JUDGMENT 1. This is an appeal on behalf of the Plaintiff against an order by which a plaint was rejected under sec. 54, cl. (b) of the Civil Procedure Code, and which operates as a decree under sec. 2. In the plaint, as originally framed, the Plaintiff asked for a declaration that a bond alleged to have been executed by her on the 15th January 1891 in favour of the husband of the first Defendant was a forgery, that a petition of compromise alleged to have been filed by her in a suit to enforce the mortgage was never executed by her, and that the decree obtained in that suit on the 16th January 1903, on the basis of the aforesaid compromise, was fraudulent. The Plaintiff also asked for an injunction to restrain the Defendant from executing the mortgage decree under which her properties had been directed to be sold and the sale fixed for the 30th October 1903. The value of the properties advertised for sale was stated to be Rs. 80,000. The value of the relief by way of injunction was fixed at Rs. 100. A Court-fee of Rs. 10 was paid, as the suit was for a declaratory decree and an additional Court-fee of Rs. 7 annas 8 was paid according to the estimated value of the relief by way of injunction. The Defendant resisted the claim upon various grounds, amongst which it is sufficient to mention two, namely, that the relief sought was undervalued, and that the plaint was written upon paper insufficiently stamped. The Subordinate Judge held that the plaint was insufficiently stamped, that the suit ought to be valued at least at the sum covered by the decree, namely, Rs. 10,000, and that the plaint was liable to be rejected unless the deficiency in Court-fees was supplied within a time to be fixed by the Court. The Plaintiff was allowed two days' time to pay an additional sum of Rs. 475. The next day the Plaintiff applied for leave to amend the plaint by striking out the prayers for declaration that the mortgage bond was a forgery and for setting aside the decree. The Subordinate Judge refused the application and as the Court-fees were not deposited within the time fixed by the Court, rejected the plaint. 475. The next day the Plaintiff applied for leave to amend the plaint by striking out the prayers for declaration that the mortgage bond was a forgery and for setting aside the decree. The Subordinate Judge refused the application and as the Court-fees were not deposited within the time fixed by the Court, rejected the plaint. The Plaintiff has appealed to this Court, and on her behalf, the decision of the Subordinate Judge has been challenged substantially on two grounds, namely, first, that the suit is for a declaratory decree without consequential relief within the meaning of Sch. II, cl. 17 (iii) of the Court Fees Act and that consequently a Court-fee of Rs. 10 is sufficient; and, secondly, that if the suit is one for a declaratory decree with consequential relief, namely, to obtain an injunction, it is covered by sec. 7, sub-sec. (iv), cls. (r) and (d) of the Court Fees Act under which the Plaintiff is entitled to value the relief he seeks at any amount he chooses and to pay Court-fees on such amount. In our opinion each of these contentions is entirely unfounded and must be overruled. As regards the first content on, it is to be observed that cl. 17 (iii) of Sch. II of the Court Fees Act provides that the proper fee payable upon a plaint in a suit to obtain a declaratory decree where no consequential relief is prayed, is Rs. 10. In the present case, however, the Plaintiff not only asks for a declaration that the decree and the mortgage and con-promise on which the decree is based, are all fraudulent, but also asks for an injunction to restrain the decree-holder from proceeding with the execution of the decree. The claim for an injunction must be treated as a prayer for consequential relief. This is amply supported by authority: See Ful Kumari v. Ghaneshyam Missra I. L. R. 31 Cal. 511 (1903) Hari Shanker v. Kali Kumer I. L. R. 32 Cal. 734 (1905) Mufti Jelaluddin v. Shaharoolla 15 B. L. R. Ap. 1; 22 W. R. 422 (1874) Monohar v. Bawa I. L. R. 2 Bom. 219 (1877). Raghu Nath v. Gangadhar I. L. R. 10. Bom. 60 (1885) Sardar Singji v. Ganapat Singji I. L. R. 17 Bom. 56 (1892) Golab Singji v. Lakshman Singji I. L. R. 18 Bom. 734 (1905) Mufti Jelaluddin v. Shaharoolla 15 B. L. R. Ap. 1; 22 W. R. 422 (1874) Monohar v. Bawa I. L. R. 2 Bom. 219 (1877). Raghu Nath v. Gangadhar I. L. R. 10. Bom. 60 (1885) Sardar Singji v. Ganapat Singji I. L. R. 17 Bom. 