JUDGMENT 1. We are of opinion that the decision of the lower Courts is correct. Durga Churn Mookerjee was the decree-holder, and he obtained by the decree the right to sell under his mortgage certain properties belonging to the Appellant. The decree is dated the 3rd December 1897 and he applied for sale on the 15th February 1898. An objection was taken to his getting an order directing the sale of the mortgaged properties and, on this objection, an order was made staying proceedings in the matter. In the meantime, and before the stay order was removed, Durga Churn died on the 30th July 1898. The stay order was removed later on. The application for sale was struck off on the 24th September 1898. Durga Churn died leaving a minor son as his heir and the right to apply for the revival of the suit and for a sale accrued to the minor. He is still a minor; but on the 30th July 1902, an administrator was appointed to the estate of the deceased Durga Churn. The present application was made on the 28th July 1905 for sale of the hypothecated properties directed to be sold under the mortgage decree. The question arises whether the application of the 28th July 1905 is barred by limitation. The right to make an application for substitution of the heir of the deceased Plaintiff and for sale of the mortgaged properties accrued at a time when the person who could make this application was a minor. Sec. 7 of the Limitation Act protects the interest of minors and the present application, if it be supposed to have been made by the minor through his next friend or guardian, was within time, it having been made before the minority terminated. Even if it be supposed that the appointment of the administrator and the application for sale by the administrator took away the operation of sec. 7 of the Limitation Act, the application of the 28th July 1905 would be in time because it was made within three years of the appointment of the administrator. But it is not necessary for us to take the latter view inasmuch as the application is substantially one on behalf of the minor and sec. 7 of the Limitation act applies. 2. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed with costs, two gold mohurs.