Judgement Appeal from a decree of the High Court (January 25, 1904), modifying a decree of Tyabji J. (October 4, 1902). The suit was brought by the appellant, under the circumstances stated in their Lordships judgment, to establish his exclusive title to the property in suit and to question the legality of the alleged adoption of Nagurdas, the second respondent. The lower Courts agreed in upholding the adoption, but differed as to the validity of a gift of Rs. 20,000 made to the sixth defendant by her father Bhagwandas, the first Court holding that the gift was invalid The principal question decided by their Lordships was whether a Hindu co-parcener by will can authorize his widow to adopt a son so as to divest his co-parcener, in whom, as survivor", the whole ancestral estate has become vested, and thus diminish his share, which has become Augmented by law. With regard to the gift and adoption in dispute, it appeared that on November 5, 1900, Bhagwandas made a gift of Rs. 20,000 Government promissory notes to his only daughter, named Navalbai, and on the 30th of the same month he made a will whereby he appointed the first three defendants, along with two others, his executors. In the 9th clause of the will the testator gave the following directions "I hereby direct my wife to adopt a son to me but such adoption must be made by the consent of Sir Balchandra Krishna and Rao Bahadur Ghansham Nilkant Nadkarni; such adoption is to be made even though a son is born to my brothers widow. In the event of a son being born to my brothers widow, however, my wife should before making the adoption enter into an agreement with the adopted son or his proper guardian that such adopted son shall be bound to accept as valid the provisions hereby made for my daughter Navalbai and my wife." Tyabji J. decided that the adoption of Nagurdas by the widow of Bhagwandas was duly made and valid in law, and that he became a co-parcener with the plaintiff, who but for the adoption would have been the exclusive owner of the properties in suit, and that it was not to the interest of either that a partition of those properties should be made. In regard to the contention that there could be no valid adoption into a joint family, even if such adoption were made with the express authority of the husband, he observed "Numerous authorities were cited to me on this point, not always reconcilable with each other, and laying down more or less conflicting principles, but it seems to me that sitting as a single judge, in a Court of first instance, the point is not open to me for discussion. I am concluded by the decision of the Privy Council in Sri Raghunada v. Sri Brozo Kishoro (L. R. 3 Ind. Ap. 154.), as explained and acted upon by the Calcutta High Court in Surendra Nandan v. Sailaja Kantdas (( 1891) I. L. R. 18 Calc. p. 385.), where the authorities bearing on this point were fully discussed, and it was decided that when the widow adopts, with the full authority of her husband, the adoption even into a joint family is valid and the adopted son takes an interest in the property of the family accordingly." The High Court affirmed this judgment in regard to the adoption, its validity, and legal effect, and also declined to direct a partition. It held the gift to Navalbai to be valid. Jardine, K.C., and Ross, for the appellant and his mother Gangabai, the fourth respondent, contended that the testamentary power to adopt, and the adoption following thereon, were invalid in law. Bhagwandas thereby attempted to make a disposition of his property, which Hindu law does not allow. The ancestral estate had vested solely in the appellant by survivorship on the death of Bhagwandas. It could not afterwards be divested to the extent of Bhagwandass share, nor could that share be transferred to the alleged adopted son on his adoption. Bhagwandass widow had no power to adopt so as to vest in the adopted child a share in the ancestral estate without the consent of the appellant or his guardian. Moreover, the adoption was not made from a. proper motive see, however, the full bench case of Ram Chandra Bhagwan v. Mulji Navabhai (( 1896) I. L. R. 22 Bomb. 558.), which lays down that the motive for adopting is irrelevant, a ruling which must be compared with that in Vellanki Venkata Krishna Row v. Venkata Rama Lakshmi. (( 1876) L. R. 4 Ind. Ap. 558.), which lays down that the motive for adopting is irrelevant, a ruling which must be compared with that in Vellanki Venkata Krishna Row v. Venkata Rama Lakshmi. (( 1876) L. R. 4 Ind. Ap. 1, 14.) With regard to the doctrine of divesting the ownership of the appellant in favour of the adopted son, reference was made to Bhoobun Moyee Debia v. Ramkishore Acharj Chowdhry(( 1865) 10 Moo. Ind. Ap. 279, 309.); Thyammal v. Venkatarama (( 1887) L. R. 14 Ind. Ap. 67.) ; Rupchand Hindumal v. Rakhmabai (( 1871) 8 Bomb. H.C.R.A. C. J. 114, 119.); Sri Raghunada v. Sri Brozo Kishoro(L. R. 3 Ind. Ap. 154, 193.); Surendra Nandan v. Sailaja Kant Das (I. L. R. 18 Calc. 385.); Bapuji Lakshman v. Pandurang (( 1882) I. L. R. 6 Bomb. 616.); Kalidas Das v. Krishna Chandra Das. (( 1869) 2 Beng. L. R. (F. B.) 103.) Then, with regard to the other point in the case, namely, the gift to Navalbai, the third respondent, it was contended that Bhagwandas had no power to deal with the property in that way. The gift was not a valid gift, being beyond the disposing power of the donor. It was not given for Navalbais marriage, it was given very shortly before his death, and there was no special reason or urgency for making such a gift. Reference was made to Parvati