JUDGMENT Fletcher, J. - In this suit, the Plaintiff who is a wealthy zemindar in the District, of Mymensingh, sues the Defendant, who is a member of the Indian Civil Service and was during the month of April 1907 District Magistrate of Mymensingh, to recover damages for an alleged trespass committed by the Defendant in searching the Plaintiff's kutchery at Jamalpore on the 28th April 1907. The defence raised by the Defendant is that he was authorised to conduct the search by statute. The statutory provisions relied on by the Defendant are (a) The Indian Arms Act, 1878, (b) The Code of Criminal Procedure, and (c) Act XVIII of 1850 ("An Act for the Protection of Judicial Officers"). Now the facts relating to the search may be shortly stated as follows:--On the 28th April 1907, the Defendant who was then at Mymensingh received in the early morning an urgent telegram from Mr. Barneville, the Sub-divisional Officer, and Mr. Luffeman, the head of the police at Jamalpore, informing him that a riot had narrowly been averted on the previous night, The state of feeling between the Hindus and Mahomedans at Jamalpore had been very intense since the 21st April but the reasons for the origin of that state are not material to be considered here. 2. Upon receipt of the telegram above mentioned, the Defendant started for Jamalpore and arrived there at about 10 o'clock in the morning. On his arrival, he was informed by Mr. Luffeman of the fact that a man named Gandoo Sheikh had been wounded on the previous evening by a shot fired from a revolver or a gun and that the police had heard that the zemindars had been storing firearms in their kutcheries. 3. Upon receipt of this information, the Defendant determined to search the kutcherles of certain zemindars in the district, including the Plaintiff's kutchery and having summoned certain gentlemen to be witnesses of the search, he proceeded on the afternoon of the 28th April to search the kutcherles accompanied by Mr. Barneville, Mr. Luffeman and a number of police and the witnesses to the search. The Plaintiff's kutchery was searched between 3 and 4 in the afternoon and it is with regard to this search that the Plaintiff seeks to recover damages in this suit. Barneville, Mr. Luffeman and a number of police and the witnesses to the search. The Plaintiff's kutchery was searched between 3 and 4 in the afternoon and it is with regard to this search that the Plaintiff seeks to recover damages in this suit. The Defendant admits the fact of the search, and that it was done by his orders and under his direction but pleads that be was authorised to conduct the search by virtue of the provisions of the statutes above mentioned. 4. Now, the general rule of the Common Law is that a Magistrate is liable in an action of trespass for acts done by him to the persons or property of others, unless he can justify the act as having been done under the authority of the law. And, if a Magistrate pleads a statute or statutes as justifying his acts, he must bring himself within the words of the statute strictly. 5. It becomes necessary, therefore, in the first place to consider the statutory provisions relied on by the Defendant as authorising the search. 6. The first of these statutory provisions is sec. 25 of the Indian Arms Act, 1878, which is in the following terms:--"Whenever any Magistrate has reason to believe that any person residing within the local limits of his jurisdiction has in his possession any arms, ammunition, or military stores for any unlawful purpose or that such person cannot be left in the possession of any such arms, ammunition or military stores without danger to the public peace, such Magistrate, having first recorded the grounds of his belief, may cause a search to be made of the house or premises occupied by such person or in which such Magistrate has reason to believe such arms, ammunition or military stores are or is to be found, may seize and detain the same, although covered by a license, and keep in safe custody for such time as he thinks necessary. The search in such case shall be conducted by or in the presence of a Magistrate or by or in the presence of some officer specially empowered in this behalf by name or in virtue of his office by the Local Government." The Defendant admits in the present case that he did not, before causing the search to be made, first record the grounds of his belief as provided by sec. 25 of the Arms Act. He says, he had no copy of the Arms Act with him, although he admits, he could have obtained one from the Sub-divisional Officer in a few minutes. 7. In these circumstances, the Defendant, not having complied with the provisions of that statute, cannot justify the search under the provisions of the Indian Arms Act. 8. Secondly, the Defendant relies upon the provisions of secs. 105 and 165 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Sec. 105 of the Criminal Procedure Code enacts that a Magistrate may direct a search to be made in his presence of any place for the search of which he is competent to issue a search-warrant under the provisions of the Code. It is obvious in the present case that the Defendant was not competent to issue a search-warrant under the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code. The Defendant was not acting as a "Court" within the meaning of sec. 94 of the Criminal Procedure Code as there was no proceeding pending before him. 9. But then it is said that, even if the Defendant cannot justify the search under the provisions of sec. 105 of the Criminal Procedure Code, yet, as he took Mr. Luffeman along with him, who was making an investigation into the case of Gandoo, the man who had been wounded on the night of the 27th April, the search can be justified as being a search made by Mr. Luffeman. 10. In my opinion, this section will not avail the Defendant. I am satisfied on the evidence that the search was not in-tended to be made under the provisions of sec. 165 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The search of the Plaintiff's and the other kutcheries was for the purpose of discovering arms generally, which, sec. 165 does not authorise. 11. In my opinion the search made by the Defendant was not, nor was it ever Intended that it should be, made under sec 165 of the Criminal Procedure Code and I accordingly hold that that section does not justify the Defendant's action. 12. Lastly, the provisions of Act XVIII of 1850 ("An Act for the Protection of Judicial Officers") are relied on by the Defendant. 12. Lastly, the provisions of Act XVIII of 1850 ("An Act for the Protection of Judicial Officers") are relied on by the Defendant. Such Act provides that no Judge, Magistrate, Justice of the Peace, Collector or other persons acting judicially shall be liable to be sued in any Civil Court for any act done or ordered to be done by him in discharge of his judicial duty whether or not within the limits of his jurisdiction, provided that he acted In good faith. 