JUDGMENT 1. The frame of the suit is somewhat complicated, and the admissions of fact made in the plaint preclude an amendment as asked for by the learned vakil for the Respondents. On the pleadings we do not see our way to uphold the judgment of the lower Appellate Court on the question of limitation, however much our finding may be regretted. The facts may shortly be stated to be these: -The Defendants Nos. 3 and 4 obtained a zurpeshgi lease of a mouzah belonging to the Plaintiff for a period extending from 1304 to 1308 F. S. The zurpeshgidars were put in possession. After 1306, and on the 1st May 1900, the zurpeshgidars surrendered the land, and, according to the allegations of both the Plaintiffs and the zurpeshgidar Defendants the zwrpeshgi lease expired at the end of the year 1306. In 1307 F. S., the mouzah became khas. The Plaintiffs became entitled to realise rents from the tenants in occupation. Their allegation in the fourth paragraph of the plaint is that they did realise rents directly from most of the tenants, though some of them did not pay rent. Notice of the surrender was given to the tenants after the 12th May 1900, and the tenant Defendants in this case have alleged that they paid their rents for the year 1307 to the zurpeshgidars on the 12th May 1900. 2. The Plaintiffs instituted a suit against the tenant Defendants in the Court of the Munsif of Patna. The suit was dismissed on various grounds; but it is sufficient to say that the findings in the judgment in that case show that the tenants had paid their rents under the bond fide belief that the zurpeshgi lease was continuing in the year 1307. There are indications in the judgment in that case which show that the Court then considered that the lease had not been terminated in 1307, and that the Plaintiffs ought to have sued both the tenant Defendants and the zurpeshgidars as well. But the main finding cannot now be challenged, namely, the finding that the tenant Defendants had paid to the zurpeshgidars rents bond fide believing that the lease was subsisting. The present suit is against both the zurpeshgidnrs and the tenants. But the main finding cannot now be challenged, namely, the finding that the tenant Defendants had paid to the zurpeshgidars rents bond fide believing that the lease was subsisting. The present suit is against both the zurpeshgidnrs and the tenants. The Plaintiffs claim relief, in the alternative, for rent against the tenants and for recovery of money payable to the Plaintiffs wrongly paid by the tenants to the zurpeshgidar Defendants. 3. The Plaintiffs do not allege in the plaint that the zurpeshgi was subsisting in the year 1307. In fact, they could not, having regard to their allegations in the fourth paragraph of the plaint and to the fact that they had realised rents from most of the tenants. The zurpeshgidar Defendants admit the surrender, and they say that they did not realise rent from any of the tenants. 4. The Munsif in whose Court the suit was instituted came to the conclusion that the suit, so far as it impleaded the tenant Defendants, was barred by the application of the principle of res judicata, the previous judgment inter partes being conclusive against the tenant Defendants. That appears to have been the opinion of the lower Appellate Court as well, and it is conceded here that the lower Courts have applied the principle rightly. The Munsif dismissed the suit against the zurpeshgidar Defendants also, holding that the suit was barred by limitation. 5. According to the judgments in the previous case, the zurpeshgidar Defendants had realised rente from the tenant Defendants on the 12th May 1900, and the present suit was instituted on the 13th June 1903, that is to say, more than three years from the date when the amount was received by the zurpeshgidar Defendants. As against these Defendants, the suit was not one for rent. The suit was one evidently for money wrongly received owing to the cessation of the lease in their favour. 6. On appeal, the learned District Judge came to the conclusion that the suit was not barred, and he remanded the case to the first Court for trial of the other points raised by the pleadings. The learned Judge applied Art. 48 of the Second Schedule of the Limitation Act. 6. On appeal, the learned District Judge came to the conclusion that the suit was not barred, and he remanded the case to the first Court for trial of the other points raised by the pleadings. The learned Judge applied Art. 48 of the Second Schedule of the Limitation Act. That article runs thus:-"For specific moveable property lost or acquired by theft or dishonest misappropriation or conversion or for compensation for wrongfully taking or detaining the same"- three years from the date-" when the person having the right to the possession of the property first learns in whose possession it is." 7. The learned Judge has relied on Rameshar Chaubay v. Matabhikh, and I. L. E. 5 All. 341 (1883) if that judgment correctly laid down the law applicable to that case, Art. 48 was clearly applicable to this case. But we are of opinion that that article has no application in a case like the present. The present suit is not a suit for recovery of a specific moveable property lost or acquired by theft or dishonest misappropriation, nor is it a suit based on conversion of such property. By specific moveable property is meant property which can be specified by the delivery of the identical subject. It cannot mean money which is not necessarily payable by means of the natural rupees, annas, or pies that had been received from the tenants. The word ' specific' is defined in the judgment of Farran, J., in Essoo Bhayaji v. The Steamship ' Savitri' I. L. R. 11 Bom. 133 (1886). It is a well-known expression, and it does not require any interpretation. West, J., in Jagjivan v. Gulam Jilani I. L. R. 8 Bom. 19 (1883) defines specific property as property capable of being recovered in specie. Consequently, money cannot come under the two Arts. 48 and 49. Mr. Sterling in his book on Limitation, also, indicates this true interpretation of the word. We cannot, therefore, accept the opinion of the learned District Judge and apply Art. 48 to the present case. 8. What article then, of the Second Schedule of the Limitation Act, is applicable to the present case? If no other article is applicable, Art. 120 would apply. But we cannot avoid applying Art. 109 in the present case. We cannot, therefore, accept the opinion of the learned District Judge and apply Art. 48 to the present case. 8. What article then, of the Second Schedule of the Limitation Act, is applicable to the present case? If no other article is applicable, Art. 120 would apply. But we cannot avoid applying Art. 109 in the present case. The zurpeshgidar Defendants, according to the allegations made in the plaint, wrongfully received money which was payable, as profits for immoveable property belonging to the Plaintiffs, to the Plaintiffs themselves, and the period of limitation under that article is three years from the date that the money was received. The money received by the zurpeshgidar Defendants was certainly profits of immoveable property and, according to the allegation of both parties, these profits were receivable by the Plaintiffs, the zupeshgi lease having expired before the 12th May 1900. If Art. 109 of the Second Schedule of the Limitation Act applies, the present suit as against the zurpeshgidar Defendants is clearly barred, and that is the view which we are disposed to take. 9. The learned vakil for the Respondent has contended that Art. 109 does not apply as this is not a suit for mesne profits, but a suit for a sum of money received by the zurpeshgidar Defendants for a single holding which is the subject matter of the suit. The word used in Art. 109 is profits, and not mesne profits. There is no reason to suppose that the legislature intended that money received in respect of one tenant out of a number is not in its legal sense profits of immoveable property. 10. An objection has been taken to the admissibility of the appeal on the ground that sec. 586, C. C. P., bars a second appeal in this case. But this is not a second appeal; it is an appeal from an order under sec. 562 of the Code, and, under cl. (28) of sec. 588, C. C. P., the right of appeal is specifically given from an order remanding a case. The preliminary objection, therefore, fails. The result of our decision is that the suit is dismissed and the appeal decreed with costs, one gold mohur, against the Plaintiffs-Respondents only. The Appellants are entitled to their costs in the lower Courts.