JUDGMENT 1. This appeal arises out of a suit for recovery of arrears of rent and cesses, together with damages, for the years 1308, 1309, 1310 and 1311, by Shivendra Pada Bandopadhya, a fractional co-sharer of the jaigir mehal in which the taluk in suit is situated. The suit was instituted in the Court of the Deputy Collector of Puri, under Act X of 1859. It appears that the Plaintiff had previously brought a suit for arrears of rent for the years 1306, 1307, 1308, 1309, against the Appellants which he withdrew, and the suit was thereupon dismissed. In the first suit, which was subsequently withdrawn, the Plaintiff had put in an application on the 30th January 1903 for permission to withdraw from his suit, with liberty to institute a fresh suit, on which the order passed was to the fol. lowing effect :--"The Plaintiff's pleader applies for withdrawing the suit. Withdrawal permitted, suit being dismissed. The application for withdrawal was filed before delivery of judgment." This order was passed on the 30th January 1903. In the present case, the first court decreed the Plaintiff's suit, and that decree has been affirmed on appeal by the District Judge of Cuttack, on the 28th June 1906. 2. In second appeal before us, the points urged are, first, that the Plaintiff cannot recover any rent from the Appellants on the ground of want of title; secondly, that under sec. 373, C.P.C., the claim of rent of 1308 and 1309, is barred, inasmuch as, in withdrawing from the previous suit, the Plaintiff did not obtain any permission to institute a fresh suit, and, that not having done so, he cannot maintain this suit in respect of the years 1308 and 1309, and, thirdly, that the Plaintiff cannot maintain a suit for a proportionate share of the rent. 3. The findings of the lower Appellate Court on the first and third points conclude us, as there are distinct findings for the Plaintiff with regard to his title and separate collection. The findings are in the following terms :-- "Now Plaintiff has conclusively shown himself to be entitled to 2 annas share of the rents payable by the sikmi tenure-holders. It does not matter whether Appellants have also a share as superior landlords or not. The findings are in the following terms :-- "Now Plaintiff has conclusively shown himself to be entitled to 2 annas share of the rents payable by the sikmi tenure-holders. It does not matter whether Appellants have also a share as superior landlords or not. Appellants as tenure-holders cannot question the right, or title of a registered proprietor :" and the finding with regard to the separate collection is-- "The estate has been split up and the several co-sharers ore collecting their shares of the rents separately. Defendants' agent admits that the Collector of Pari is collecting his share of the rents separately. This being the case, Plaintiff was justified in suing for his share of the rents alone." 4. With regard to the second contention, as to whether sec. 373 has any application to suits under Act X of 1859, we think the authorities, to which our attention has been invited on behalf of the Appellants, are not in point. The case of Nilmoni Singh v. Tara Nath Mookerjee L.R. 9 I.A. 174 : s.c. ILR 9 Cal. 295 (1882) is one of the authorities relied upon by the Appellants. The question raised in that case was whether the Deputy Commissioner of Manbhum, who had made certain decrees in rent suits under Act X of 1859, could transfer these decrees for execution to another district. The attention of their Lordships in that case was mainly directed to the question of transfer of decrees from the Court at Manbhum to another district, and the solution of this question depended upon the construction of the expression " Civil Courts " used in sec. 77 of Act X of 1859 and some other kindred sections. It was held that the rent Court is a Civil Court, in the sense that it is deciding on purely civil questions between persons seeking their civil rights, and being a Civil Court in that sense, it comes within the provisions of Act VIII of 1859 which was the old Civil Procedure Code. It was decided that the rent Court being a Civil Court under that Act, it had the power of transferring decrees for execution to another district. 5. The next authority referred to for the Appellants is the case of Sadai Naik v. Serai Naik 5 C.W.N. 279 : s.c.I.L.R.28 Cal. 532 (1901). It was decided that the rent Court being a Civil Court under that Act, it had the power of transferring decrees for execution to another district. 