JUDGMENT 1. This is an appeal against a decision of the District Judge of Burdwan, dated the 1st July 1907. The suit was brought for a declaration of title to and recovery of possession of 1,102 bighas of land in Mouzah Sone-para. This area of land was the subject of an order under sec. 145, Cr. P. C, which was passed on the 9th April 1902. The present suit was instituted on the 10th May 1905. Therefore the Courts below have held that it is barred by limitation. The Plaintiff contends that the order of the District Judge is wrong inasmuch as the date of the final order in the case under Art. 47 of the Indian Limitation Act which is the article applicable to the case must be the final order of this Court In this case and not the final order of the Magistrate. It is pointed out to us that a rule was issued by this Court on the 4th June 1902 which was not disposed of until the' 24th August 1902 and hence, It is said, that the suit is within time. We, however, cannot take this view of the matter and we think that the date in column 3 of Art, 47 of the Limitation Act must mean the date of the order of the Magistrate. Orders under sec. 145, Cr. P. C, are not subject to appeal review or revision. This is apparent from sub-sec. 3 of sec 435, Cr. P. C. No doubt a rule was issued by ' this Court in connection with this order. But that was issued under sec. 15 of the Charter Act and it could never had been contemplated by the Legislature when they drew up the provision of Art. 47 of the Indian Limitation Act that rules issued under our powers of " superintendence under the Charter Act" and disposed of by us should come within the meaning of the words " final order" in the case. 2. Then another contention has been raised that the order of the Magistrate was only with regard to mineral rights and therefore the order of the Magistrate under sec. 145, Cr. P. C, Is without jurisdiction. We do not think that this is the case. The order of the Magistrate was passed with regard to 1,203 bighas of land and the minerals subsisting underneath. The latter are tangible immoveable property. 145, Cr. P. C, Is without jurisdiction. We do not think that this is the case. The order of the Magistrate was passed with regard to 1,203 bighas of land and the minerals subsisting underneath. The latter are tangible immoveable property. The last ground of appeal is that the Plaintiff has now got a fresh lease of the land and so he is not bound by the order passed under sec. 145, Cr. P. C. We think, however, that it is clear that this is not so. At all events, the Defendants have got a good title to the lands by the order under sec. 145, Cr. P. C. Their possession and their rights cannot be disturbed except by a Civil Court decree. The Plaintiff was a party to the case under sec. 145, Cr. P. C, and the suit is clearly barred under the provisions of Art. 47 of the Limitation Act. We therefore dismiss the appeal with separate cost to each of the two sets of Respondents.