56 (1892) Golab Singji v. Lakshman Singji I. L. R. 18 Bom. 100 (1893) The case of Zinnat-un-nessa v. Girindra Nath I. L. R. 30 Cal. 788 (1903) is not really opposed to this view, as the only prayer in the suit was for declaration that a certain decree was ineffectual and inoperative against the Plaintiffs; the Plaintiffs asked for a declaratory decree and did not ask for any consequential relief. At the stage the case was brought on appeal to this Court, no question could be raised as to whether a suit for a mere declaration without consequential relief could be maintained under the provisions of sec. 42 of the Specific Relief Act. Similar observations apply to the cases of Karam Khan v. Daryai Sing I. L. R. 5 All. 331 (1883) and Shrimant Sagaji Rao v. Smith I. L. R. 20 Bom. 736 (1895) The distinction between the two sets of authorities to which we have just referred, is pointedly brought out in the judgment of Mr. Justice Banerjea in Girijanand v. Shailajanand I. L. R. 23 Cal. 645 (1896) where it was observed that either consequential relief may be asked in addition to the prayer for declaration or the Plaintiff may content himself with a declaratory decree which may or may not by its own force result in consequential relief to him. In the former case the suit is to obtain a declaratory decree where consequential relief is prayed within the meaning of sec. 7, sub-sec. (iv), cl. (c); in the latter case the suit is to obtain a declaratory decree where no consequential relief is prayed within the meaning of cl. 17 (iii) of Sch. II of the Court Fees Act. In the present instance, the suit falls within the former and not the latter description. The first point taken on behalf of the Appellant must consequently be overruled. 2. As regards the second contention, advanced on behalf of the Appellant, we observe that sec. 17 (iii) of Sch. II of the Court Fees Act. In the present instance, the suit falls within the former and not the latter description. The first point taken on behalf of the Appellant must consequently be overruled. 2. As regards the second contention, advanced on behalf of the Appellant, we observe that sec. 7 of the Court Fees Act-we reproduce only so much of it as has any bearing upon the question raised before us-provides as follows: 7. The amount of fee payable under this Act in the suits next hereinafter mentioned shall be computed as follows : IV. In suits (c) To obtain a declaratory decree or order, where consequential relief is prayed, (d) To obtain an injunction. According to the amount at which the relief sought is valued in the plaint. In all such suits the Plaintiff shall state the amount at which he values the relief sought. 3. It is argued on behalf of the Appellant that this section entitled the Plaintiff to value the relief he seeks at any amount he chooses and to pay Court-fees on such amount, and that it is not open to the Court at the instance of the Defendant to enquire whether the valuation is proper and to compel the Plaintiff to alter the valuation if it is found to be too low. The question raised as to the true interpretation of this provision of the law, is of great importance; it is by no means free from difficulty, and as will presently appear, there has been some divergence of judicial opinion upon the subject. Before we review the authorities, however, it is necessary to refer to the history of the section which throws considerable light upon the question of its true construction. 4. In Act VII of 1870 (the Court Fees Act) in its original form, the last paragraph of sec. 7, sub-section (iv) was as follows:-" In all such suits the Plaintiff shall state the amount at which he values the relief sought, and the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 4. In Act VII of 1870 (the Court Fees Act) in its original form, the last paragraph of sec. 7, sub-section (iv) was as follows:-" In all such suits the Plaintiff shall state the amount at which he values the relief sought, and the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 31, shall apply, as if for the word ' claimed ' the words ' relief sought' were substituted." Sec. 31 of Act VIII of 1859 which is the CPC to which reference is made, was in these terms: " If it appear to the Court, that the claim is improperly valued, or being properly valued that the plaint is written upon stamped paper of inadequate value, and the Plaintiff on being required by the Court to correct such improper valuation or to supply such additional stamp paper