Judgement Appeal from a decree of the Chief Court (May 26, 1903) reversing a decree of the Court of the District Judge of Amritsar (March 30, 1899). On May 7, 1894, Dyal Singh, the father of the plaintiffs in the suit (of whom the respondent is the survivor), executed a deed of sale conveying a thirty-seven-sixty-fourth share of the properties in suit to the appellants and certain other members of their family in consideration of advances made and services recited to have been rendered. These properties at one time belonged to Sardar Dhanna Singh, at whose death they passed to his widows, Dyal Singh being his nearest reversionary heir on their deaths, which happened prior to 1894. The suit was brought in 1897 on behalf of the minor sons of Dyal Singh, namely, Thakar Singh and Kehr Singh. The latter died pendente lite. The plaint alleged that the sale of 1894 was without legal necessity, and that the property in suit was ancestral property and incapable of being alienated by Dyal Singh, who was made a party defendant except for necessity. The prayer was that the sale be declared not binding on the reversionary interests of the plaintiffs. The vendees pleaded, so far as now material, that the property in suit was not ancestral, that Dyal Singh had full power of alienation, and that the alienation was for necessity. Both Courts held, with regard to properties in suit other than the land and house in Tungbala, that they were not ancestral, and that accordingly Dyal Singhs alienation bound the respondent. With regard to the Tungbala estate the Courts differed, the District Judge finding that it was not ancestral, the Chief Court that it was. The material passages in the judgment of the Chief Court are as follows — "We proceed at once to what is the main point in the case and what has been the crucial point throughout, i.e., is the property in suit ancestral in whole or in part in the sense in which that term is understood under the customary law ? Ancestral property for the purposes of this suit means property which was held by an ancestor who is the common ancestor of the parties. In this case, therefore, it would mean property held by any direct ancestor of Dyal Singh and of Dhanna Singh. Ancestral property for the purposes of this suit means property which was held by an ancestor who is the common ancestor of the parties. In this case, therefore, it would mean property held by any direct ancestor of Dyal Singh and of Dhanna Singh. There appears to be no doubt that the village was originally founded by a Tung Jat who was the common ancestor of the defendants, Dyal Singh and Dhanna Singh. In the pedigree table prepared at settlement Dyal Singh and Dhanna Singh are shewn as descended from one Harji. No doubt in the Sikh times the stronger members of a family got more than their shares, and we find from the remarks recorded in 1892-93 that the entire land had practically come into the hands of Dhanna Singh. Lands given up by other co-sharers and coming to Dhanna Singh in virtue of his relationship and of the fact that the land had beén held by a common ancestor of the absconder and Dhanna Singh would clearly be held to be ancestral. Some portions may have been derived from other proprietors of their holdings only by purchase or simple acquisition in their absence, but the main portions would appear to have been left by the other Tung relatives to come into Dhanna Singhs hands. It is noted in the pedigree table that most of the co-sharers of the village, being in straitened circumstances, absconded or absented themselves. Out of the proprietary body Sardar Dhanna Singh alone remained in possession of the entire land. It would appear, therefore, clear that the village had been acquired practically in its entirety by Dhanna Singh in consequence of the abandonment of his relatives and collaterals. In regard to such land it has been laid down in Punjab Record No. 31 of 1894 that it should be considered ancestral. It would appear, therefore, clear that the village had been acquired practically in its entirety by Dhanna Singh in consequence of the abandonment of his relatives and collaterals. In regard to such land it has been laid down in Punjab Record No. 31 of 1894 that it should be considered ancestral. At page 88 of that judgment it is remarked, 1 Considering that this was a portion of the family ancestral holding, and fell to Sham Singh owing to its abandonment by a near relative, we think that this portion of the estate should Le held to be governed as regards alienations by the same rule as that which applies to that part of the estate which is admittedly ancestral/ We think that this particular land is not removed from the category of ancestral property merely because it came to Sham Singh owing to the abandonment thereof by a near relative rather than by simple inheritance. These principles are in no way traversed in the judgment in Punjab Record No. 81 of 1901, which is by a single judge, the circumstances in that case being quite different from those in this. We think, therefore, that it must be presumed that the land in Dhanna Singhs hands before the village was evacuated in order that Kanwar Nau Nihal Singh might make a garden of it must be considered to have been then ancestral. It is impossible to differentiate between the portions which came from relatives and co-sharers and the portions which may have, in some instances, been purchased. " It appears, however, that Kanwar Nau Nihal Singh about fifty years ago (i.e., about 1842) caused the village to be evacuated, for he intended planting a garden there/ These are the words on this point in the pedigree table of 1892-93. It does not appear how far this intention was ever carried out, or whether the depopulation and evacuation went beyond the village site. It appears that when Sardar Nau Nihal Singh wished to start his garden Sardar Dhanna Singh started another village site— abadi—on the lands of the hunting ground known as Shikargah, and that abadi remained as the village site of Tungbala, the old site, which had been destroyed or depopulated to make room for the garden being included as nazul property in Amritsar. It does not appear whether Sardar Nau Nihal Singh ever intended to, or ever did, take up the cultivated lands of Tungbala, which would have made a very large garden. The word used in connection with the garden is tamir, which suggests the idea that a walled and enclosed garden was intended. The idea was not carried out, but the new abadi for Tungbala which Dhanna Singh had started remained as the abadi of Tungbala and the old one was incorporated