v. Ganpatrao. (( 1893) I. L. R. 18 Bomb. 177, 183.) As to the share which the adopted son was entitled to if his adoption was held valid, and the Court decreed partition, see Raghubanund Doss v. Sadhu Churn Doss (( 1878) I. L. R. 4 Calc. 425.) and Ramasawmi Aiyan v. Vencataramaiyan. (( 1879) L. R. 6 Ind. Ap. 196.) Cohen, K.C., and De Gruyther, for the first three respondents, the widow and adopted son and daughter of Bhagwandas, were heard on the question of the legal rights and status of the adopted son under the circumstances, assuming the adoption to be proved in fact and valid in law. They contended that his adoption operated to constitute him a member of the joint family, with all the rights in the ancestral estate which would have accrued to him had he been a member by birth. They contended that his adoption operated to constitute him a member of the joint family, with all the rights in the ancestral estate which would have accrued to him had he been a member by birth. According to Hindu law, the shares in the joint ancestral estates were, until partition, always liable to be incrased by deaths or diminished by births, regardless of any doctrine as to vesting. An adopted son in no way differed in that respect from a born son. He was entitled to succeed on partition to the share which would have accrued to his father had he been living, and until partition was interested in the joint estate as a male member of the joint family. The family continued to be a joint one so long as any widow remained in it with a power to adopt. The family estate, therefore, never vested solely and absolutely in the appellant, and no divesting on the adoption by Bhagwandass widow was necessary. It was joint estate in his hands, and a coparcenary interest therein was immediately created by the adoption. Reference was made to West and Buhler, p. 600; Bhoobun Moyee Debia v. Ramkishore Acharj Chowdhry (10 Moo. Ind. Ap. 279, 309.); Kathama Natchiar v. Rajah of Shivagunga (( 1863) 9 Moo. Ind. Ap. 539, 589.); Jogendra Bhupati Hurri Chundun Mahapatra v. Nityanund (( 1890) L. R. 17 Ind. Ap. 128, 131.) ; Sri Raghunada v. Sri Brozo Kishoro (L. R. 3 Ind. Ap. 154, 193.); Maynes Hindu Law, 7th ed. p. 241 ; Surendra Nandan v. Sailaja Kant Das (I. L. R. 18 Calc. 385, 398.); Mondakini Dasi v. Adinath Dey (( 1890) I. L. R. 18 Calc. 69.); Vithoba v. Bapu (( 1890) I. L. R. 15 Bomb. 110.); Pudmacoomari Debi v. Court of Wards (( 1881) L. R. 8 Ind. Ap. 229.); Vellanki Venkata Krishna Row v. Venkata Rama Lakshmi. (L. R. 4 Ind. Ap. 1, 8.) With regard to the gift to Navalbai it was contended that it was valid and within the disposing power of Bhagwandas. The state of the property justified it, and the High Court found that it was made, not out of the corpus of the estate, but out of the income. The partition asked for had been rightly refused by the Courts below. Reference was made to Appovier v. Rama Subha Aiyan (( 1866) 11 Moo. Ind. Ap. The state of the property justified it, and the High Court found that it was made, not out of the corpus of the estate, but out of the income. The partition asked for had been rightly refused by the Courts below. Reference was made to Appovier v. Rama Subha Aiyan (( 1866) 11 Moo. Ind. Ap. 75.) ; Maynes Hindu Law, 7th ed. p. 370; and West and Buhler, p. 994. Jardine, K.C., replied. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by Sir Arthur Wilson. In the year 1900 two brothers, Hurkisondas and Bhagwandas, formed a joint Hindu family governed by the Mitakshara law as in force in Bombay, and as such they held large ancestral property. On September 14, 1900, Hurkisondas died without male issue, but leaving his widow pregnant. On November 30 of the same year Bhagwandas made his will, by which he purported to make certain dispositions of the family property, and also directed his widow to adopt a son. The terms of this will be considered hereafter. On December 17 following Bhagwandas died, and on the next day Hurkisondass widow gave birth to a son Bachoo, the present plaintiff and appellant. On February 17, 1901, Bhagwandass widow adopted Nagurdas as son to her deceased husband, with the consents prescribed by his will. The parts of that will material for the present purpose are the following— By clause 2 he appointed executors and trustees. " 4. I have a daughter by name Navulbai. I direct that my executors and trustees shall get her suitably married (if she is not married in my lifetime), at an outlay of Rs. 5000 five thousand or thereabouts. I also direct that they shall on the occasion of her marriage present her with ornaments of the value of Rs. 10,000 ten thousand or thereabouts and wearing apparel and silver pots of the value of Rs. 5000 five thousand or thereabouts. " 5. I further direct that my executors and trustees shall during her lifetime place at her absolute disposal two carriages and two horses and maintain the said carriages and horses out of my estate. “ 6. I hereby direct my executors and trustees to set apart for my said daughter so much of my immoveable property at Kasu as will yield a net income of Rs. 200 two hundred per month. “ 6. I hereby direct my executors and trustees to set apart for my said daughter so much of my immoveable property at Kasu as will yield a net income of Rs. 200 two hundred per month. I also devise and bequeath to her my house in Bombay which opens on Narayen Dhuru Street and Bibi Jan Street, and bears Nos. 13—23,61—69. She is to enjoy the said immoveable property and the said house during her lifetime, and on her death the said property and house shall belong to such of her children