JUDGMENT 1. These three appeals have arisen out of three proceedings in execution of orders made in the same suit. The suit was instituted in the Court of the Second Subordinate Judge of Mozufferpur at a time when Durbhanga was not made into a separate district; for civil purposes. After the disposal of the suit in March 1896, notifications were issued by the local Government that certain parts of the original Zillah Tirhut should be taken off the jurisdiction of the District Judge of Mozufferpur and formed into a separate district. A District Judge was appointed to take charge of the new district as well as a Subordinate Judge to try civil cases arising in it. The suit which gave rise to the orders under these appeals related to property which was exclusively within the present district of Durbhanga. Applications were made to the Subordinate Judge of Durbhanga for orders for execution and for substitution of the present Appellant as decree-holder in place of the original decree-holders. Orders were made by the Subordinate Judge but, on appeal, the District Judge of Durbhanga held that the Subordinate Judge of Durbhanga had no jurisdiction to make any order for substitution under see. 232 of the Code. In his opinion, the words " the Court which passed the decree" in sec 232 applied exclusively to the Court of the Second Subordinate Judge of Mozufferpur which had entertained and passed the decree in the original suit. He accordingly disallowed the application for substitution and hence these appeals. 2. It has been contended before us that sec. 649, C.P.C., enlarged the definition of the words "the Court which passed the decree" and, according to it, the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Durbhanga had jurisdiction to deal with the applications for substitution. On the other hand, it has been contended that the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Durbhanga would not, under the circumstances of the case, come within the words " the Court which passed the decree " as defined in sec 649, C.P.C. 3. The question is not res Integra, so far as this Court is concerned. In Dutchman v. Madan Mohun ILR 6 Cal. 518 (1889), Sir Richard Garth, the then Chief Justice, and Mr. The question is not res Integra, so far as this Court is concerned. In Dutchman v. Madan Mohun ILR 6 Cal. 518 (1889), Sir Richard Garth, the then Chief Justice, and Mr. Justice Field held, in a case, much similar to the present one, that the words " the Court which passed the decree " did not exclude the Court which originally passed the decree but merely included another Court, namely, the Court which had jurisdiction to execute the decree, on the transfer of jurisdiction. The learned Judges put a wide and convenient construction on the following words in sec. 649, namely, " the Court which passed the decree to be executed has ceased to exist or to have jurisdiction to execute It." 4. The same view was taken in another case in this Court, Jahar v. Kamini Debi (2). Prinsep and Hill, JJ., were of opinion that Lutchman v. Madan Mohun ILR 6 Cal.513 (1880) was correctly decided and that the applications for execution could be entertained either by the Court which passed the decree or the Court which at the time of the application had local jurisdiction with respect to the subject-matter of the suit. 5. A contrary view appears at first sight to have been taken in the case of Kalipodo v. Dinonath ILR 25 Cal 315 (1897). It was held in that case that, where the District Judge, in the exercise of the powers conferred on Mm by sec. 13 of the Bengal, N.W.P. and Assam Civil Courts Act, had so assigned the jurisdiction of a Munsif, that the result was that the Munsif who had not originally decided the case had jurisdiction with respect to the original subject-matter, the Court which passed the decree had exclusive jurisdiction to entertain an application for execution. There were some observations in the judgments of the learned Judges which might favour the contention of the Respondent in the present case. But the judgments passed in the above case were discussed in the later case of Jahar v. Kamini Debi ILR 28 Cal. 238 (1900). and it was distinguished from the case of a change of jurisdiction by a notification of the Government of Bengal. 6. We are also of opinion that the case of Kalipodo v. Dinonath ILR 25 Cal. 315 (1807) was decided on facts which are quite different from the facts of the present cases. 238 (1900). and it was distinguished from the case of a change of jurisdiction by a notification of the Government of Bengal. 6. We are also of opinion that the case of Kalipodo v. Dinonath ILR 25 Cal. 315 (1807) was decided on facts which are quite different from the facts of the present cases. We are not bound by the obiter observations of the learned Judges in that case. We prefer to follow the decisions in Lutchman v. Madan Mohun ILR 6 Cal. 513 (1880) and Jahar v. Kamini Debi ILR 28 Cal. 238 (1900) and no good reasons have been shown to us to come to a different conclusion from that arrived at by the learned Judges in those cases. 7. Our attention has been drawn to a recent decision of the High Court at Madras in Panduranga Mudaliar v. Vythilinga Reddi ILR 30 Mad. 537 (1907) The learned Judges in that case were not inclined to follow the decisions in Lutchman v. Madan Mohun ILR 6 Cal. 513 (1880) and Jahar v. Kamini Debi ILR 28 Cal. 238 (1900) already referred to and they relied on Kalipodo v. Dinonath ILR 25 Cal. 315 (1807). But with all respects to the learned Judges of the Madras High Court, we are of opinion that sec. 649, C.P.C., should, if possible, be so construed as to make it convenient to parties to execute their decrees, the decree-holders as well as the judgment-debtors. The result of taking a different view would be that an application for execution might be entertained by the Subordinate Judge's Court at Mozufferpur; but as soon as the application was made, it would have to be transferred to the Court of the Subordinate Judge at Durbhanga, as no execution could be enforced within the jurisdiction of the Subordinate Judge's Court at Mozufferpur. It seems to us that the object of sec. 649 is to avoid the cumbrous procedure which would result if the Court which passed the decree be held to be the only Court which could execute it. We, therefore, Bet aside the orders of the lower Appellate Court, and restore the orders of the Subordinate Judge of Durbhanga. The appeals are accordingly decreed with costs. We assess the hearing fee at one gold mohur in each case.