as may be necessary, shall not comply with the requisition, the Court shall reject the plaint." When Act VIII of 1859 was replaced by the CPC of 1877 (Act X of 1877) the provisions of sec. 31 were reproduced as part of sec. 54 in the following terms: The plaint shall be rejected in the following cases: (a) If the relief sought is undervalued, and the Plaintiff on being required by the Court to correct the valuation within a time to be fixed by the Court, fails to do so: (b) If the relief sought is properly valued, but the plaint is written upon paper insufficiently stamped, and the Plaintiff on being required by the Court to supply the requisite stamped paper within a time to be fixed by the Court, fails to do so. 5. When the Code of 1877 was replaced by the present Code (Act XIV of 1882) this portion of sec. 54 was reproduced without any alteration. In 1891, when the Repealing and Amending Act (XII of 1891) was passed, Part I of the First Schedule repealed the following words from the last clause of sec. 7, sub-sec. (iv):- "And the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 54 was reproduced without any alteration. In 1891, when the Repealing and Amending Act (XII of 1891) was passed, Part I of the First Schedule repealed the following words from the last clause of sec. 7, sub-sec. (iv):- "And the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 31, shall apply as if for the word ' claim,' the words ' relief sought' were substituted." The first paragraph of the Preamble to Act XII of 1891 makes it quite clear that these words were repealed because they had become unnecessary; in other words, the legislature did not intend to alter the law, but only to omit words which had become superfluous, inasmuch as in the new CPC the terms " claim " had been replaced by the phrase " relief sought." From this history of the section, two inferences appear to us to be irresistible, namely, first, that when sec. 7 of the Court Fees Act was originally passed, the legislature intended that the right of the Plaintiff to state the amount at which he values the relief sought in suits to obtain a declaratory decree with consequential relief or an injunction, should be exercised subject to the power and duty of the Court to ascertain whether the valuation made was proper; and, secondly, that the legislature subsequently repealed the clause which made the provisions of sec. 31 of the CPC of 1859 expressly applicable with a modification, because subsequently the language of the Code itself was suitably modified so that the altered provision of the Code became applicable of its own proper vigour without an express provision in the Court Fees Act. It is hardly necessary to point out that whereas the word used in sec. 31 of Act VIII of 1859 was "claim," the term used in sec. 54 of Act X of 1877 and Act XIV of 1882 is "relief sought." This alteration in the language of the Code made the concluding words of the last clause of para, (iv) of sec. 7 of the Court Fees Act, unnecessary. We shall now refer to the authorities on the subject, many of which appear to us to have overlooked the history of the section. 6. 7 of the Court Fees Act, unnecessary. We shall now refer to the authorities on the subject, many of which appear to us to have overlooked the history of the section. 6. One of the earliest cases on the point in which the question was raised as to the right of the Plaintiff to put an arbitrary valuation upon the relief sought in cases of this description, is Monohar v. Bawa, I. L. R. 2 Bom. 219 (1877) The case then before the Court was one for accounts, and it appears to have been contended that it was open to the Plaintiff to set any arbitrary valuation upon the relief sought. Sir Michael Westroppe, C. J., declined to decide the question and observed that the interpretation, if accepted, might make sec. 31 of Act VIII of 1859 practically nugatory, though it was made expressly applicable. The learned Chief Justice, however, pointed out that in suits for accounts it was not desirable that the Judge should enhance the valuation on the reception of the plaint, because in most cases he could only make or conjecture as to the value of the relief sought and would be quite as likely to be wrong as to be right. With these observations we are disposed to agree; but we are not prepared to treat the case as an authority in support of the contention that the Court is powerless, even if the Plaintiff puts an arbitrary and manifestly unfair valuation upon