13. Now, In order that the Defendant should bring himself within the provisions of that statute, it is necessary that the act done or ordered to be done by him should be done, or ordered to be done by him in discharge of his judicial duty. What judicial duty was the Defendant performing in conducting the search of the Plaintiff's premises 1 In my opinion, he was performing no judicial duties at all. The Defendant, as District Magistrate, has important duties, both executive and judicial, cast upon him and the Defendant was not, I think, performing any judicial duty in conducting the search of the Plaintiff's premises for arms. 14. In these circumstances, I must hold that the search of the Plaintiff's premises by and under the direction of the Defendant was not warranted by law. The entry by the Defendant into the Plaintiff's premises being, therefore, a trespass, I have to consider, before I determine what amount of damages I shall award to the Plaintiff, whether the Defendant was actuated by malice or other improper motives. 15. It cannot be said, in this case, that the Defendant had any feelings of hatred or revenge against the Plaintiff with whom he was not acquainted. It has, however, been argued that the Defendant had, in the unfortunate disturbances which had arisen between the Hindus and Mahomedans at Jamalpore, taken the side of the Mahomedans and that the search on the 28th April 1907 was really conducted by the Defendant owing to the improper feelings that he held against the Hindus at Jamalpore generally. It has, however, been argued that the Defendant had, in the unfortunate disturbances which had arisen between the Hindus and Mahomedans at Jamalpore, taken the side of the Mahomedans and that the search on the 28th April 1907 was really conducted by the Defendant owing to the improper feelings that he held against the Hindus at Jamalpore generally. In support of this, it is alleged that, as the Defendant, when he arrived at Jamalpore on the morning of April 28th, was aware that the Mahomedans had previously announced by beat of drum that the Government had given them permission to loot the Hindus' property and to marry their widows in nika-form and that a large number of the Hindus were fleeing from the place in a state of panic, if the Defendant had honestly done his duty, he would, in the first place, have tried to restore confidence to the Hindus by assuring them of the impartiality of the Government. 16. It may be that a man of wider experience or riper judgment would have done so; but, even if I were to assume that this was the primary duty of the Defendant, this allegation against the Defendant only cornea to this, namely, that he committed an error of judgment. 17. The Defendant was severely cross-examined by the learned counsel for the Plaintiff, and I am satisfied, from what I have heard in this case, that the Defendant, in determining upon the search that was made on the 28th April 1907, was acting bond fide and was not actuated by malice or other improper motives against any particular individual or section of the community. 18. But, whilst I find that the Defendant was not actuated by malice, I cannot absolve the Defendant with regard to one matter, namely, that the Defendant failed to exercise proper supervision and control over the people under him conducting the search. Now, what are the facts relating to the actual search itself? By the time the Defendant and the searching party reached the Plaintiff's kutohery, the kutcheries of three other zemindars and a Hindu temple had been previously searched without finding anything suspicious. Now, what are the facts relating to the actual search itself? By the time the Defendant and the searching party reached the Plaintiff's kutohery, the kutcheries of three other zemindars and a Hindu temple had been previously searched without finding anything suspicious. In these circumstances, one would have thought that the Defendant would have then doubted whether the information given to him by the police was correct and would have proceeded with great circumspection, the more specially so, as he admits that, at the search of one of the kutcheries previously searched, a complaint had been made to him by a Hindu gentleman, who was accompanying the search party, as to the method in which the search was being conducted. What then are the facts relating to the actual search of the Plaintiff's kutchery? The servants of the Plaintiff (except one Safaullah, a Mahomedan who had charge of the keys of the kutchery and who was not on the premises when the Defendant and the search party arrived) having fled owing to the panic, it became necessary for the search party to break open the outer door to the kutchery. Having thus effected an entrance, some of the Mahomedan mob which had collected and were accompanying the search party were requisitioned to go and bring daos and assist in opening the boxes which contained the zemindary papers. That the search was conducted with unnecessary damage to the property of the Plaintiff cannot to my mind be doubted for an instant. The papers out of various boxes in the kutchery were strewn haphazardly on the floor of the kutchery. Mr. Horniman of the Statesman newspaper who, accompanied by Mr. Newman of the Englishman newspaper, had been especially delegated to proceed to Jamal-pore and report on the state of the disturbances at Jamalpore has graphically described the condition of affairs as he found them at the Plaintiff's kutchery on May 1st. I am satisfied on the evidence that the state of affairs at the Plaintiff's kutchery on May 1st was the same as it had been left on the conclusion of the search. 19. It is only fair, however, to the Defendant to state that he had had no previous experience in conducting a search and that he did not himself enter the kutchery but relied on the police to conduct the search in a proper manner. 19. It is only fair, however, to the Defendant to state that he had had no previous experience in conducting a search and that he did not himself enter the kutchery but relied on the police to conduct the search in a proper manner. But, whilst this goes to establish the Defendant's bond fides, it does not release him from the obligation the law casts upon him as being in supreme control of the search party from seeing that the search was conducted in a proper and reasonable manner. 20. Turning then to the question of damages, I am of opinion that the conduct of the Defendant has not been such as the damages to be awarded should be exemplary, But, whilst I think that the damages should not be exemplary, I also think that they must be substantial. I am unable to accede to the argument of the learned counsel for the Defendant that the damages in this case should be purely nominal. Having given the matter the best consideration that I can, I think the justice of the ease would be met if I order the Defendant to pay to the Plaintiff Rs. 500 as damages. The Defendant must also pay to the Plaintiff his costs of this suit on scale No. 2.