendants' rights under the grant. What has been contended before us for the Respondents has been that the Plaintiff has no title to resume the lands in suit, and even if he had a title to resume them for failure on the part of the Defendants to comply with the terms of the grant he has failed to make out a case to prove that the Defendants have forfeited their rights. 10. 10. The main issues for determination in this appeal, as the learned Counsel for the Appellants has argued, have then been narrowed down to the decision of the following questions. What was the nature of the original grant, what was the effect of the confiscation of the Raj in 1858, and what was the result of the restoration of the Raj to the Plaintiff in 1895? 11. From the evidence of Kasiram given before the Settlement Officer in the case No. 372 of 1901-1902, from the reports of the Settlement Officers in 1860 and 1882 and from the evidence in the present case and from the circumstance that the grant was made by the holder of the Raj to a younger member of the family, it seems clear that the grant was originally a maintenance grant and that the villages were granted free of rent. There is no direct evidence to prove that the grant was made subject to the condition that the grantee would render babuani services when required. The evidence to prove that such services were ever rendered is, as the Subordinate Judge very properly remarks, worthless, and the Plaintiff failed to adduce better evidence on the point which apparently might have been obtained. In the absence of evidence to support the Plain tiff's allegation that the grant was subject to the condition that the services should be rendered, we hold that the Subordinate Judge was right in finding that the Plaintiff had failed to prove that it was a condition of the grant the failure to carry out which would render it liable to forfeiture. 12. But even conceding that the grand was made subject to that condition, we have next to consider what was the effect on the grant of the confiscation of the Raj by Government in 1858. The learned Counsel for the Appellant has contended that its effect was merely to transfer to Government as proprietor all the rights which the deposed Raja had, and that the rights in respect of the maintenance grants remained unaffected. When afterwards in 1895 the Raj was restored to the Plaintiff it was given back with all existing rights and all incidents at tacking to it as an impartible and inalienable Raj including those attaching to maintenance grants. When afterwards in 1895 the Raj was restored to the Plaintiff it was given back with all existing rights and all incidents at tacking to it as an impartible and inalienable Raj including those attaching to maintenance grants. We do not think that this view can be accepted and we agree with the view advanced by the learned Advocate-General for the Respondents that when the Raj was confiscated and the Government took possession of the estate, all rights of the Raja as well also as all rights of persons holding lands in the estate lapsed When Government afterwards settled the lands,-though the settlement may have been with the persons who had been holding the lands under the Raja, the settlements were new settlements and the rights under them were conferred by the Government. At that time a settlement of the lands in suit was made with Kasiram Singh, Defendant No. 1, and the other sons of Jadunath who were then found to be holding the lands covered by the original grant. Certain villages in Kolhan were at the same time taken khas possession of by Government, the sons of Jadunath receiving in lieu of them a certain payment yearly in money. It was then noted that they were holding the lands as holders of a maintenance grant but the lands were then settled with them as lakhiraj or rent-free lands No condition of rendering services was then attached to the lands as newly settled and it is proved by the evidence that for 38 years the lands were held under Government as rent-free and that no services in respect of them were ever demanded or rendered. The restoration of the Raj could not have had the effect of recreating a maintenance grant with conditions in favour of the Raja which, if they had ever existed, had lapsed during the period while the Raj was under confiscation. The restoration of the Raj to the Plaintiff could not operate to destroy rights acquired since the time when it was confiscated. We agree, therefore, with the conclusion at which the Subordinate Judge has arrived that after the restoration of the Raj in 1895 the properties in suit did not constitute a maintenance grant subject to any condition of paying rent or rendering any service but that they constituted a grant free of rent and service. 13. We agree, therefore, with the conclusion at which the Subordinate Judge has arrived that after the restoration of the Raj in 1895 the properties in suit did not constitute a maintenance grant subject to any condition of paying rent or rendering any service but that they constituted a grant free of rent and service. 13. We are unable to hold that the case of Ram Nundan Singh v. Janki Koer 7 C. W. N. 57: s. c. I. L. R. 29 Cal. 828 (1902) is sufficient authority for the contention which has been advanced for the Appellants that the restoration of the Raj to the Plaintiff can be taken to have had the effect of destroying rights acquired while the estate was under forfeiture. 14. We also think that the argument advanced for the Respondents is correct and that even if the grant had been liable to forfeiture for sale of any portion of the lands covered by it or for failure to render babuani services, the Plaintiff has failed to make out that he had before suit a sufficient case for forfeiture. It has not been proved by any direct evidence that the lands covered by the grant were inalienable and that an alienation of any portion would operate as a forfeiture of the whole grant. The extracts from Hunter's Statistical Reporter which have been relied on, though they might be taken to corroborate other evidence on this point, cannot be accepted as in themselves sufficient direct proof. Further, we agree with the Subordinate Judge that after the sale the Plaintiff recognised the Defendant No. 3 as a holder of a portion of the grant in the place of the Defendant No. 1, Kasiram, and so directly accepted and confirmed the transfer, supposing such acceptance to have been necessary to complete the title of the transferee. The deposition of the Defendant Kasiram taken before the Settlement Officer in the case in 1901-1902 which explained the circumstances under which the sale was made, sufficiently prove that the Plaintiff was aware of the sale, that the Defendant Kasiram was forced by necessity to sell the property to pay off his debts, that he offered it for sale first to the Plaintiff and that as the Plaintiff refused to give a fair price he sold it to Defendant No. 6. We hold that the sale made under these circumstances and subsequently accepted by the Plaintiff cannot be taken to be a sufficient ground for forfeiture of the entire grant. 15. As regards the demand for the babuani services by the Plaintiff and the refusal to render them by the Defendants, we find that the evidence adduced fails to prove any such refusal before suit as would render the Defendants liable to forfeiture of the grant. 16. We hold, therefore, that even if the grant had been proved to be subject to the conditions as asserted by the Plaintiff, he has failed to prove such a breach of those conditions as would entitle him to resume the properties covered by it. 17. We, however, agree with the Subordinate Judge that the Plaintiff has failed to prove that the grant is subject to these conditions. We accordingly confirm the judgment and decree of the Subordinate Judge and dismiss the appeal with costs.