JUDGMENT 1. This is a rule which was granted calling upon the District Magistrate of Patna to show cause why the order of the City Magistrate of Patna, dated the 20th August 1906, and the order of the Sessions Judge, dated the 3rd December 1906, should not be set aside. The order made by the City Magistrate was one made under sec. 110, Cr. P. C, binding the Petitioner down to be of good behavior in a sum of Rs. 1,000, for a period of two years with two sureties of 1,000 Rupees each on the ground that he habitually committed extortion and was so desperate and dangerous a character as to render his being at large without security hazardous to the community. 2. The learned vakil who has appeared in support of the rule has taken a number of objections to the order which has been made. The first point he takes is that the order made by the Magistrate instituting proceedings under sec. 110 did not comply with the provisions of sec. 112 inasmuch as it did not set forth the substance of the information received; and he contends that the object of the section is to enable the accused to know what case he had to meet. In the present case in our opinion the order made by the Magistrate which we have compared with the information which was given him by the Police is in compliance with sec. 112, because it does set forth we think quite sufficiently and fully the substance of the information which the Police gave to the Magistrate, and therefore the order cannot be objected to on the ground that it has no compliance with that section. The Petitioner has not been prejudiced we think by the nature of the information which was before the Magistrate, because he had ample time during the long period that this investigation covered to meet the case which was made by the prosecution and which was founded on the information contained in the Magistrate's order calling upon him to show cause. 3. Then the learned vakil contends that with regard to cl. (f) of sec. 3. Then the learned vakil contends that with regard to cl. (f) of sec. 110 the Magistrate had acted on evidence of general repute and he contends that such evidence is not admissible for the purpose of showing that the man is of a desperate and dangerous character; and further with respect to that clause he also points out that the Magistrate in his judgment has not only relied upon evidence which is not admissible to support the finding as to this clause, but he has also not found facts which would justify the inference that the Petitioner was a person of dangerous and desperate character. We think there is considerable force in these two objections. We think that in the section a man of desperate and dangerous character means a man who shows a reckless disregard of the safety of the persons or the properties of his neighbours, and we agree with him that under this section evidence of general repute is not sufficient to bring the case within cl. (f). The Magistrate has referred to a number of cases of extortion which were relied upon to show that the accused was a person who came within the cl. (d) of sec. 110. He referred to 30 cases of extortion which did not come within the legal definition of that offence, stating that though they were not evidence that the accused habitually commits extortion yet they were evidence that he was so desperate and dangerous as to render his being at large without security hazardous to the community. In that we do not agree, and we not think that acts of extortion unaccompanied by acts causing dangers to the person and properties of other persons would be sufficient to justify the Magistrate in coming to the conclusion that the Petitioner was of so desperate and dangerous a character as to render his being at large without security hazardous to the community; and we agree with the contention of the learned vakil following the authority which he cited to us, Akhoy Kumar v. The Queen-Empress 5 C. W. N. 849 (1900), that evidence of general repute is not admissible to prove that the Petitioner was of the character described in cl. (f). 4. (f). 4. But even though we agree with the learned vakil as to these objections they by no means dispose of the case, because the Magistrate has found that the Petitioner is a person who habitually commits extortion. On that finding the order binding him down under secs. 110 and 112 would be perfectly legal. But the learned vakil objects to the finding that he habitually commits extortion on certain grounds. One is that the 64 cases of extortion which were alleged to have been committed by the Petitioner extend over a very long period. One case he states happened as long as 20 years ago and a number of other cases more than a year ago. But excluding those cases and excluding the 30 cases in which the act done does not come within the definition of extortion as defined by the Penal Code, there remained 34 cases of which 23 are found to have been committed within the twelve months previous to the Petitioner being called on to show cause. Now if the Magistrate has found those 23 cases were proved against the Petitioner we think he is quite justified in finding that he is a person who habitually commits extortion; and the learned vakil complains that it is impossible to expect the Petitioner to meet a case made against him which was alleged to have been committed years ago, and therefore he is prejudiced, and he relies on the well-known case of Subramania Ayyer v. King-Emperor I. L. R. 25 Mad. 61 (1901), that the accused should not be hampered with being charged with a great number of charges extending over a long period of time. But in that case the issue was whether the Petitioner had or had not committed certain offences with which he was charged. In this case the question of the particular acts with which the Defendant is charged is not the issue to which the Court is to direct its attention. It has to look at the whole body of charges which are made against the Defendant and see whether they are in the main substantiated in such a manner as to lead to the conclusion that he is a person whose habits are such as are in cl. (d) of sec. 110. It has to look at the whole body of charges which are made against the Defendant and see whether they are in the main substantiated in such a manner as to lead to the conclusion that he is a person whose habits are such as are in cl. (d) of sec. 110. The evidence of acts that have been committed years ago standing by itself is of no weight and by itself would not justify the making of an order under secs. 110 and 112. But it is admissible and cannot be excluded because it indicates the formation of the habit. The question which the Magistrate has to decide is whether the habit is still the habit of the Defendant when he is called upon to give security. If all those earlier cases stood and there were no evidence of misconduct within the last one year or 18 months then we should be prepared to say that the order could not properly be made. If on the other hand the earlier evidences were discarded and yet it was proved that a number of acts of extortion had been committed within the last one year or 18 months then we should say notwithstanding discarding the earlier evidence the order might properly be made. The earlier evidence is admissible to show the formation of habit. But the material question which is to be considered is whether the habit is still inspiring the Petitioner. For those reasons we think the objections which the learned vakil argued with considerable ability to the finding of the Magistrate with regard to the acts of extortion are not well-founded, and we do not think that it can properly be said that the Defendant was prejudiced in his defence having regard to what he had to meet under sec. 110. 