as may be born or conceived in my lifetime, but in default of her having any such children I hereby give her power to appoint the said property and house in such manner as she may in her absolute discretion deem fit. In the event of her not making any such appointment, and not leaving any such children as aforesaid, I direct that the said property and house shall after her death be treated as a part of the residue of my estate." Clause 7 dealt with the contingency of the brothers widow giving birth to a daughter, and purported to make provision for the girl, in a manner somewhat similar to that made for the testators own daughter. Clause 8 contained provisions for the two widows, the testators and his brothers. Clause 9 said "I hereby direct my wife to adopt a son to me but such adoption must be made with the consent of Sir Bhalchandra Krishna and Rao Bahadur Ghansham Nilkant Nadkarni; such adoption is to be made even though a son is born to my brothers widow. In the event of a son being born to my brothers widow, however, my wife should, before making the adoption, enter into an agreement with the adopted son or his proper guardian that such adopted son shall be bound to accept as valid the provisions hereby made for my daughter Navalbai and my wife.” These are all the facts relevant to the principal questions arising in the present case. The plaint was filed in the High Court of Bombay on February 28, 1901, immediately after the adoption, on behalf of Bachoo, the posthumous son of Hurkisondas, against a number of persons, amongst whom was the fifth defendant, the adopted son of Bhagwandas. The main controversy in the case lay between those two parties. The plaint was filed in the High Court of Bombay on February 28, 1901, immediately after the adoption, on behalf of Bachoo, the posthumous son of Hurkisondas, against a number of persons, amongst whom was the fifth defendant, the adopted son of Bhagwandas. The main controversy in the case lay between those two parties. The plaint asked for a declaration that the plaintiff is exclusively entitled to the ancestral property, that the fifth defendant is not the adopted son of Bhagwandas, and is not entitled to any interest in the estate. In the alternative, in case the exclusive right of the plaintiff should not be established, the plaint asked for partition. All these claims were opposed. Tyabji J., who tried the case, held that the adoption was valid, and rejected the claim of exclusive right set up on behalf of the plaintiff. He further refused to order a partition, on the ground that it would not be beneficial to the infants concerned, or to either of them. On all these points the Court of Appeal agreed with him. On the last point, that of partition, it is enough to say that their Lordships entirely concur with the Courts in India. As to the adoption and its effect, the first point raised by the appellant was this It was contended that, on the face of the will, the power to adopt was a part of a plan for the disposition of the family property which was in contravention of the law, and that the power was dependent upon that plan having effect. But this is to misread the will. The dispositions made by the testator were within his competence at the date of the will and at the date of his death ; they were only liable to be defeated in one event (which in fact happened), namely, his brothers widow giving birth to a son. And the will expressly said-that, supposing that event to occur, the adoption should still be made. The next point raised was as to the effect of the adoption upon the title to the joint property. It was contended that, at the time when the adoption took place, the family estate had become vested absolutely and exclusively in the infant Bachoo, plaintiff-appellant, and that the adoption could not detract from the right so vested. The next point raised was as to the effect of the adoption upon the title to the joint property. It was contended that, at the time when the adoption took place, the family estate had become vested absolutely and exclusively in the infant Bachoo, plaintiff-appellant, and that the adoption could not detract from the right so vested. Their Lordships are, however, of opinion, as were the Courts in India, that the case of Sri Raghunadha v. Sri Brozo Kishoro (L. R. 3 Ind. Ap. 154.), decided by this Board, governs this case and excludes the appellants contention. The point that remains for consideration is quite unconnected with the other questions in the case. Navalbai, the daughter of Bhagwandas, was made a defendant in the suit. In her written statement she alleged that she was absolutely entitled to Government promissory notes, of the nominal value of Rs. 20,000, as given to her and transferred to her name by her father in his lifetime. As to the fact of the gift and the transfer there is now no controversy. At the time of the gift Bhagwandas was the head of the family, and indeed the only male member of it, and the estate was large. Tyabji J. considered that the gift was not justified by the circumstances of the case. The Court of Appeal, having in the meantime ascertained that the gift was made out of income, not out of capital, took a different view, and decided in favour of Navalbai. The question belongs to a class in respect of which this Board is always very unwilling to interfere with the decisions of the Courts in India; and no sufficient reason has been shewn why they should do so in the present instance. Their Lordships will humbly advise His Majesty that the appeal should be dismissed. The appellant will pay the costs.