5. The next authority referred to for the Appellants is the case of Sadai Naik v. Serai Naik 5 C.W.N. 279 : s.c.I.L.R.28 Cal. 532 (1901). This case deals with the question whether a second appeal would lie to this Court from an appellate decree of the District Judge in a suit under Act X of 1859, which suit had been tried by a Deputy Collector: and the first cited decision of the Privy Council in Nilmoni Singh v. Tara Nath Mookerjee L.R. 9 I.A. 174 : s.c. ILR 9 Cal, 295 (1882) was relied upon; but it was held that, inasmuch as the suit was dealt with, on appeal, by the District Judge, though it was a suit for rent under Act X of 1859, the decree of the Appellate Court became a decree of Civil Court, and hence an appeal would lie to the High Court. Neither of the cases cited relates to the question whether sec. 373, C.P.C. applies to suits under Act X of 1859. 6. On the other hand, we find in Mokunda Bullav v. Bhagaban Chunder ILR 21 Cal. 514 (1894), that it has been distinctly held that sec 373, C.P.C., does not apply to suits under Act X of 1859 which is a complete Code by itself. The same view was taken in the case of Radha Madhub Santra v. Lukhi Narain ILR 21 Cal. 428 (1893). We find that in these two cases, the facts were very similar to those of the present case, and that in both the cases the Plaintiffs, in withdrawing from the previous suits, had not obtained any permission to institute fresh suits. 7. In Mokunda Bullav v. Bhagaban Chunder ILR 21 Cal. 514 (1894), the decision of the Judicial Committee, In Nilmoni Singh v. Tara Nath Mookerjee L.R. 9 I.A. 174 : s.c. ILR 9 Cal. 295 (1882), was referred to, and there, also, it was held that the question discussed by the Privy Council was simply whether a Revenue Court under Act X of 1859 had any authority to transfer an execution case from its own file to the Civil Court of another district for the purpose of execution of the decree. 8. 295 (1882), was referred to, and there, also, it was held that the question discussed by the Privy Council was simply whether a Revenue Court under Act X of 1859 had any authority to transfer an execution case from its own file to the Civil Court of another district for the purpose of execution of the decree. 8. In Nogendra Nath v. Mathura Mohan ILR 18 Cal. 368 (F.B) (1891), it was held that the provisions of sec. 14 of Act XX of 1877 (The Limitation Act) are not applicable to suits for arrears of rent under Act X of 1859, since that Act has always been considered as a complete Code by itself. 9. In Hare Krishna v. Bhusan Chandra 12 C.W.N. 888 : s.c. 7 C.L.J. 428 (1908), the learned Judge discussed the authorities with reference to Act X of 1859 being a complete Code by itself. In this case it was held that the provision of secs. 560 and 588 (27) were applicable by reason of the provisions of sec. 161 of Act X of 1859, and Stephen, J., in his judgment goes on to say: "This view is amply supported by the judgments in Sadai Naik v. Serai Naik 5 C.W.N. 279 : s.c. ILR 28 Cal. 532 (1901) following as it does, the Full Bench decision in the Sudder Dewani Adalut Court in Hallodhar Biswas v. Mohesh Chunder S.D.A. Decisions for 1861, p. 144 and Nilmoni Singh v. Tara Nath Mookerjee L.R. 9 I.A. 174 : s.c. ILR 9 Cal. 295 (1882)." We would also cite, in the same case, the remarks of Mookerjee, J.: " In this view of the matter, it is unnecessary to deal at length with the first branch of the contention of the Appellant which raises the question, whether the proposition that Act X of 1859 is a complete Code in the sense that no provision of the CPC is applicable to proceedings thereunder, may not require to be qualified in view of the decision of the Judicial Committee in Nilmoni Singh v. Tara Nath L.R. 9 I.A. 174 : s.c. ILR 9 Cal. 295 (1882)." 10. On a review of the cases, we are of opinion that the provisions of sec. 295 (1882)." 10. On a review of the cases, we are of opinion that the provisions of sec. 273, C.P.C., have no application to suits instituted under Act X of 1859, and, therefore, the Plaintiff, that is, the present Respondent, was not debarred from instituting a fresh suit with regard to rents for 1308 and 1309 notwithstanding the fact that he had not obtained distinct permission to do so. 11. We have already observed that, on the 30th January 1903, an application was made by the Plaintiff to withdraw from his suit, with liberty to institute a fresh suit, on which an order was passed on the same day giving permission to withdraw from the suit. Although nothing was said in that order, as to the Plaintiff's liberty to institute a fresh suit on the same cause of action, that order ought to be read along with the application on which it was passed. In that application we find a distinct prayer to be allowed to withdraw from the suit with liberty to institute a fresh suit on the same cause of action, and the Deputy Collector appears to have taken particular care in noticing that the application for withdrawal was filed before delivery of judgment, that is to say, before the order of dismissal was passed. In these circumstances, the judgment of the lower Appellate Court is correct, and we therefore dismiss this appeal with costs.