JUDGMENT Stephen, J. - This is an appeal against the dismissal by the District Judge of Birbhoom of an appeal against an order by a Munsif ordering an adjustment under secs. 244, 258 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The facts are simple. The Appellant before us was decree-holder in a mortgage suit brought against the Respondent who was mortgagor. The suit had proceeded as far as the making an order absolute for sale under sec. 89 of the Transfer of Property Act, but no sale had actually been made, when the decree-holder accepted two sums of Rs. 39 and Rs. 136 from the mortgagor on the terms that he would give up his claim for compound interest and a sum of Rs. 80 in addition. The only point raised in the Court below was that no order could be made under those portions of the CPC that are not embodied in the Transfer of Property Act by means of rules under sec. 104. In this Court the Appellant contends that the decree having been made absolute under sec. 89 of the Transfer of Property Act the only way in which a legal effect could be given to the payment of money in respect of debt on which the decree was founded was by a certified payment or adjustment under sec. 258 of the Code, and that the authorities show that this section does not apply to such a decree. 2. The first part of this contention seems to me unsound. It has been laid down by a Full Bench of this Court in Bibijan Bibee v. Sachi Bewa 8 C.W.N. 684: s.c. ILR 31 Cal. 863 (1904) that a mortgagor does not lose his right to redeem when an order for sale is made absolute under sec. 89, Transfer of Property Act, but retains it till the sale has actually taken place. If he can redeem in full, there seems to be no reason why he should not redeem in part. It may be that the account taken under sec. 86 cannot be reopened; but there is nothing in the Act to prevent the exercise of the Court's equitable powers to make allowance on the basis of the account for any payment made by the mortgagee while It is still open to him to make such a payment. It may be that the account taken under sec. 86 cannot be reopened; but there is nothing in the Act to prevent the exercise of the Court's equitable powers to make allowance on the basis of the account for any payment made by the mortgagee while It is still open to him to make such a payment. If this is so, the Munsif had power to make the order in this case irrespectively of secs. 244 and 258 of the Code; and it becomes unnecessary for me to consider the question whether the present order can be supported under these sections which are not embodied in the rules made under sec. 104, Transfer of Property Act. I need not therefore, discuss the authorities that have been quoted before us to show the effect to be given to the provision of the Code in the application of the Act. Though the order in the Court below is correct it must not be taken that I approve of the reasons there given. The appeal is dismissed with costs. 3. We assess the hearing-fee at three gold mohurs. Mookerjee, J. This is an appeal from an order made in the course of a proceeding for the enforcement of a mortgage decree. The question in controversy between the parties was as to the amount for the realization of which the decree-holder was entitled to take out execution. It was alleged on behalf of the judgment-debtors that in the course of a previous execution some payments bad been made in partial satisfaction of the decree and that the parties had come to an adjustment under which the decree-holder had agreed to give up his claim for compound interest and to allow a certain remission. It has been found by the Courts below that the adjustment alleged by the judgment-debtors is established by the evidence and this finding is not challenged before this Court. But it is argued that the Courts below had no jurisdiction to deal with the matter of adjustment inasmuch as sec. 258, C.P.C, has not been made applicable to the execution proceedings on the basis of mortgage decrees by the rules framed by this Court under sec. 104 of the Transfer of Property Act. But it is argued that the Courts below had no jurisdiction to deal with the matter of adjustment inasmuch as sec. 258, C.P.C, has not been made applicable to the execution proceedings on the basis of mortgage decrees by the rules framed by this Court under sec. 104 of the Transfer of Property Act. This contention which has been overruled by the Courts below is sought to be supported by a reference to the decision of this Court in the cases of Kedar Nath v. Kali Charan I. L. R. 25 Cal. 703 (1898) and Sham Kitten v. Sunder Koer I. L. R. 31 Cal. 378 (1904). It is broadly contended that as sec. 258, C. P.C., is