the relief sought. The question was raised again in Sardar Singji v. Ganapat Singji I. L. R. 17 Bom. 56 (1892) which was a suit for declaration of title and for injunction and was decided by the High Court in 1892 after the Court Fees Act was amended by Act XII of 1891. Mr. Justice Jardine held that the valuation of the relief sought, vested with the Plaintiff and not with the Court. Mr. Justice Telang declined to express any opinion upon the general question and contented himself with the observation that in the particular case the valuation did not form part of the functions of the Court. In the High Court of Allahabad, the question was raised Ostoche v. Haridas I. L. R. 2 All. Mr. Justice Telang declined to express any opinion upon the general question and contented himself with the observation that in the particular case the valuation did not form part of the functions of the Court. In the High Court of Allahabad, the question was raised Ostoche v. Haridas I. L. R. 2 All. 869 (1880) which was a suit for a declaratory decree; the learned Judges held that under the Court Fees Act the valuation of the relief sought vested with the Plaintiff and not with the Court. In Jugal Kishore v. Tale Singh I. L. R. 4 All. 320 (1882) the same question was raised, the majority of the learned Judges held that the valuation of the suit vested with the Plaintiff. Mr. Justice Oldfield, however, held, that the valuation so made by the Plaintiff was subject to the provisions of sec. 54 of Act X of 1877. In Sheodeny Bom v. Tulsi Ram I. L. R. 15 All. 378 (1893) which arose out of a suit to declare the invalidity of a deed of adoption, the learned Judges held that it is for a Plaintiff to put his own valuation on the relief which he claims. In the High Court of Madras, the question appears to have been raised in the cases of Samiya v. Minammal I. L. R. 23 Mad. 490 (1899) Guru Vajamma v. Venkata I. L. R. 24 Mad. 34 (1900) and Chinnammal v. Madarsa Rowther I. L. R. 27 Mad. 480 (1903) in which it was ruled that the valuation given in the plaint by the Plaintiff cannot be revised. In this Court, the question was raised in Hari Shanker Dutt v. Kali Kumar Patra I. L. R. 32 Cal. 734 (1905) which arose out of a suit for eclaration of title to immoveable property and for an injunction restraining the Defendant from interfering with the possession of the Plaintiff. The learned Judges appear to have held that in the cases falling within the provisions of sub-sec. (iv), cls. (c) and (d) of sec. 7 of the Court Fees Act, it is not the duty nor is it within the power of the Court, to ascertain the value of the property for the purposes of jurisdiction. The learned Judges appear to have held that in the cases falling within the provisions of sub-sec. (iv), cls. (c) and (d) of sec. 7 of the Court Fees Act, it is not the duty nor is it within the power of the Court, to ascertain the value of the property for the purposes of jurisdiction. It was ruled that the value of the relief stated in the plaint should be accepted both for the purposes of determining the Court-fees and the jurisdiction of the Court to try the suit. No doubt the language used by the learned Judges may lend some support to the suggestion that they laid down a general rule of law, but this they could hardly have intended to do, as their view is clearly opposed to the decision of this Court in Baidyanath v. Makham Lal I. L. R. 17 Cal. 680 (1890) to which reference is made in their judgment. In the case just mentioned, it was laid down by Sir Comer Petheram, C. J., and Mr. Justice Banerjee, that in cases falling under sec. 7, sub-sec. (iv) of the Court Fees Act, although the Plaintiff is to state the amount at which he values the relief sought, the legislature never intended that the Plaintiff should be at liberty to assign any arbitrary value and thus be free to choose the Court in which he should bring his suit. The learned Judges relied upon sees. 7, 8 and 11 of the Suits Valuation Act (VII of 1887) as clearly indicating that this could not have been the intention of the legislature. In our opinion, this view is unquestionably well-founded and, as has been shown above, it is supported by the history of the section. The same view has been adopted in the case of Hari Chand v. Jiwan Mal 4 Punj. L. Rep. 255 It may very well be that in some instances the Court will be slow to question the propriety of the valuation put by the Plaintiff on the relief sought; but we do not think it can be affirmed as an