Judgement Appeal from a decree of the High Court (February 14, 1902) affirming a decree of the Subordinate Judge of Madura (East) dated July 20, 1899. The suit was brought by the Raj ah of Ranmad} as the hereditary trustee of the Hindu temple of Meenatchi Sundareswara, situate in the town of Kamudi, for a declaration that the members of the Shanar community are not en titled to enter the temple, and for an injunction restraining them from doing so and for a sum of Rs.2500 as damages. The defendants were Shanars and were sued as representing the whole community of Shanars, resident in or about Kamudi, under Civil Procedure Code, s. 30. The Defendants pleaded, inter alia, that the members of their community have a right to the use of the temple and to participate in the worship therein. The Subordinate Judge made the declaration and injunction prayed for and awarded Rs.500 as damages. On appeal the High Court affirmed the decree with costs. The findings of the Subordinate Judge were as follows— (1.) That the Nadars were not a distinct and separate community from the Shanars, whose hereditary occupation was the cultivation of the palmyra tree and cocoanut palm, and the extraction and manufacture of their juice; (2.) that persons belonging to that class were prohibited from entering the plaint temple by the rules of worship therein observed; (8.) that a custom was proved excluding Shanars from entering the said temple; (4.) that the acts of sacrilege alleged to have been done by the appellants on May 14, 1897, were not done by them, and that the plaintiffs case was in this respect false; (5.) that the Civil Courts could take cognizance of the present suit; (6.) that in Consequence of the entry into the temple purification was necessary, and that the defendants ought to pay Rs.500 for this purpose. While the appeal was pending before the High Court, and on July 23, 1901, a petition, signed by the plaintiff and the appellants, was preferred on behalf of the latter, stating that the parties had effected a compromise of the matters in suit, and praying that the compromise might be recorded and a decree passed in accordance therewith. While the appeal was pending before the High Court, and on July 23, 1901, a petition, signed by the plaintiff and the appellants, was preferred on behalf of the latter, stating that the parties had effected a compromise of the matters in suit, and praying that the compromise might be recorded and a decree passed in accordance therewith. The agreement of compromise, a copy of which was annexed to the petition, was to the following effect—" First, the plaintiff shall not exclude the defendants and their caste people from exercising their right of free access to and of worshipping in the said temple of Kamudi, but shall allow them to enjoy and exercise their said right of free access and worship in the same manner and to the same extent as such rights are enjoyed by Vellala, Chetty, and other Sudra sects of the Hindu community. Secondly, the defendants shall enjoy and exercise their said rights in the same manner and to the same extent as the aforesaid sects of the Hindu community enjoy them, and that they have no higher rights of access and worship in respect of the temple, and that the defendants are not liable to pay the plaintiff any sum of money by way of damages; and, thirdly, each party shall bear their own costs of the suit and the appeal. It is further agreed that the plaintiff and the defendants shall present a joint petition or petitions to the High Court, praying that the said decree on the file of the Subordinate Court of Madura (East) be reversed, and that a decree should be passed in accordance with the terms of this agreement." Thereupon two of the worshippers of the temple in question, and also the infant son and heir apparent of the original plaintiff, by his mother and next friend, were joined as party respondents to the appeal, in order that they might oppose the petition of compromise, to which they took various objections which were stated in the evidence filed in support of their applications. When the petition of compromise came on for hearing it was supported by the appellants alone, and opposed not only by the newly-joined plaintiffs, but also by the original plaintiff, who expressed the desire to withdraw from the compromise. When the petition of compromise came on for hearing it was supported by the appellants alone, and opposed not only by the newly-joined plaintiffs, but also by the original plaintiff, who expressed the desire to withdraw from the compromise. The petition was dismissed on the ground that the agreement of compromise put forward was not a lawful agreement or com-promise within the meaning of Civil Procedure Code, s. 375. The learned judges said "It has been judicially established before the Subordinate Judge that the defendants ‘belong to a class which under custom and the shastras are prohibited from entering the plaint temple, and that their having done so caused defilement, which necessitated the purificatory ceremonies. "That finding is binding on the plaintiff as well as on the defendants, and he cannot take upon himself to say I have made further inquiries. I am satisfied that the finding of the Court is wrong. I shall, therefore, allow the Shanars to enter the temple. "To do this would be to ignore and alter the fundamental character and uses of the temple as ascertained by judicial authority. It is not in the power of the trustees to do this. This principle was laid