JUDGMENT Maclean, C.J. - This is a suit by an administrator pendente lite to the estate of one Babu Gopal Lal Seal deceased, upon a kistibundi or instalment bond. It appears that Babu Gopal Lal Seal had obtained two decrees in this Court against the Defendants in certain rent suits, on account of arrears of certain putni mohal; that the property was proclaimed for sale for a sum of Rs. 11,549 odd, and the sale was fixed for the 16th of July 1898. By the bond in question dated the 11th of Aswin 1305, after reciting that the sum of Rs. 11,549 odd was due under the decrees and that they were unable to pay the money at once, and that Babu Gopal Lal Seal had agreed to take the sum of Rs. 9,115 odd by instalments, after allowing remission of Rs. 2,434 from the aforesaid amount, the Defendants executed the bond and as security hypothecated certain properties mentioned in the schedule. It was in fact a mortgage bond. Then there was a provision that if there were default in payment of the instalments, it should be competent to Babu Gopal Lal Seal to realise the money in execution of the decrees, and in default of payment of two consecutive Instalments the entire amount including the amount remitted, should be realisable in execution of the decrees. The Defendants have only paid about Rs. 800 under the bond, and the execution of the decree has become barred by limitation. A substantial sum is due under the bond. The Plaintiff as representative of Babu Gopal Lal Seal sues for that amount, and for the realisation of the sum out of the hypothecated property. The only defence that has been submitted to us is that the mortgage bond is void under sec. 257A of the Code of Civil Procedure. The Court below took this view and dismissed the suit: and, the only question argued before us on this appeal was whether that view was correct. The only defence that has been submitted to us is that the mortgage bond is void under sec. 257A of the Code of Civil Procedure. The Court below took this view and dismissed the suit: and, the only question argued before us on this appeal was whether that view was correct. Sec. 257A, so far as it is material, runs as follows : " Every agreement to give time for the satisfaction of a judgment-debt shall be void unless it is made for consideration, and with the sanction of the Court which passed the decree, and such Court deems the consideration to be under the circumstances reasonable." It is urged that the bond was a mere agreement to give time for the satisfaction of the debt, and as it was made without the sanction of the Court it is absolutely void. In the absence of authority upon the point I should have been disposed to think that what is meant by an agreement to give time in that section, is a mere agreement between the decree-holder and the judgment-debtor to give time for the satisfaction of the debt, and that one object of the section was to obviate discussion, as to whether or not there had been such an extension of time given, as to which there might be a considerable conflict of oral evidence: and also, as some Judges think, to protect the debtor and, to avoid this, the Legislature determined that any such agreement should be void, unless made with the sanction of the Court. It is noticeable here that the bond was given not by the judgment-debtors but by two of them only, as executors of the deceased tenant. The question therefore is, is this bond as agreement to give time within the meaning of the section. Prima facie it is an ordinary instalment bond hypothecating certain property for the payment of those instalments. But it is said that the provision at the end of the deed for keeping alive the right to execute the decree makes it an agreement to give time within the meaning of sec 257A. On the face of it, it is more than that: it is a contract between the parties that, for the consideration set forth, the Defendants hypothecated certain property to secure the balance of a certain debt. There is a great diversity of judicial opinions upon the point. On the face of it, it is more than that: it is a contract between the parties that, for the consideration set forth, the Defendants hypothecated certain property to secure the balance of a certain debt. There is a great diversity of judicial opinions upon the point. In the Calcutta and Madras High Courts (subject to a recent decision in the latter Court) the view taken is, that such a bond is not void under sec. 257A and that it can be enforced in a separate suit: whilst, the High Courts of Bombay and Allahabad appear to have entertained an opposite view. In the case of Jhabar Mahomed v. Modan Sonahar ILR 11 Cal. 671 (1885), it was distinctly held that an instalment bond of the present nature was not an agreement to give time for the satisfaction of a judgment-debt within the meaning of sec. 257A of the Code of Civil Procedure, and, reference was made to an earlier judgment of this Court in the case of Gunamani Dasi v. Pran Kishori 5 B.L.R. 223 (1870). This view was further emphasized in the case of Hukum Chand Oswal v. Taharunnessa Bibi ILR 16 Cal. 504 (1889), where reliance was placed upon the cases I have previously cited, and upon a decision of the Madras High Court in the case of Sellamayyar v. Muthan ILR 12 Mad. 61 (1888), and a decision of the Allahabad High Court in the case of Ramghulam v. Janki Rai ILR 7 All. 124 (1884). The same principle was applied in the case of Hurkissen Das Serowgee v. Nibaran Chandra Banerjee 6 C.W.N. 27 (1901), and again in the case of Juji Kamti v. Annai Bhatta ILR 17 Mad. 382 (1893), where it was held that the intention of the section was to render such agreement void, only so far as it affects the right to execute the decrees. In the case of Bank of Bengal v. Vyabhoy Gangji ILR 16 Bom. 618 (1891), it was held that, where such an agreement to give time, not sanctioned by the Court as required by sec. 257A formed part of the consideration for the bond, and has actually been enjoyed by the obligee of the bond, such consideration not being in its nature illegal and not having as a fact failed, there is no reason why the obligor should not enforce the terms of the bond. 257A formed part of the consideration for the bond, and has actually been enjoyed by the obligee of the bond, such consideration not being in its nature illegal and not having as a fact failed, there is no reason why the obligor should not enforce the terms of the bond. In the case of Kesu Shivaram v. Genu Babaji ILR 23 Bom. 502 (1898), it was held that the provisions of sec 257A do not include, within their scope, an agreement between a judgment-creditor and a person other than the judgment-debtor, whereby the latter, in consideration of the postponement of the execution of the decree against the judgment debtor, undertakes to pay to the judgment-creditor a certain sum of money. Here, as I have pointed out, the obligees of the bond were not the judgment-debtors. In the case of Tukaram v. Anantbath ILR 25 Bom. 252 (1900), it was held that the true test was whether the mortgage bond suspended the right to execute the decree, or whether it put an end to the remedy on the decree, and substituted the mortgage bond. If it amounted to an actual and present satisfaction of the judgment, it is not an agreement to give time for the satisfaction of a judgment-debt, and does not fall within sec. 257A of the Code of Civil procedure. In that case all the authorities were carefully reviewed by the Court. This view was adopted by the Madras High Court in the case of Venkala Subramania v. Koran Kannan ILR 26 Mad. 19 (1902). All the cases were reviewed in a Full Bench case of the Allahabad High Court, Lalji Singh v. Gaya Singh ILR 25 All. 317 (1903), where it was held that an agreement whereby a decree is adjusted, and so rendered unenforceable is not within the purview of sec 257A of the Code of Civil Procedure. These are substantially all the authorities on the point, and as the result of these authorities, and looking at the language of the section, I think the Plaintiff is entitled to maintain the suit. The provision as to giving time to execute the decree is not illegal, though it may be incapable of enforcement, as the agreement was not made with the sanction of the Court, Bank of Bengal v. Vyabhoy Gangji 1. L.R. 16 Bom. 618, 625 (1891). The provision as to giving time to execute the decree is not illegal, though it may be incapable of enforcement, as the agreement was not made with the sanction of the Court, Bank of Bengal v. Vyabhoy Gangji 1. L.R. 16 Bom. 618, 625 (1891). In point of fact, however, the Plaintiff has performed that part of agreement, and although that part of the agreement may not be capable of enforcement, there is nothing to taint the rest of the agreement with illegality, or to prevent the Plaintiff from suing upon it. 2. The appeal must be allowed with costs Doss, J. I agree.