JUDGMENT Fletcher, J. - In this suit the Plaintiff, who is the same person as is the Plaintiff in the suit in which I have just delivered judgment,(Brojendra Kissore Roy Chowdhury v. L. 0. Clarke, vide, supra., p. 977.) seeks to recover damages against the Defendant, who was, in the month of April 1907, District Superintendent of Police in the District of My-mensing for certain alleged unlawful acts done by the Defendant on the 27th and 28th of April 1907. It will be convenient to deal, In the first place, with the acts alleged to have been done by the Defendant on the 28th April. This suit, so far as it relates to those acts, is founded on exactly the same facts as those dealt with in the suit against Mr. Clarke. The acts so done were done by the Defendant under the orders and directions of Mr. Clarke, his lawful superior; and for those acts, he cannot be held responsible. The suit, therefore, so far as It relates to the Incidents of the 28th April, falls. 2. Coming then to the Incidents on the 27th of April which are relied on by the Plaintiff in this suit, it appears that, about 9 o'clock In the evening, the Defendant and Mr. Barneville were sitting together In the Dak Bungalow when they beard a report of a fire-arm and the Defendant went out and found a man running past the Bungalow who told him, a man had been shot. The Defendant accompanied by Mr. Barneville immediately started in the direction In which the report of the shot had come, and on the way, they met a wounded man being assisted by others. From them, they learnt the place of occurrence to which they proceeded. On arriving there, the Defendant states that, he was told, the shot had been fired by one Prokash Dutt accompanied by four or five young men, who were strangers to Jamalpur and that the men, after the occurrence, had run in the direction of the Plaintiff's and his mother's kutcheries. The Defendant states that he proceeded towards the kutcheries with a view to effecting the arrest of the men and that, when approaching the kutcheries, he met the Inspector Kamini with a body of constables who informed him that the men had run into the kutcheries. 3. The Defendant states that he proceeded towards the kutcheries with a view to effecting the arrest of the men and that, when approaching the kutcheries, he met the Inspector Kamini with a body of constables who informed him that the men had run into the kutcheries. 3. The Defendant then entered the Plaintiff's mother's kutchery, known as the four-annas kutchery, and there arrested certain persons. The acts that are said to have occurred at the four-annas kutchery are not material to be considered at present and will only be material if I find that the Plaintiff is entitled to maintain this suit. The Plaintiff says that, from the four annas kutchery, the defendant proceeded to his kutchery and assaulted one of the Plaintiff's servants Bhownath Ojha and caused damage to the kutchery buildings. The Defendant, in his evidence before me, states that he never went to the Plaintiff's kutchery buildings at all, that from the four-annas kutchery, he proceeded through the compound of the Plaintiff's kutchery (having only inspected the basha of the Plaintiff's Naib on the way) to the temple of the Hindu goddess which has been so frequently mentioned in this case. 4. I have first, therefore, to decide whether the Defendant did enter the Plaintiff's kutchery on the night of the 27th of April. In my opinion, the evidence shows that he did and it is to be noticed that the Defendant in his written statement admits that he went to the Plaintiff's kutchery. Moreover, in the notice before action, the fact that the Defendant went to the Plaintiff's kutchery is distinctly alleged. The Defendant had notice of this fact all along, and If he meant to controvert the fact that he went to the Plaintiff's kutchery, he ought to have done so at the earliest moment. The Defendant has called no evidence to corroborate his statement that he did not enter the Plaintiff's kutchery. In these circumstances, I find as a fact that the Defendant did enter the Plaintiff's kutchery on the night of the 27th April. In the next place, for what purpose did the Defendant enter the Plaintiff's kutchery? The Plaintiff's witnesses evidence shows that he was searching for some persons and the only Inference that I can draw from this is that he was searching for people connected with the shooting affray. In the next place, for what purpose did the Defendant enter the Plaintiff's kutchery? The Plaintiff's witnesses evidence shows that he was searching for some persons and the only Inference that I can draw from this is that he was searching for people connected with the shooting affray. The entry of the Defendant into the Plaintiff's kutchery was, therefore, in the first place, lawful: were then such unlawful acts done by or under the direction of the Defendant after his entry as made him a trespasser ab initio ? 