down by Eldon L.C. in the case of Attorney-General v. Pearson ((1817) 3 Mer, 353, 400.) in these words Where an institution exists for the purpose of religious worship, and it cannot be discovered from the deed declaring the trust what form or species of religious worship was intended, the Court can find no other means of deciding the question than through the medium of an inquiry into what has been the usage of the congregation in respect to it; and, if the usage turns out upon inquiry to be such as can be supported, I take it to be the duty of the Court to administer the trust in such a manner as best to establish the usage, considering it as a matter of implied contract between the members of that congregation. But if, on the other hand, it turns out that the institution was established for the express purpose of such form of religious worship, or the teaching of such particular doctrines, as the founder has thought most conformable to the principles of the Christian religion, I do not apprehend that it is in the power of individuals having the management of that institution at any time to alter the purpose for which it was founded, or to say to the remaining members, "We have changed our opinions, and you, who assemble in this place for the purpose of hearing the doctrines, and joining in the worship, prescribed by the founder, shall no longer enjoy the benefit he intended for you unless you conform to the alteration which has taken place in our opinions." J " These words, no doubt, were used with reference to the regulation of religious trusts in England by the Court of Chancery, but we apprehend that, mutatis mutandis, the Court will be guided by the same principles in this country. Where an institution exists for the purpose of religious worship, but the exact form of worship, or the class for whose benefit it was established, cannot be discovered from the instrument creating the trust, or where, as in the present case, there is no such instrument, the Court can find no other means of deciding those questions than through the medium of an inquiry into what has been the usage of the worshippers in respect thereto, and, if the usage is a lawful one, it is the duty of the Court to support that usage on the suit, legally instituted, of any person interested. It is not in the power of individuals having the management of the institution to alter the purpose for which it was founded, or to say to the other worshippers, We have changed our opinions, and you, who resort to this place for the purpose of worshipping in the customary manner, shall no longer enjoy the benefit intended for you unless you conform to the alteration which has taken place in our opinions, even to the extent of submitting to the presence of other worshippers who are prohibited by custom and the shastras from entering into the temple. It is not in the power of any trustee to say this to the other worshippers in a temple. It is not in the power of any trustee to say this to the other worshippers in a temple. On the contrary, it is the duty of the trustee to maintain the customary usage of the institution, and if he fails to do so he is, in our opinion, guilty of a breach of trust, and still more so if he deliberately attempts to effect a vital change of usageand to make it binding on the worshippers by obtaining a decree of the Court to establish it. "The defendants, however, contend that, as the decree of the Subordinate Judge in this case is under appeal, the appeal opens up the whole question as to whether the Shanars are or are not prohibited from entering into and worshipping in the temple, and there is no binding decision as to what the usage is, and therefore no breach of trust on the first plaintiff s part in making the agreement to admit the Shanars to the temple. " This contention, it seems to us, rests on a fallacy and is invalid. The appeal, no doubt, opens up the whole question for the decision of the Appellate Court, but pen ding that decision the decree of the Subordinate Judge does not cease to be binding on the parties. Pending that decision they are just as much bound by the decree as if there was no appeal. In view, then, of the finding of. the Subordinate Judge that the Shanars are prohibited by custom and by the shastras from entering the plaint temple, we must hold that the proposed compromise by the first plaintiff involves a breach of trust on his part, and is therefore not a lawful compromise within the meaning of s. 375 of the Code of Civil Procedure." The High Court thereafter dismissed the appeal, finding that " there can be no doubt that the evidence adduced by the plaintiffs as to the custom of the plaint temple is far superior in weight and credibility to that adduced by the defendants and is in fact sufficient to establish the contention of the plaintiffs that the . Shanars are by custom prohibited from entering the plaint temple." The judgment then proceeded " A great deal of evidence has been adduced with regard to the rights of the Shanars to enter Hindu temples, other than the plaint temple, whether in other parts of the Madura district or in other districts of the Presidency. There is some evidence on defendants side that Nadars have been allowed to enter certain Hindu temples in the Tanjore and Coimbatore districts, and at Chidambaram in the South Arcot district, and also at Palani in the Madura district, but there is an overwhelming preponderance of evidence on the plaintiffs7 side against the existence of any such right in the