JUDGMENT 1. In the first of the cases a Rule has been granted calling on the District Magistrate of Bhagalpur to show cause why seven criminal cases that have been instituted against one Rash Behary Lal Mondal by that officer should not be transferred to the District Magistrate of Monghyr or some other suitable Magistrate. In the second, the Petitioner moves that the same criminal proceedings should be quashed. This application was made to us on a date after the Rule was granted and we directed that it should be heard together with the above-mentioned Rule, and this has now been done. The facts on which both applications are directly based are as follows.-- In consequence of the result of investigations which we need not at this moment consider, Mr. Lyall, the District Magistrate of Bhagalpur, issued a warrant on the 16th of February 1908 ordering that the Petitioner's house should be searched and that any zamindari papers found there should be produced before him forthwith. This was done, and many papers were taken from the house where the search was ordered to take place, while other papers were received from his servants at other places. On the 28th February, the Petitioner put in a petition in the District Magistrate's Court asking for a return of the papers and, on the 29th, an order was passed that such papers might be given to the Petitioner as were "not required for the purposes of the enquiry about to be made." Provisions were added as to the rules to be observed in selecting papers to be restored; and it was recorded that the Petitioner's pleader said that he had no further request to make, and that the order in question would serve his purpose. No papers were in fact returned and the Petitioner denies his pleader's authority to consent to the order as far as he did so. Early in April, the Petitioner was called on to take back his papers. To this he replied by a petition of the 11th April stating that he was willing to take them back unconditionally but not on the terms mentioned in the order of the 29th February. On the 15th April the Petitioner's attorney gave notice to Mr. Lyall under sec. To this he replied by a petition of the 11th April stating that he was willing to take them back unconditionally but not on the terms mentioned in the order of the 29th February. On the 15th April the Petitioner's attorney gave notice to Mr. Lyall under sec. 424, Civil Procedure Code, that after two months he would sue him for a return of the papers seized and for damages for their seizure and retention. On the 20th April, the Petitioner in Calcutta received a notice from the Sub-divisional Officer of Madhipura, dated the 15th April, calling on him to take back all the papers seized. On the 29th April, 77 bundles of papers were delivered to the Petitioner's muktear at the Petitioner's house : but before he could take possession of them, seven search warrants were produced under which all the 77 bundles were again taken possession of by the Police. An inspection of these was made by a Deputy Magistrate on the 1st and 2nd of May and, after some papers had been extracted, most of them were returned to the Petitioner. The Petitioner was served early in May with summonses in relation to the cases to which the search warrants applied, dated the 28th April, and the Magistrate has subsequently given the Petitioner copies of the order sheets in those cases showing that the District Magistrate took cognizance of the offences to which the summonses and warrants related on the 28th April under sec. 190 (1) (c). On these and a few other subsidiary facts, the Petitioner prays to have the criminal proceedings against him quashed and all the papers seized returned to him; and also for a transfer of the cases. As there is no dispute about the transfer, we will consider first the prayer for having the proceedings quashed and the papers returned. 2. Taking the grounds on which the petition is based, and postponing the consideration of the ground that the prosecution is not a bon fide one, the earliest, in respect of the facts on which it depends, is that the District Magistrate's action in causing the search and taking away the papers was illegal and without jurisdiction. At the hearing before us, it was doubtful if the District Magistrate issued any warrant for the search. But it now appears that he did. The warrant is in the form No. VIII of Sch. At the hearing before us, it was doubtful if the District Magistrate issued any warrant for the search. But it now appears that he did. The warrant is in the form No. VIII of Sch. V of Criminal Procedure Code reciting that information had been laid before him of the commission of the offence of fraudulently obtaining decrees for sums not due. The question of its legality under sec. 96 depends on whether there was any investigation, enquiry, trial or other proceedings under the Code as mentioned in sec. 94. It seems that there was not. The Magistrate had no doubt received the information that he mentions in the order, but he had not acted judicially on it at the time he issued the warrant. The judgment in re Hari Lal Buce ILR 22 Bom. at p. 949 (1898) supports what seems to us the plain meaning of the two sections in question, and as there is here no question of search under the second and third paragraphs of sec. 96 (1), we must hold that the issue of the search warrant was not justified by that section. 3. It has been contended that the issue of the warrant might have been under sec. 98 in which case the existence of a proceeding etc. under the Code is not necessary and that, though the warrant is in form one under sec. 96, it may be taken to be under sec. 98 by the operation of sec. 537. The objections to this argument seem to be that no suggestion is made in the warrant of the existence of any forged document and that, though on the facts it may be that It was supposed that some of the documents that it was sought to seize, were forged, the warrants subsequently issued seem to have been issued under sec. 96. Further it does not seem possible to read sec. 537 as giving a legal effect to a defective warrant, as its highest effect is to validate a finding, sentence or order which is defective for an antecedent defect in procedure. 96. Further it does not seem possible to read sec. 537 as giving a legal effect to a defective warrant, as its highest effect is to validate a finding, sentence or order which is defective for an antecedent defect in procedure. In the view that we take of the effect of subsequent proceedings and bearing in mind that the legality of the warrant may be the subject of enquiry in civil proceedings, it is perhaps not necessary that we should come to a judicial finding on the point, but we cannot find that the warrant justified the seizure and retention of the papers that were seized. 