5. Now, the facts relied on against the Defendant are, first, the damage to the corrugated-iron door of the Plaintiff's Naib's bed-room; secondly, the damage done to the buildings by the Mahomedan mob; and, thirdly, the assault on Bhownath Ojha. First then as to the damage done to the corrugated-iron door to the bed room of the Plaintiff's Naib, I do not think there Is any evidence to connect the Defendant with this act. Similarly, with regard to the damage to the building by the mob, although there can be no doubt but that damage was done, there is no evidence to show that the mob acted by or under the direction of the Defendant or that he in any way approved of their action. 6. The main contest has been as to whether or not Bhownath Ojha was assaulted by the order of the Defendant. 7. But, even If I were to find as a fact that Bhownath Ojha was assaulted under the orders or by the direction of the Defendant, can the Plaintiff maintain the present suit? Now, the learned counsel for the Plaintiff put the Plaintiff's cause of action on this portion of the case on two grounds,--first, trespass to the land of the Plaintiff, and, secondly, trespass to the person of the Plaintiff's servant. 8. Now, with regard to the first of these two causes of action, I can find nothing in the evidence to show that, at the time when Bhownath Ojha was alleged to have been beaten, the Defendant had finished his search and was remaining on the Plaintiff's premises for the unlawful purpose of committing an assault on Bhownath. 9. The general rule laid down in the Six Carpenter's case 8 Co., Rep. 146 (a), s. c. 1 Sm. 9. The general rule laid down in the Six Carpenter's case 8 Co., Rep. 146 (a), s. c. 1 Sm. L. C. (11th Ed.) p. 132 is that, where there is an authority given by law for doing an act-, there an abuse may (not necessarily must) turn the act into a trespass ab initio [see, judgment of Littledale, J., on Simple v. Egginton 7 Ad. and El. at p. 176 (1837)]. 10. It would be much too wide an extension of the doctrine of trespass ab initio to hold that if a police-officer, whilst lawfully conducting a search, assaulted some person on the premises, his entry on the premises had become unlawful from the outset. 11. The suit, therefore, in so far as it is founded on a trespass to the land of the Plaintiff, fails. 12. The second cause of action relied on by the Plaintiff is a trespass to the person of his servant Bhownath. Now, undoubtedly, a master may, in certain circumstances, maintain an action for a trespass done to the person of his servant whereby he is deprived of the servant's services. The commonest form of action of this nature is an action for seduction which is brought by the parent not for the dishonour done to his daughter, but on the theory that the parent has been deprived of his daughter's services owing to the wrongful act of the seducer. But, In all cases of action for trespass to the person of the servant of the Plaintiff, It is necessary for the Plaintiff to prove that he has, to some extent at least, been deprived of the services of his servant owing to the wrongful acts of the defandant. 13. In the present case, It is not suggested that Bhownath went to his native village owing to the effects of the alleged assault upon him. His own statement Is that be fled from Jamalpore owing to the panic prevailing there. In these circumstances, I must hold that, even if I were to find that the assault on Bhownath was done under the orders or by direction of the Defendant, the present suit must fail. 14. It becomes, therefore, Immaterial to consider the conduct of the Defendant, for, even if express malice were found against the Defendant, the Plaintiff would still have no cause of action against the Defendant for the assault on Bhownath. 14. It becomes, therefore, Immaterial to consider the conduct of the Defendant, for, even if express malice were found against the Defendant, the Plaintiff would still have no cause of action against the Defendant for the assault on Bhownath. This suit, in my opinion, fails and must be dismissed with costs on scale No. 2.