JUDGMENT 1. The present appeal arises out of a suit brought for apportionment of rent and for recovery of arrears of rent. The Plaintiff claimed to be entitled to a 10 anna share of the rent by virtue of a purchase made by him of the zamindari right of Lot Bajeh Santra recorded in the Burdwan Collectorate as Towzl No. 1274 in execution of a certificate of the Birbhum Collectorate against Defendants Nos. 5 to 9 and their co-sharers. The Plaintiff after his purchase got his name registered as proprietor under the Land Registration Act and sued to recover rents from the tenant Defendants Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 4. The Court of first instance decreed the suit, but on appeal the District Judge set aside the judgment and decree of the Court of first instance and dismissed the suit. 2. It appears that in a suit brought by one Golam Karim and some of the pro forma Defendants in the present suit against the present Plaintiff with the object of setting aside the sale held in pursuance of the certificate granted under the Public Demands Recovery Act (Act I (B.C.) of 1885), that being the sale at which the present Plaintiff made his purchase and claimed his title as land-lord, it was held on appeal to this Court that there was no power in the Burdwan Court to send the certificate for execution to the Birbhum Court and therefore that the subsequent proceedings under which the property was sold by the Birbhum Court were not legal as that Court had no power whatever to sell the property. The sale was accordingly held to be vitiated and void ab initio. 3. The learned Judge of the lower Appellate Court relying on that judgment of this Court in the case brought by some of the original co-sharer proprietors of the estate to have the effect of declaring that the sale under which the Plaintiff claimed his right as purchaser was void, held that the Plaintiff in the present suit was not entitled to recover rent even though he had been registered as a part proprietor, by purchase, in the estate. The Plaintiff has appealed and it has been contended that the Defendants were precluded from setting up the defence on which the lower Appellate Court relied by the provisions of sec. 60 of the Bengal Tenancy Act. The Plaintiff has appealed and it has been contended that the Defendants were precluded from setting up the defence on which the lower Appellate Court relied by the provisions of sec. 60 of the Bengal Tenancy Act. It seems, however, doubtful whether this case, having regard to its peculiar circumstances, can be regarded as one which properly comes within the purview of that section. No doubt the object of that section was to give to a registered proprietor facilities for recovering rent and to prevent tenants from setting up false and vexatious defences by pleading that a third person not registered was entitled to receive rent. But the proof furnished by the proprietor of registration under the Act would only amount to proof of the title under which he claimed to bring the suit; and if, as in the present case, it were proved that the title which he claimed to hold and in respect of which he had been registered had been held by a Court properly constituted to be void and of no effect, then it seems questionable whether the provisions of sec. 60 could be held to apply to prevent a tenant from giving in defence to a suit brought against him for rent evidence to prove that the title under which the Plaintiff claimed to recover rent and in respect of which he had been registered had been held to be invalid. In our opinion the contention advanced on behalf of the Appellant in this appeal cannot prevail. The judgment of this Court on which the learned District Judge has relied clearly lays down that the sale at which the Plaintiff claimed to acquire his title by purchase was void and of no effect and that being the case it must be held that the Plaintiff acquired no title under the sale. The mere fact that he had afterwards been registered on the basis of a title found to be void would not be sufficient to support the claim to recover rent when proof has been given by the Defendants that the title in respect of which the Plaintiff had been registered had no real existence. Though we are unable to agree in all the remarks made by the District Judge in his judgment we think that the conclusion at which he has arrived is correct and we therefore dismiss the appeal with costs.