temples generally in the Madura district.....So far as an inference with regard to the custom in the plaint temple can be drawn from the practice in other Sivaite temples of the Madura district, the evidence on this point is strongly in favour of the plaintiffs contention. The evidence adduced is too meagre to establish any custom in regard to the practice of temples at a distance from Madura, and in any case the inference to be drawn from such practice, if established, grows weaker in proportion to the distance from the plaint temple. " A great mass of evidence on both sides was adduced with reference to the issue as to whether the defendants belong to a class inferior to the other classes that worship there; but, as already remarked, this question is relevant only in so far as it leads to an inference with regard to the alleged prohibition against the Shanars entering the plaint temple. The evidence is, as might be expected, conflicting, but there can be no doubt whatever as to its general result. There is no sort of proof, nothing, we may say, that even suggests a probability, that the Shanars are, as the defendants contend, descendants from the Kshatriya or Warrior caste of Hindus, or from the Pandiya, Chola, or Chera race of kings, and the futile attempt of the Shanars to eatablish the connection has brought well-deserved ridicule on their pre-tensions. Nor is there any distinction to be drawn between the Nadars and the Shanars. Shanar is the general name of the caste, just as Vellala and Maravar designate castes. Nor is there any distinction to be drawn between the Nadars and the Shanars. Shanar is the general name of the caste, just as Vellala and Maravar designate castes. 1 Nadar is a mere title, more or less honorific, assumed by certain members or families of the caste, just as Brahmins are called Aiyars, Aiyangars, and Rows. All Nadars are Shanars by caste, unless, indeed, they have abandoned caste, as many of them have by becoming Christians. The Shanars, as a class, have from time immemorial been devoted to the cultivation on the palmyra palm and to the collection of its juice and the manufacture of liquor from it. Their own local traditions connect them with the toddy drawers of Ceylon, whence the Tiyans, or toddy drawers of the west coast, are also supposed to have immigrated. There are no grounds whatever for regarding them as of Aryan origin. Their worship was a form of demonology, and their position in general social estimation appears to have been just above that of Pallas, Pariahs, and Chucklies (who are on all hand regarded as unclean and prohibited from the use of the Hindu temples), and below that of Vellalas, Maravars, and other cultivating castes usually classed as Sudras, and admittedly free to worship in the Hindu temples. In process of time many of the Shanars took to cultivation, trade, and money-lending, and to-day there is a numerous and prosperous body of Shanars who have no immediate concern with the immemorial calling of their caste. In many villages they own much of the land and monopolize the bulk of the trade and wealth. With the increase of wealth they have, not unnaturally, sought for social recognition and to be treated on a footing of equality in religious matters. " In a few individual cases in Tanjore and other districts away from Madura they appear to have, to some extent, succeeded, but the general attempt of the caste to force itself to an equality with the better castes in social and religious matters has been fiercely resisted in the southern districts, and especially in Madura, where serious rioting and loss of life have resulted. The general result of the oral evidence as to the position of the Shanars in the social scale, as above stated, is abundantly borne out by all the best authorities who have written on the subject. The general result of the oral evidence as to the position of the Shanars in the social scale, as above stated, is abundantly borne out by all the best authorities who have written on the subject. Extracts from these are given in paragraph 59 of the Subordinate Judges judgment. The reference to the Abbe Dubois work is inaccurate, but the other extracts are to much the same effect. We refer to a few of them. In the official report on the census of 1871 (exhibit L) it is stated The Shanar people, in whatever district they may be found, are clearly a non-Aryan people. The relations of the sexes and their religious development are just those of all aboriginal people. In Tinnevelly and Canara they are chiefly devil-worshippers. In Malabar they have hardly any religion at all, beyond the worship of some local deities. They are chiefly classed as Sivaites 68.3 percent., but 24.4 per cent. are nominally Vishnuvites. They have their own gurus or priests in the Sivaite sects, but Brahmins officiate for the Vishnuvites; and again, it has been ascertained that many of the Shanars of Tinnevelly returned themselves as Kshatriyas, a position in the caste system which they have no claim to " In Baierleins Land of the Tamilians, published in 1875 (exhibit M), it is stated It was amongst this simple race of palmyra farmers, the Shanars, some of whom also cultivate the land, that Christianity has celebrated her most important victories in India. Living at the southern extremity of India and possessing only a barren country, they were not much affected either by the Brahmin immigrations or by the Mahomedan sway. The Brahmins suffered them to drag their idol cars, but did not permit them to