in Amritsar. It does not appear whether or not Dhanna Singh was ever dispossessed of any part of the culturable lands; if he was, apparently they were almost immediately restored intact. Some neighbouring villages were destroyed to make the hunting ground of Maharaja Kharak Singh, but this was not the case with Tungbala, and we are quite unable to find from the record that there was any such confiscation and break of ownership in regard to Tungbala as would bring the case within the purview of the ruling in Ram Nundun Singh v. Janki Koer. (( 1902) L. R. 29 Ind. Ap. 178; S. C. I. L. R. 29 Calc. 828.) Even if the land was taken up by Sardar Nau Nihal Singh for a short period, which is by no means established, it appears to have been restored intact, and there was no such break of continuity as to deprive the property of its ancestral character. We hold, therefore, on a full consideration of all the facts disclosed by the record, that that part of the property must be classed as ancestral." De Gruyther, K.C., for the appellants, contended that the plaintiffs were bound by their fathers deed of alienation unless they proved (and the onus lay on them) that the property now in suit was the ancestral and not self-acquired property of their father. Their father was the heir of Dhanna Singh, to whom the property belonged at his death. But in order to prove that the land was ancestral in the hands of their father they must shew that they came to Dhanna Singh by descent from a lineal male ancestor in the male line through whom the plaintiffs also in like manner claimed. Otherwise it did not descend upon Dhanna Singh in such a manner that the plaintiffs as his issue acquired right in it as against him. Otherwise it did not descend upon Dhanna Singh in such a manner that the plaintiffs as his issue acquired right in it as against him. There was no evidence to identify this property as included in properties which had come to Dhanna Singh by lineal male descent as an unobstructed inheritance. The boundaries of the self-acquired and ancestral properties, if any, were not defined by the evidence, and therefore it was impossible to prove that the property in suit was ancestral. Conjectures, however reasonable, could not supply the place of conclusive evidence. Reference was made to Maynes Hindu Law, 7th ed. p. 343, s. 275 ; Sona v. Loku (( 1881) Punjab Record, vol. 16, p.2) ; and see also Ram Nundun Singh v. Janki Koer. (L. R. 29 Ind. Ap. 178.). The respondent did not appear. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by LORD COLLINS. This is an appeal from a decree of the Chief Court of the Punjab varying a decree of the District Judge of Amritsar. The suit was brought by Thakar Singh and his brother Kehr Singh, minors, by their mother acting as next friend, to set aside a deed of sale made on May 7, 1894, by their father, Dyal Singh, to the appellants and certain other persons as purchasers, on the ground that the lands the subject-matter of the sale were, in the view of the Hindu law, ancestral, and that the sale was not necessary and was for a fictitious consideration and in fraud of the rights of the plaintiffs father, Dyal Singh, as next heir and reversioner on the death of the widow of Dhanna Singh, the deceased owner. Kehr Singh died while the suit was pending. The only question in dispute on this appeal is whether the lands were ancestral. The District Judge has held that they were not; the Chief Court has reversed his decision and held that they were. It is not disputed that the onus on this issue is on the plaintiffs, and it is because in the opinion of the District Judge they failed to discharge this onus that the suit was dismissed. The District Judge has held that they were not; the Chief Court has reversed his decision and held that they were. It is not disputed that the onus on this issue is on the plaintiffs, and it is because in the opinion of the District Judge they failed to discharge this onus that the suit was dismissed. It is through their father, as heir of the above-named Dhanna Singh, that the plaintiffs claimed, and unless the lands came to Dhanna Singh by descent from a lineal male ancestor in the male line, through whom the plaintiffs also in like manner claimed, they are not deemed ancestral in Hindu law. Therefore, if the plaintiffs cannot shew that they were not self-acquired lands in the hands of Dhanna Singh, the suit fails. Now, as the District Judge points out, there is really no evidence that the lands in question came to Dhanna Singh by descent at all. There is evidence that he acquired some lands in the district by purchase from the owners, and there is a probability that he acquired others by the abandonment of other persons who may have been collateral, and in that way may have become possessed of lands which, by the custom of the Punjab, would he regarded as ancestral. But there is no evidence whatever defining the boundaries of these portions of land respectively. Indeed the learned judges of the Chief Court themselves say, " It is impossible to differentiate between the portions which came from relatives and co-sharers and the portions which may have, in some instances, been purchased "But it is by reason of this impossibility that the plaintiffs failed to prove their case. The learned District Judge also points out that since the death of Dhanna Singh large portions of the land held by him have been sold by his widow, and it is quite possible that all the ancestral land, if he had any, was embraced in these sales, and that the sale of the lands in question embraced exclusively self-acquired lands. Their Lordships agree that, when the onus lies, as it does in this case, on the plaintiffs in seeking to set aside on such grounds a solemn deed executed by their father, conjectures cannot be accepted as a substitute for proof. Their Lordships agree that, when the onus lies, as it does in this case, on the plaintiffs in seeking to set aside on such grounds a solemn deed executed by their father, conjectures cannot be accepted as a substitute for proof. With the greatest respect to the judges of the Chief Court, their Lordships venture to think that they have hardly given sufficient weight to this consideration. Their Lordships agree with the conclusion and reasoning of the learned District Judge, and will humbly advise His Majesty that the appeal be allowed and the decree of the Chief Court set aside with costs. The respondent must pay the costs of this appeal, except so far as they may have been increased by the delay which has taken place in the prosecution of the appeal.