JUDGMENT 1. The facts of this case are not beyond doubt; but it appears that the Appellant was recorded as a raiyat at fixed rates in the record-of-rights prepared by the Settlement-officer of Mymensingh in 1896. The landlord Respondent put in a petition under Bee. 106 of the unamended Bengal Tenancy Act asking that this entry might be corrected. This was in 1897. The proceedings were greatly delayed for some unknown reason and on the 11th July 1900, that is to say, after the passing of the Amending Act of 1898 the case was referred to the Civil Court under the proviso to sec. 106 of the Act, as amended. Further delay ensued. The case was disposed of by the Munsif in 1906 and the landlord's But was dismissed. Subsequently the Subordinate Judge on appeal by the landlord decreed the*suit and gave the landlord a declaration that the disputed land was not held in mokurari jama but at a rent which was liable to enhancement Presumably what he meant was that the entry that the Defendant was a raiyat at fixed rate was wrong and that he ought to have been entered as an ordinary occupancy raiyat. The Subordinate Judge also dismissed the cross-objection as to jurisdiction which has again been raised by the present Appellant before us. The decision of the Subordinate Judge has been attacked on two grounds. 2. The first ground is that inasmuch as the proceedings were initiated under the Bengal Tenancy Act before it was amended the Settlement-officer acted without jurisdiction in referring it to the Civil Court under the proviso to sec. 106 of the Act as amended. No authority has been shown in support of this view. But reference has been made to sec. 8 of the Bengal General Clauses Act of 1899. That section of course cannot apply to the Amending Act of 1898 which was passed before it. The enactment that does apply is sec. 4 of Act V of 1867 (B. C.) and it is clear that that section does not yield any support to the Appellant's case. It is argued, however, that on the general principle which finds a place in sec. 8, cl. (e) of the Subsequent General Clauses Act, we should hold that the landlord is not entitled to the benefit of the reference to the Civil Court under the Bengal Tenanoy Act as amended. CI. It is argued, however, that on the general principle which finds a place in sec. 8, cl. (e) of the Subsequent General Clauses Act, we should hold that the landlord is not entitled to the benefit of the reference to the Civil Court under the Bengal Tenanoy Act as amended. CI. (e), sec. 8 of the Subsequent Bengal General Clauses Act, 1899, provides that when an enactment is repealed the repeal shall not affect any pending legal proceeding. But it seems to us that when the repeal of a section is accompanied by the substitution of a new section, although any pending legal proceeding may not be affected by the repeal there is nothing in the section to prevent its being affected by the new provisions so substituted. It is generally settled that in matters of procedure an Amending Act does affect legal proceedings. In this case the Defendant cannot have been prejudiced in any way. Sec 106 of the old Act and sec. 106 of the new Act are of course dissimilar. But so far as this case is concerned the only difference between the two sections that matters is the addition of a proviso that the Settlement-officer may refer proceedings to the Civil Court for decision. We see no reason why that proviso should not be applied to the proceedings which were instituted before the section was amended. 3. The second point is that the Subordinate Judge is wrong on the merits in declining to find that the Defendant is a raiyat at fixed rates. Now what the Subordinate Judge has found is that the kabuliyat on which the Defendant relies is not genuine, that his own conduct is inconsistent with the theory that he is anything more than an ordinary raiyat with occupancy rights, that he has failed to prove that his rent is invariable and with respect to the fact that he had erected permanent buildings on his land without objection by the landlord, that the fact is quite consistent with the supposition that he is an ordinary raiyat with right of occupancy. On these findings of fact we do not see that the Subordinate Judge could have come to any other decision and we are not prepared to say that any question of law arises upon them. 4. Reference has been made to the decision in Nabu Mondul v. Cholim Mullik ILR 25 Cal. On these findings of fact we do not see that the Subordinate Judge could have come to any other decision and we are not prepared to say that any question of law arises upon them. 4. Reference has been made to the decision in Nabu Mondul v. Cholim Mullik ILR 25 Cal. 896 (1808). That case seems to us to be clearly distinguishable. In that case the question was whether the Appellant's tenure was permanent or not. The learned Judge who decided the case held that the presumption that the grant was a permanent grant might be Inferred from the fact that the landlord stood by and made no objection to the erection of masonry buildings. In this case the Defendant is not a tenure-holder at all but an occupancy raiyat. He cannot be ejected nor can his rent be enhanced except under strict conditions His right, is heritable. His tenancy has therefore many elements of permanence and he stands in no need of a presumption drawn from the conduct of his landlord, In allowing him to build houses. The ruling which has been cited could hardly be made applicable to the case of a raiyat at all, and It certainly does not in the least justify any inference that the present Appellant is a raiyat at fixed rates. That question did not arise and could not arise in the case quoted above, which dealt with an entirely distinct class of tenancy. 5. It is also argued that the Subordinate Judge Is wrong in finding that the Defendant has failed to prove that his rent was invariable. This seems to us to be a question of fact with which we are not entitled to deal. The Subordinate Judge says :--"The dakhilas relied upon by the Respondent also do not favour the contention that the jama remained unchanged since 1246." He then goes on to illustrate his finding by pointing out what he calls considerable variation in the rent realised since the year 1294. We are unable however to accept the contention that this illustration indicates that the learned Subordinate Judge baa paid no consideration to the evidence of the Defendant in respect of the rent which was realised before 1294. It is not incumbent on the Appellate Court to set out all the evidence in detail. We are unable however to accept the contention that this illustration indicates that the learned Subordinate Judge baa paid no consideration to the evidence of the Defendant in respect of the rent which was realised before 1294. It is not incumbent on the Appellate Court to set out all the evidence in detail. We see no reason in this case to doubt that the Subordinate Judge has considered all the rent receipts that were placed before him as evidence. We think his decision thereon Is based on his consideration of all those receipts and cannot be interfered with by us in second appeal. The result is that the appeal falls and must be dismissed with costs.