enter the temples. In this way they retained their own gods and their own worship. Their gods were demons, with an influence for evil only. “ In Garretts Classical Dictionary of India 1871 (exhibit K), the Shanars are described as a low caste very numerous in Tinnevelly, whose hereditary occupation is that of cultivating and climbing the palmyra palm, the juice of which they boil into a coarse sugar. This is one of those occupations which are restricted by Hindu usage to members of a particular caste. This is one of those occupations which are restricted by Hindu usage to members of a particular caste. The majority of the Shanars confine themselves to the hard and weary labour appointed to their race; but a considerable number have become cultivators of the soil, as landowners or farmers, or are engaged in trade. They may in general be described as belonging to the highest division of the lower classes or the lowest of the middle classes; poor, but not paupers ; rude and unlettered, but by many degrees removed from a savage state. Demonolatry, or devil-worship, is the only term by which the religion of the Shanars can be accurately described. " In Sir W. W. Hunters Gazetteer of. India (exhibit U), 1887, we read The Shanars are a low caste, living solely by the cultivation of the palmyra palm. They claim (perhaps with justice) to be the original lords of the soil. Christian missions have been especially successful among them. Devil-worship is common, especially among the Shanars. Tinnevelly has been less influenced by pure Hinduism than other districts. Some Brahmins have even taken up the local devil-worship. "In the Manual of the Tanjore District (exhibit Q), compiled by the order of Government in 1883, we read Shanars, fishermen, Oddars, Kuravars and Tombars, all held in about the same degree of exclusion, none of them being allowed to enter the houses of caste people, temples or choultries. " Again Dr. Caldwell in his Dravidian Grammar page 77, says In Northern India, the Sudra is a low caste man; in Southern India he ranks next to the Brahmin, and the place which he occupies in the social scale is immeasurably superior, not only to that of the Pariahs and agricultural slaves, but also to that of the unenslaved low castes, such as the fishermen and the cultivators of the cocoanut and the palmyra palms. " These and the other extracts from various writers which have been filed as evidence in the case give no support to the pre-tensions of the Shanars. On the contrary, they go a considerable way to suggest that the Shanars are not likely to have a right by immemorial custom to worship in Sivaite temples, but are rather likely, from their low original occupation and social estimation, and the demonological character of their worship, to be excluded from such temples. On the contrary, they go a considerable way to suggest that the Shanars are not likely to have a right by immemorial custom to worship in Sivaite temples, but are rather likely, from their low original occupation and social estimation, and the demonological character of their worship, to be excluded from such temples. The Shanars admittedly have a temple of their own in Kamudi dedicated to Subrahmania Badrakali, and there are many other such temples elsewhere. " Another matter from which an inference as to the custom of the temple may well be drawn is that referred to in the fifth issue, which runs as follows Whether there are shastras prohibiting the defendants from entering and worshipping in the plaint temple. " The Subordinate Judge has examined this question at length, and his conclusion is that, according to the Agama shastras, which are received as authoritative by worshippers of Siva in the Madura district, entry into a temple where the ritual prescribed by these shastras is observed is prohibited to all those whose profession is the manufacture of intoxicating liquor and the climbing of palmyra and cocoanut trees. No argument was addressed to us to shew that this finding is incorrect, and we see no reason to think that it is so. It might, of course, be that the local custom differed from the rule laid down by the shastras, but, in the absence of evidence, the inference to which the shastras would lead is that Shanars are prohibited, owing to their hereditary caste occupation, from entering the Sivaite temples, and we have already seen that this is also the con clusion to be drawn from all the other evidence in the case. No doubt many of the Shanars have abandoned that occupation and have won for themselves, by education, industry, and frugality, respectable positions as traders and merchants and even as vakils and clerks, and it is natural to feel sympathy for their efforts to obtain social recognition and to rise to what is regarded as a higher form of religious worship; but such sympathy will not be increased by unreasonable and unfounded pretensions, and in the effort to rise the Shanars must not invade the established rights of other castes. They have temples of their own, and are numerous enough and strong enough in wealth and education to rise along their own lines and without appropriating the institutions or infringing the rights of others, and in so doing they will have the sympathy of all right-minded men, and, if necessary, the protection of the Courts. The only other question is as to the remedy to which the plaintiffs are en titled in the present case. There can be no doubt but that the defendants did enter the temple not with-standing the protests of the