JUDGMENT Maclean, C.J. - The question submitted to the Full Bench is whether the judgment referred to In sec 199, C. P. C, which can be pronounced by a Judge's successor is one which must be written by the Judge, while holding office as Judge, or whether It may be one written after he has ceased to exercise jurisdiction in the place where the cause of action in the suit to which the judgment relates arose, owing to his transfer or proceeding on leave. I think the language of the question is a little involved, and the real question which is raised by this reference, is whether the decision in the case of Sundar Kuar v. Chandreshur Prasad Narain Singh 11 C. W. N. 501: s. c. 1. L. R. 34 Cal. 293 (1907), which held that the Judge who has heard the evidence in the case is entitled under sec 199 of the CPC to write his judgment and to send it to his successor for delivery, although the judgment was written by him after he had taken leave or left the post which he was occupying when he heard the case, is correct. The question seems to me to depend entirely upon the construction of sec 199 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It is a very short section, and, in my judgment, its construction is not susceptible of any real difficulty. The section runs as follows, "A Judge may pronounce a judgment written by his predecessor but not pronounced." In this case, the suit was heard by Mr. Thomson when he was Subordinate Judge of Deoghur, and, he was subsequently transferred to Dumka and ceased to be Subordinate Judge of Deoghur on the 17th January 1905. On that date he recorded the following order : " Defendants refuse to argue or to file written argument. I am making over charge to-day and all the parties want me to write the judgment; so the record must be sent to Dumka, to which place I am going on transfer." I regret Mr. Thomson took ten months to write his judgment. He, however, did write it and sent It to his successor at Deoghur to deliver and he did deliver It. It is urged that this is illegal and that see. 199 does not justify such a procedure. In my opinion, it does. Thomson took ten months to write his judgment. He, however, did write it and sent It to his successor at Deoghur to deliver and he did deliver It. It is urged that this is illegal and that see. 199 does not justify such a procedure. In my opinion, it does. There is nothing in that section which indicates directly or indirectly that the judgment of the Judge who Is leaving the Court must be written by him before he has left. That Is the point urged by the learned vakil for the Appellant. Apart from authority, and had it not been for the respect I feel for the view of the referring Bench, I personally should entertain no doubt upon the question of the construction of the section: and, It seems to me that the authorities are in favour of the view I have expressed. I have already referred to the case of Sundar Kuar v. Chandreshur Prasad Narnin Singh 11 C. W. N. 501: s. c. I. L. R. 34 Cal. 293 (1907), which is the last authority upon the point. There is a similar decision in the case of Girja Shankar v. Gopalji 7 Bom. L. R. 951 (1905) in which the Court held that sec. 199 was a clear answer to a similar objection. As regards the older cases, the case of Parbutty v. Higgin 17 W. R. 475 (1873) is an authority against the present Appellant; and, the earlier case Mutty Lal Sen v. Deshkar Roy 9 W. R. 1 (1867) has no application to the question now under discussion; for sec. 199 was not in existence when that case was decided,--besides, the facts of that case are obviously different--all that was then held was that the opinions (reduced to writing) of Judges who heard the case but who had ceased to be Judges of the High Court before judgment was pronounced could not be treated as judgments but must be regarded as mere memoranda. Two of the Judges had retired and the third had died before judgment was delivered. That is not the present case. Before I part with the case, I desire to express strongly that the Judge when transferred ought not to have allowed such an inordinately long period as ten months to elapse before sending his judgment to his successor. Two of the Judges had retired and the third had died before judgment was delivered. That is not the present case. Before I part with the case, I desire to express strongly that the Judge when transferred ought not to have allowed such an inordinately long period as ten months to elapse before sending his judgment to his successor. He ought to have done so as quickly as he reasonably could, and I hope this will be done in future. 2. I therefore answer the question by saying that the Judge who heard the evidence in the case is entitled under sec. 199 of the CPC to write his judgment and send It to his successor for delivery, although the judgment was written by him after he had left the judicial post which he was occupying when he heard the case. 3. The result is that the appeal is sent back to the Division Bench which made the reference with this intimation of our opinion. 4. The Appellant must pay the costs of this reference--hearing fee 3 hundred rupees. Rampini, J. 5. I do not wish to press the view I expressed in the reference : and I agree with the learned Chief Justice. Brett, J. 6. I agree with the learned Chief Justice. Mitra, J. 7. I agree with the learned Chief Justice. Babu Dwarka Nath Chuckerbutty In the course of his argument referred to two cases (Appeals from Appellate Decrees No. 2264 and 2239 of 1905) decided by me in the beginning of the year 1905. The facts of those cases are clearly distinguishable from those of the present case: and it appears to me that the question which has now been argued was not argued then before me. Doss, J. I agree in the judgment of the learned Chief Justice.