JUDGMENT 1. The question contested before us in this second appeal is whether the alienation by a Hindu widow of a portion of her husband's estate without legal necessity but with the consent of the next reversioner is valid or not, or whether an alienation by a Hindu widow in such circumstances is valid only if she alienates the whole of her husband's property. The Judge in the Court below has decided that a widow may alienate a portion of her husband's property if the next reversioner consents. The Appellants' pleader contends that this view is incorrect and that, unless the Hindu widow alienates the whole of her husband's property and so, as it were, surrenders the whole of her Interest in the whole of her husband's property, the alienation is invalid. The learned pleader for the Appellants has cited the following cases in support of his view, viz., Behari Lal v. Madho Lal I. L. R. 19 Cal. 236(1892), Marudamutha v. Srinivasa Pillai 1. L. R. 21 Mad. 128 (1898), Radhashyam v. Joy Ram I. L. R.17 Cal. 896(1890). By the other side, the oases of Nabo Kishore v. Hari Nath I. L. R. 10 Cal. 1102 1884, Hem Chunder Sanyal v. Surnomoyi Debt I L R. 22 Cal. 354 (1894), Vinayak Vithal v. Govind I. L. R. 25 Bom 129 (1900), Bajrangi v. Mano 12 C W. N 74 : s. c L R. 35 I. A. 1 (1907) and Annada Kumar v. Indra Bhusan 12 C. W. N. 49 (1907) have been relied on. We are of opinion that the view of the learned District Judge is correct and that a Hindu widow may validly alienate a portion of her husband's property with the consent of the next reversioner. There would seem to be no reason why she should not do so, or why to make a valid alienation she must convey or surrender the whole of her husband's property. The only direct authority for such a view is to be found in the judgment of the Madras High Court in Marudamutha v. Srinivasa Pillai I. L. R.21 Mad. There would seem to be no reason why she should not do so, or why to make a valid alienation she must convey or surrender the whole of her husband's property. The only direct authority for such a view is to be found in the judgment of the Madras High Court in Marudamutha v. Srinivasa Pillai I. L. R.21 Mad. 128 (1898), in which two former judgments of the Court to the contrary effect are overruled; but the decision In this oase would seem to be based on a mistaken interpretation of the rule laid down by their Lordships of the Privy Council In Behari Lal v. Madho Lal I. L. R. 19 Cal. 236 (1892), viz., that the surrender must be absolute and complete and that the whole estate should be withdrawn. This does nor, we think, mean that the husband's whole property must be alienated. It only means that the whole estate of the widow in the husband's property must be withdrawn and that she cannot retain any interest in it. In the case of Radhashyam v. Joy Ram I. L. R. 17 Cal. 896 (1890), some of the reversioners only consented to the alienation and, for this reasons, it was held to be invalid as being an alienation of only a part of the Hindu widow's interest. The case reported in the foot-note at page 900 shows that this was the meaning of this judgment. The case of Behari Lal v. Madho Lai I. L. R. 19 Cal. 236 (1892) has been considered by the District Judge in his judgment and, we think, must be interpreted in the way In which, while alluding to Mr. Justice Subramaniya Aiyer's judgment in Murudamutha v. Srinivasa Pillai I. L. R. 21 M.d. 128(1898), we have indicated it should, in our opinion, be construed. 2. On the other hand, the Full Bench decision in the case of Nobo Kishore v. Hari nath I L R. 10 Cal. Justice Subramaniya Aiyer's judgment in Murudamutha v. Srinivasa Pillai I. L. R. 21 M.d. 128(1898), we have indicated it should, in our opinion, be construed. 2. On the other hand, the Full Bench decision in the case of Nobo Kishore v. Hari nath I L R. 10 Cal. 1102 (1884), broadly lays down that:-- " Under the Hindu law current in Bengal a transfer or conveyance by a widow upon the ostensible ground of legal necessity, such transfer or conveyance being assented to by the person who at the time is the next reversioner, will conclude another person not a party thereto, who is the actual reversioner upon the death of the widow, from asserting his title to the property." The Full Bench make no distinction between an alienation of the whole or of a part of the property. Then, in the case of Hem Chunder v. Surnomoyi I. L. R. 22 Cal. 354(1894), it has been expressly said :-- "The widow may convey to the reversioner or to a third party with the consent of the next reversioner, the whole or any portion of the estate and the transferee will acquire an absolute interest." It is objected that this is an obiter dictum, but it is the view of a distinguished Hindu lawyer. The case of Vinayak v. Govind I. L. R. 25 Bom. 129 (1900) is a direct authority for holding that a Hindu widow may validly alienate portions of her husband's property with the consent of the next reversioners. The case of Bajranji v. Manokarnika 12 C. W. N 74 : s. c. L. R. 35 I. A. 1 (1907) is also an authority for this view. In this case portions of the husband's property were alienated on different occasions between 1872 and 1875. The subsequent consent of the reversioners, though given in 1877 and 1878, was held to validate the alienations. Again, in Annada Kumar v Indra Bhusan (8), the alienation by a Hindu widow of the half share of her husband's property in favour of the then reversioner was held to be legal and valid. 3. The consensus of authority is accordingly in favour of the view taken by the learned District Judge. We dismiss the appeal with costs.