temple authorities on May 14, 1897, and that, as purificatory ceremonies .were thereby rendered necessary, the plaintiffs are entitled to damages. We do not think that the sum of Rs.500 awarded by the Subordinate Judge is excessive. Plaintiffs are also entitled to the declaration and injunction given by the Subordinate Judge in order to prevent a recurrence of the trespass." De Gruyther, K.C, and Kyffin, for the appellants, contended that the decree of the High Court ought to be reversed. They contended that the compromise filed in the High Court was binding on the respondents and ought to have been enforced. Reference was made to s. 375 of the Civil Procedure Code, and it was contended that the compromise was valid within the meaning of that section and as being within the powers of the plaintiff as trustee acting bona fide. The Courts wrongly held that the Nadars and Shanars belong to the same caste and that it was a degraded one; also that a custom of exclusion was proved. Even if proved it was invalid in law as unreasonable. If con-current findings of fact in this case cannot be disturbed, the decree, it was contended, was too general in its terms, and its operation ought to be confined to the actual parties defendant to the suit. The respondents did not appear. The reasons for the report were delivered by LORD ROBERTSON. The question between the parties is whether the appellants and the caste to which they belong have legal right to enter and worship in a temple at Kamudi. This temple is dedicated to the worship of Shiva, and the customary ceremonies of Hindu worship are there carried on. It is common ground between the disputants that the appellants represent a caste called the Nadar or Shanar caste. This temple is dedicated to the worship of Shiva, and the customary ceremonies of Hindu worship are there carried on. It is common ground between the disputants that the appellants represent a caste called the Nadar or Shanar caste. It is alleged by the respondents that the presence of persons belonging to the appellants caste is repugnant to the religious principles of the Hindu worship of Shiva and to the sentiments of the caste Hindus who worship in this temple, and that it is contrary to custom in this temple. Both Courts in India have decided against the appellants, the judgment of the Subordinate Judge discussing the question in great detail and with much research, and the High Court at Madras resting their decision upon extremely comprehensible and cogent grounds. The controversy touches, but does not involve, delicate and abstruse questions of Hindu religious doctrine. In the view of their Lordships it admits of decision upon a much more palpable and limited range of facts. First of all, the appellants, as matter of fact, worship by themselves in a temple of their own. Second, the result of the evidence is a complete failure to prove any resort by persons of the appellants caste to the temple in dispute. Those two facts not merely negative the case of the appellants that they “have been from time immemorial .... participating in the pooja and worship" in the disputed temple, but they make easy the respondents further contention that this separation in worship between the two classes was not accidental or voluntary, but rested on a deeper ground. The evidence has been admirably analysed by the High Court, and their appreciation of the quality of the evidence on the one side and on the other, concurring as it does with that of the Subordinate Judge, is entitled to the greatest weight. The argument addressed to their Lordships was directed rather against the soundness of the doctrine asserted by the respondents as involving the exclusion of Nadars, and it was endeavoured to shew that there were inconsistencies in the respondents treatment of the appellants in other respects. All this, however, as matter of theological argument, is too rationalistic; while, on the other hand, it wanders from the region of fact and custom. All this, however, as matter of theological argument, is too rationalistic; while, on the other hand, it wanders from the region of fact and custom. What the respondents have succeeded in proving is that by custom the appellants are not among the people for whose worship this particular temple exists. Their Lordships have spoken of "the respondents " generally; but it is necessary to note the episode in the proceedings euphemistically described as "the compromise." The original plaintiff in the suit was the rajah, who was the hereditary trustee of this temple, which was the temple of one of the villages in his zemindari. After the case had been decided in his favour by the Subordinate Judge, this person thought fit to profess that he now saw that he and the judge were wrong; and he asked that the judgment should be altered, so as to defeat his own action. A very sordid motive for this surrender was specifically asserted and has not been disproved. The Court, on being applied to, very properly reinforced the cause of the worshippers of the temple by joining certain new plaintiffs to the original plaintiff (whose confidence in the justice of his suit had by this time convalesced). The principles applicable to the case of a trustee who thus betrays his trust by surrendering a decree have been well stated and applied by the High Court. For these reasons their Lordships, on June 16 last, agreed humbly to advise His Majesty that the appeal ought to be dismissed, and ordered the appellants to pay the costs of the appeal.