Judgement Appeal from an order of the High Court (June 17, 1904), reversing an order of the Subordinate Judge of Gya (March 31, 1903), which set aside the auction sale in suit. On June 11, 1901, the respondents obtained a decree under a mortgage bond against the appellants. An execution sale was fixed by proclamation for May 19, 1902, but a consent order was made on that day for postponement for seven days, and afterwards till July 21, when, according to the appellants petition therefor, it would be held " without issuing fresh proclamation," petitioners " to have no right to raise any objection on the ground of irregularity or inadequacy of price." A further postponement was also consented to till September 22, and afterwards till November 24, on the same terms; and on November 25 a sale to the respondents, who had obtained leave to bid, was effected for Rs. 18,500. On December 20, 1902, the appellants petitioned to set the sale aside, stating the value of the property to be Rs. 85,000, and alleging the invalidity of the sale on the ground that the dates of sale were fixed without specifying the hour of sale as directed by s. 291 of the Civil Procedure Code, and for other irregularities. The Subordinate Judge found that certain of the alleged irregularities were covered by the waiver contained in the appellants applications for postponement, but that two were not Law. Rep. 34 Ind. App. 164 ( 1906- 1907) Dhanukdhari Singh V. Mahabir Pershad Singh 66 so covered. One of these was that the application for postponement of sale of July 21, 1902, was filed by one of the two judgment debtors, and contained no waiver at all, and therefore the property could not be sold on September 22, 1902, without the issue of a fresh proclamation. The other was as to the non-specification of the hour of sale. The judge referred to a decision in Bhibari Misra v. Rani Surjamoni Pat Malta Dai (( 1901) 6 Calc. The other was as to the non-specification of the hour of sale. The judge referred to a decision in Bhibari Misra v. Rani Surjamoni Pat Malta Dai (( 1901) 6 Calc. W.N. 48.), which, he stated, laid down that the non-specification of the hour was a material irregularity, and that in the case of proved substantial injury, it must be presumed that the injury resulted directly from the non-specification of the hour, and he held, in accordance with that ruling, that the judgment debtors did not waive their right to object on the ground of this material irregularity. He also found that the property was worth Rs. 35,000, and that the under-valuation by the respondents at Rs. 15,000 in their application for sale was an irregularity which had been waived. The High Court, in a judgment reported in I. L. E. 31 Calc. 815, said that the arguments before them had centred on the point as to the non-mention of the hour of sale. They referred to three decisions of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council (L. R. 10 Ind. Ap, p. 25, L. R. 15 Ind. Ap. p. 171, and L. R. 20 Ind. Ap. p. 176), and said " Those decisions would appear to have held that there should be direct evidence connecting an alleged material irregularity in the publication or conduct of a sale with the inade quacy of price at such a sale as cause and effect in order to enable the Court to set aside the sale"; and that the decision in I. L. R. 18 Allah, p. 37, is to the same effect. They decided that " it is clear that there must be evidence of circumstances which will warrant the necessary or at least reasonable inference that the inadequacy of price at the sale was the result of the irregularity complained of." Kenworthy Brown, for the appellants, submitted that the order of the High Court should be reversed. Both Courts had held that the property had been sold for little more than half its real value. There was grave irregularity in the proclamation for sale placing such a low valuation as Rs. 15,000 on the property. It could not have been so alleged in good faith, and the irregularity was not one which could be waived, or which, on the evidence, had in fact been waived see ss. There was grave irregularity in the proclamation for sale placing such a low valuation as Rs. 15,000 on the property. It could not have been so alleged in good faith, and the irregularity was not one which could be waived, or which, on the evidence, had in fact been waived see ss. 287, 290, 291 and 811 of the Civil Procedure Code, and Saadatmand Khan v. Phul Kuar. (( 1898) L. R. 25 Ind. Ap. 146.) C. W. Arathoon, for the respondent, contended that this issue as to waiver had been disposed of by the Subordinate Judge on the evidence against the appellants, who had not appealed there from to the High Court. The only point taken before the High Court was the omission to specify the hour of sale. They had acquiesced before that Court in the finding that the objection now relied on had been waived, and were not entitled to take in appeal that which had become by reason of their own omission a new point. K. Brown replied. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by LORD ROBERTSON. Their Lordships are confronted with this objection to the appeal, that the argument offered to them is on a question of fact—namely, that of waiver—which was decided adversely to the present appellants in the Court of the Subordinate Judge, and was not submitted for review to the High Court in Calcutta. Accordingly it is out of their Lordships power to entertain the ground of appeal, it being one of fact which has not been subject to the consideration of the Court below. Their Lordships will therefore humbly advise His Majesty that the appeal ought to be dismissed. The appellants will pay the costs of it.