JUDGMENT 1. This la an appeal against the judgment of the learned Subordinate Judge In favour of the Plaintiffs. An action was brought by certain persons who are members of a firm for money advanced by that firm to the Defendant No. 1. The firm in question consisted of the Plaintiffs Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 and two other persons who appear on the record in the category of Defendants, namely, Defendants 2 and 3. These persons were the brothers of the Plaintiffs 1 and 2. It has not been disputed that the money was advanced by the firm to the Defendant and that it has not been repaid; but the Defendant says that he cannot be sued by the present Plaintiffs because the loan in question was covered by a hatchitta given in favour of Ramprosad and Mrittunjoy, and that Ramprosad having already sued on that hatchitta and having failed to recover judgment, the present Plaintiffs are debarred from recovering the debt in respect of which the hatchitta was given. 2. Now, the hatchitta was given in favour of Ramprosad and Mrittunjoy. Mritttunjoy died. Ramprosad brought an action claiming the debt as though it were due not to the firm but to himself, and for the purpose of representing that the debt was due to himself, he fraudulently struck out the name of Mrittunjoy from the hatchitta and forged the Defendant's signature to the alteration in the hatchitta. The suit which he brought on this forged document was dismissed and it is contended that Ramprosad's action extinguished the debt due to the present Plaintiffs. 3. The first proposition insisted upon by the learned vakil for the Appellant is that Ramprosad could not sue in respect of the present debt. To that proposition, we agree. 4. The second proposition insisted on by him is that the debt has been extinguished by the action brought by Ramprosad. In this proposition we do not agree. Ramprosad's action was not for the debt alleged to be due to the partnership but for a debt alleged to be due to himself. To that proposition, we agree. 4. The second proposition insisted on by him is that the debt has been extinguished by the action brought by Ramprosad. In this proposition we do not agree. Ramprosad's action was not for the debt alleged to be due to the partnership but for a debt alleged to be due to himself. It is true the suit was dismissed on the ground that the document which he had relied on as evidence of the debt was fraudulent: and even if it had not been fraudulent, the suit could not possibly have succeeded because he was suing in his individual capacity for a debt which was due not to him in his individual capacity but was due to the firm of which he was a member. The position, therefore, with regard to Ramprosad's action is this that Ramprosad is in precisely the same position as he would have been if the action had been dismissed on the ground that the debt was due not to him but to the firm, and the firm was not then suing in respect of It. For these reasons, It appears to us that Ramprosad's action does not affect the right of the present Plaintiffs. 5. The learned vakil for the Appellant cited the case of Master v. Miller 2 R. R. 899; 4 Term Rep, 320 (1891) as an authority for the proposition that where an alteration is made in an in strument given in respect of a debt, that extinguishes the debt; but that case has no application to the present one. That was an alteration in a Negotiable Instrument and the Negotiable Instrument having been accepted as payment for the debt operated to extinguish the debt. Here in the present case, it is not a Negotiable Instrument and that distinguishes this case from that cited by the learned vakil for the Appellant. 6. Then he relies on another case, Gour Chandra v. Prasanno Kumar I. L. R. 83 Cal. 812 (1906), In which a bond was sued upon which had been fraudulently altered : and in the course of the judgment it was pointed out that the Plaintiff having fraudulently altered it, bad destroyed the evidence of the debt and that there was no evidence to sue on the original consideration. 812 (1906), In which a bond was sued upon which had been fraudulently altered : and in the course of the judgment it was pointed out that the Plaintiff having fraudulently altered it, bad destroyed the evidence of the debt and that there was no evidence to sue on the original consideration. That case is distinguishable from the present because the persons who are suing in the present case were not parties to the alteration in the hatchitta and they have done nothing which precludes them from giving evidence of their debt. 7. To enable the Appellant to succeed, he would have to show that the fraud committed by Ramprosad was imputable to the firm. The proposition of law which is laid down in Lindley on Partnership, p. 189, and which the Appellant would have to meet is this: A fraud committed by a partner while acting on his own separate account is not in: putable to the firm, although had he not been connected with the firm he might not have been in a position to commit the fraud. In the present case though Ramprosad would not have been able to commit the fraud if he had not been connected with the firm, and had access to the hatchitta, yet, inasmuch as he did it. on his own separate account and not as agent for the firm to which the debt was really owing, such fraud is not Imputable to the Plaintiffs' firm and they were not barred from realising the debt which is due to them. 8. For these reasons we think that the judgment of the learned Subordinate Judge in favour of the Plaintiffs was right. A cross-objection is taken on behalf of the Plaintiffs against so much of the judgment of the learned Judge as directs that Ramprosad and his brother are to have no portion of the debt which is recoverable by the firm. 9. We think that the objection as to this part of the judgment must be sustained; because the learned Judge had no jurisdiction to interfere as between the partners of the firm with regard to the share of the debt which would be allocated to them, inter se. This is a question which can only be decided when the accounts of the partnership are taken. This is a question which can only be decided when the accounts of the partnership are taken. As between particular partners, the Court in deciding only whether a debt is or is not due has no power to say in what proportion the partners should share in the proceeds. 10. For these reasons, we dismiss the appeal against the judgment of the learned Subordinate Judge subject only to this modification that the direction that Defendants Nos. 2 and 3 are to have no share of the debt to be recovered must be expunged. In this view, we direct that the amount claim by the Plaintiffs be paid over to them fur their firm. The Plaintiff-Respondents will be entitled to costs of the appeal and of the cross-objection.