not mentioned in the rules framed by the High Court it is not applicable to proceedings in execution of a mortgage decree and that consequently the Court has no power to deal with the question of adjustment alleged by the judgment-debtors. There may perhaps be some expression in the judgment of this Court in the case of Kedar Nath v. Kali Charan I. L. R. 25 Cal. 703 (1898) which may lend some apparent support to the argument, but in my opinion the contention is unfounded. It is conceded by the learned vakil for the Appellant that if his contention is carried to its legitimate conclusion be would not be entitled to be heard before this Court at all, for sec. 244, C. P. C., is not one of the sections mentioned in the rules and unless the order of which the Appellant complains is treated as one made under that section, the appeal is incompetent. It is not necessary for the purposes of the present appeal to consider the scope of sec. 104 of the Transfer of Property Act or the effect of the rules framed thereunder. Upon this point there has been some difference of judicial opinion, see Mulika Gunnoda v. Linga Murli I. L. R. 25 Mad. 244 at p. 21 (1900) and Kedar Nath v. Kali Charan I. L. R. 21 Cal. 703 (1898). It is quite clear, however, that the powers of the Court which are called upon to execute a mortgage decree are not confined within the four corners of the rules framed under sec. 104 of the Transfer of Property Act. As explained in Dakshina Mohan v. Basumati Debi 4 C.W.N. 474 (1900) sec. 703 (1898). It is quite clear, however, that the powers of the Court which are called upon to execute a mortgage decree are not confined within the four corners of the rules framed under sec. 104 of the Transfer of Property Act. As explained in Dakshina Mohan v. Basumati Debi 4 C.W.N. 474 (1900) sec. 104 is an enabling section and the rules made by the High Court under the provisions of that section do not limit the applicability of the provisions of the CPC as regards sales held in execution of mortgage decrees. It may be pointed out that the contrary view put forward on behalf of the Appellant would lead to the anomaly that as rules were not framed till 1892, that is, more than 10 years after the Transfer of Property Act had been passed, there could not have been in the interval any execution of mortgage decrees. Much stress was laid on behalf of the Appellant upon the decision of this Court in the case of Hatem Ali v. Abdul Gaffur Khan 8 C.W.N. 102 (1903) in which the learned Judges appear to have expressed an opinion that sec. 258, C.P.C., is not applicable to applications under sec. 89 of the Transfer of Property Act. Upon closer examination, however, It is plain that the decision relied upon is of no assistance to the Appellant. The learned Judges held that the execution Court has full power to ascertain what balance of the mortgage debt is really outstanding at the time of the application and to make the order absolute for the realisation of that amount only. It seems to me to be obvious that a Court which is competent to execute a mortgage decree is not only competent, but that it is also its duty, to determine how much is due and realisable under the decree at the time when execution is sought. If au adjustment is pleaded it raises a question relating to the execution or satisfaction, partial or otherwise, of the decree and no intelligible principle has been suggested why the powers of the execution Court should be deemed to be so restricted as not to cover an enquiry of this description. As pointed out by this Court in the case of Bibijan Bitee v. Sachi Bewa 8 C.W.N. 684: s.C. ILR 31 Cal. As pointed out by this Court in the case of Bibijan Bitee v. Sachi Bewa 8 C.W.N. 684: s.C. ILR 31 Cal. 863 (1904) a mortgagor has the right to redeem at any time until the Bale of the mortgaged property has been completed and sec. 89 of the Transfer of Property Act does not prohibit the exercise of such right after the passing of an order absolute for sale and before the sale under such order has really taken place. If so, it is indisputable that the Court is competent after the order absolute has been made and before the sale actually takes place, to investigate whether the decree has or has not been adjusted in whole or In part. It follows, therefore, that whether sec. 258 of the CPC be or be not treated as applicable to proceedings in execution of mortgage decrees, it was quite competent to the Courts below to deal with the matter of adjustment under sec. 89 of the Transfer of Property Act and sec. 244 of the Code, Ram Kamlessuri v. Sukhan Singh (7). In this view of the matter the decision of the Courts below is manifestly right and ought to be affirmed.