5. He has also objected that with respect to the alleged acts of extortion which fell within the definition of extortion there have been no complaints made to the Police or prosecutions before the Magistrate except in one single case in which the conviction was quashed. This observation is a very proper one to make but it does not conclude the case. It only touches the weight to be attached to the evidence, and we do not think, considering what the case of the prosecution was, that any inference could be drawn from it. This observation is a very proper one to make but it does not conclude the case. It only touches the weight to be attached to the evidence, and we do not think, considering what the case of the prosecution was, that any inference could be drawn from it. The charges were not unfounded because the persons who made them were individually afraid to prefer complaints to Police. 6. Then it is objected that the evidence of general repute must be evidence of men who lived in the same neighbourhood, and it has been alleged that there were more witnesses from the Petitioner's own quarter to speak in his favour than there were who were against him. But the Petitioner appears to be a well-known resident of Patna as we gather from the fact that he has been elected a Municipal Commissioner, and we think the Magistrate was quite right in hearing the evidence of his fellow-citizens though it happened that they were not all men in his immediate neighbourhood. 7. Then there was another point taken that the trial began before Mr. Miluc and continued before his successor Mr. Luce. We do not think that the Petitioner can now raise any question with regard to that. It was legally continued before Mr. Luce and it was open to him at the time to say that that course would prejudice him and to have asked for a trial de novo. He did not do that and we cannot interfere with it unless we are convinced that a serious miscarriage of justice has taken place. 8. Then comes another point which the learned vakil has laid great stress on and that is the refusal of the Magistrate to summon further witnesses on behalf of the Petitioner. Now it appears that the Petitioner gave a list of some 192 witnesses, having stated at the commencement of the trial that he intended to examine about 200. But after he had examined 192 witnesses, he put in a petition asking that 73 more witnesses should be summoned to give evidence on his behalf. Now it appears that the Petitioner gave a list of some 192 witnesses, having stated at the commencement of the trial that he intended to examine about 200. But after he had examined 192 witnesses, he put in a petition asking that 73 more witnesses should be summoned to give evidence on his behalf. Now, speaking for ourselves, if we were trying the case and the Defendant who had stated to us that he intended to summon about 200 witnesses, applied to summon an extra body of 73 witnesses, we should suppose that his object was to delay the hearing of the case, unless he was ready with some clear and explicit reason for not having included those witnesses in his first list. The petition does not seem to contain any clear or reasonable explanation at all as to why these persons were not mentioned in the original list. The only ground that we hear is stated for the non-summoning of them is that the Petitioner's vakil desired to summon some more witnesses from a particular quarter of the town. This is no explanation for not having summoned them originally, and we think that under these circumstances the Magistrate was perfectly right in coming to the conclusion that the witnesses were asked to be summoned for the purpose of delaying the hearing, and in refusing to summon these extra 73 witnesses; and what happened strengthens the conclusion to which we have come. It appears that the Petitioner was asked to mark off 8 of the number of persons from among of these 73 so as to make the full number of 200, and 8 persons were marked off and summoned. Of these we are informed four only were called, and out of these four only, one single person came from the quarter of the town which, it was said the 73 he desired to summon would come from. This leaves the strongest impression on our mind that the application was not a bona fide one, but was made for the purpose of delaying the hearing. 9. It is quite true that the section which has been pointed out by the learned vakil provides that the Magistrate shall issue process unless he considers the application should be refused on the ground that it is made for the purpose of vexation or delay or to defeat the ends of justice. 9. It is quite true that the section which has been pointed out by the learned vakil provides that the Magistrate shall issue process unless he considers the application should be refused on the ground that it is made for the purpose of vexation or delay or to defeat the ends of justice. Such ground should be recorded by him in writing. The Magistrate has in his order in which he refused to summon the extra witnesses stated facts which certainly would have justified him in drawing the inference that the application was made for the purpose of delay. The defence undertook to call 200 witnesses and that 73 were put in on the 17th July and that none of them were persons of positions. It is true he has not in express terms stated, in these facts I am of opinion that the application is made merely for the purpose of delay," and possibly his order would be more satisfactory if he had added these words; but we do not think we ought to set aside the order and send the case back because the Magistrate does not state in express terms that he found that the application is made for the purpose of delay, though he has stated the facts which led him irresistibly to the conclusion that application could be for no other purpose. 10. Another application was made a few days later for the examination of some more witnesses who were produced by the Defendant, but we think the Magistrate was quite right in refusing them, we having no sort of doubt that the application was also made with the object of further delaying the trial. 11. The result is that in our opinion the grounds for upsetting the order binding down the Petitioner have not been substantiated. Discarding the finding of the Magistrate that the Petitioner is a person of desperate and dangerous character under cl. (f) there remains the finding that he is guilty of habitual extortion under cl. (d). That finding appears from our perusal of the judgment to be founded on ample evidence and it justifies the order which has been made under the section. For these reasons we discharge the rule.