inflexible rule of law that it is not open to the Court to revise the valuation put by the Plaintiff, when it is conclusively established that it is arbitrary and improper. To adopt such an interpretation is to enable an unscrupulous litigant to defraud the Government and to oust the jurisdiction of the Court which is competent to adjudicate the matters in controversy. The history of the section proves conclusively that such was not the intention of the legislature and we are satisfied that the language of the Court Fees Act as it stands, at present, does not necessitate the conclusion that the Plaintiff is at liberty to put any arbitrary valuation upon the relief sought. We must consequently hold that in cases covered by sec. 7, sub-sec. (iv), cls. (c) and (d) of the Court Fees Act, although it is for the Plaintiff to state the amount at which he values the relief sought and although the amount of Court-fees payable varies with the amount at which the relief sought is valued in the plaint, it is open to the Court, if a question is raised, as to the true valuation of the suit, to determine such question and that it is not only within the power of the Court but it is also its duty to take action under sec. 54 of the Civil Procedure Code, if it is established that the valuation is improper. 7. If these principles are applied to the facts of the case before us the inference becomes irresistible that the Plaintiff is completely out of Court. The Plaintiff values the relief by way of injunction which she seeks at Rs. 100. If the injunction is granted, she is benefited to the extent of Rs. 10,000; she escapes liability for payment of this sum which the Defend ant is entitled to recover under the decree. The grant of the injunction therefore while it benefits the Plaintiff to this extent, deprives the Defendant of the benefit of her decree precisely to the same extent. Upon what intelligible principle, then, can it be affirmed that the Plaintiff is entitled to value the relief she seeks by way of injunction at an arbitrary sum of Rs. 100. If the Plaintiff had been consistent, the suit would lie in the Court of the Munsif, because under sec. 8 of the Suits Valuation Act in a case of this description the value as determinable for the computation of Court-fees must be the same as the value for purposes of jurisdiction, [Golab Singji v. Lakshman Singji I. L. R. 18 Bom. 8 of the Suits Valuation Act in a case of this description the value as determinable for the computation of Court-fees must be the same as the value for purposes of jurisdiction, [Golab Singji v. Lakshman Singji I. L. R. 18 Bom. 100 (1893) and Bai Varnunda v. Bai Manegavri I. L. R. 18 Bom. 207 (1893)]. 8. It follows, therefore, that the arbitrary valuation put by the Plaintiff upon the prayer for relief by way of injunction must be rejected. The question consequently arises what is the proper valuation. In the present case this question is free from difficulty. The decree, as we have stated, is for Rs. 10,000, the value of the property sought to be sold is Rs. 80,000; the value of the relief in such a case is obviously the sum sought to be realized under the decree [see Venkappa v. Narasimha I. L. R. 10 Mad. 187 (1887) and Jagatdhar v. Brown I. L. R. 33 Cal. 1138 (1906)]. Reference may also be made by way of analogy to the provisions of sec. 7, sub-sec. (viii) of the Court Fees Act. If, therefore, the valuation of the relief by way of injunction is Rs. 10,000, the Plaintiff is bound to pay the additional amount of Court-fees, which she was directed to pay by the Subordinate Judge. The second ground upon which the decision of the Court below is challenged, cannot accordingly be sustained. 9. As there is some conflict of judicial opinion upon the point raised in this case, we think the Plaintiff ought to have an opportunity to pay the additional amount of Court-fees in this Court. She will be allowed six weeks time from the date of this judgment to pay in this Court the additional amount of Court-fees, namely, Rs. 465. If she does so, the order of the Court below will be discharged and the case remitted for trial on the merits. If she fails to do so, the appeal will stand dismissed. In either event, however, the Defendant-Respondent will be entitled to her costs in the Court below as also in this Court. We assess the hearing fee in this Court at 2 gold mohurs. The decree of this Court will be drawn up after six weeks from this date in accordance with the event which may actually happen.