4. The next grounds that we have to consider are that there were not sufficient materials before the Magistrate to justify the issuing of the summons and what depends on the same facts that the informations on which the Magistrate based his proceedings were vague and indefinite, and that he was not justified in taking action on them. As to this all that we have to say is that the Information on which the Magistrate took cognizance under sec. 190 (1) (c) has been recorded in each case, in accordance with the law as laid down in Thakur Pershad Singh v. The Emperor 10 C.W.N. 775 (1906), and that in most of the cases, though all the allegations the proof of which would be necessary to prove the offence mentioned have not been made, enough has been alleged to justify the Magistrate in dealing judicially with the matter. It is nowhere laid down, and it is probably impossible to state in general terms, how much the accused is entitled to have recorded in such cases; but here in most of the recorded statements enough is said to make it impossible for us to say that the Magistrate had not enough before him to justify him in considering that a prim facie case was made out; and, unless we can say as much as this, we cannot interfere. As regards the statements of Goribi Koeri and possibly that of Hansa Lal, if they stood alone, we might be inclined to interfere; but in view of the other cases and of the orders we propose to pass as to the transfer, we consider our interference unnecessary. As regards the statements of Goribi Koeri and possibly that of Hansa Lal, if they stood alone, we might be inclined to interfere; but in view of the other cases and of the orders we propose to pass as to the transfer, we consider our interference unnecessary. Some of the statements are vague in form no date being specified, but looking to the acts mentioned this vagueness is formal rather than substantial. Apart from the absence of date, however, they are neither vague nor Indefinite. 5. The next ground that we have to consider is that the so-called order of attachment, by which we understand to be meant the second set of search warrants, and the keeping of the papers in custody presumably after the 29th April, is unwarranted by law. "We can see no force in this contention. From the order sheet it appears that the Magistrate took cognizance of the seven offences with which we are concerned on the 28th April, issued summonses in respect of them and ordered search warrants to be made out under sec. 96. These last orders had, therefore, exactly the justification which was lacking in the case of the first warrant, namely, a proceeding under the Code. The papers may have been illegally in the possession of the Magistrate or the Police up to the time they were returned on the 29th; but, as we have held that the Magistrate was justified in initiating proceedings, it is impossible to see on what ground the seizure and retention of the papers by virtue of the warrants executed on the 29th April can be impeached. 6. The last ground for setting aside the proceedings that we are asked to consider is that "the prosecution is not a bon fide one." The Petitioner's Counsel asked us to attach to bon fides the meaning attached to good faith in sec. 52, I.P.C.; namely, that nothing is said to be done in good faith which is done without due care and attention. If we accept this meaning we cannot regard a want of good faith as a ground for setting aside criminal proceedings, as whenever a Magistrate makes a mistake he does something without due care and attention; and no one suggests that any mistake is a ground for setting proceedings aside. If we accept this meaning we cannot regard a want of good faith as a ground for setting aside criminal proceedings, as whenever a Magistrate makes a mistake he does something without due care and attention; and no one suggests that any mistake is a ground for setting proceedings aside. But looking at the contents of the petition in this application and to the recital in the petition for transfer of former proceedings which date back a very long way and have no immediate bearing on the present case, we cannot attach so limited a meaning to the phrase in question. The District Magistrate considers that it is imputed to him that he is acting otherwise than in what he takes to be in the interests of justice. 7. We agree with him, and further consider that he is accused of acting from personal feelings of enmity derived from a long past dispute between one of his subordinates and the Petitioner, and that he is consciously straining the law to injure the Petitioner. Were such a state of things or anything like it shown to exist it would no doubt, as is admitted by the Advocate-General, be our duty to set aside these proceedings. We have carefully considered the record and other papers that influenced the Magistrate's conduct. We were invited on behalf of the Petitioner to exclude the latter from our consideration because they were not on the record: but where the Petitioner travels as far outside the record as he does it would be manifestly unfair to confine the Magistrate to narrower limits. We cannot now go into any detail as to our opinions as to facts alleged to have been brought to light as they may form the subject of future proceedings. But the result of our investigation is that we find that the Magistrate's action in his first seizure of the papers cannot be supported; and that he acted hastily and ill-advisedly on the 9th of May when, on the non-appearance of the Petitioner in obedience to a summons, he ordered proceedings to be drawn up against him under sec. 174, I.P.C., though these proceedings have been quashed by consent in another Rule No. 536 of 1908. But that throughout he acted solely with the desire to secure the proper administration of justice in a complicated and difficult case we have no doubt at all. 8. 174, I.P.C., though these proceedings have been quashed by consent in another Rule No. 536 of 1908. But that throughout he acted solely with the desire to secure the proper administration of justice in a complicated and difficult case we have no doubt at all. 8. Consequently all the grounds urged in support of this application fail : and it is dismissed. 9. As to the rules for transfer the Advocate-General admits that they should be made absolute, and, considering the feelings that have been excited on both sides, we have no doubt that this is the proper course to be followed. We need hardly point out that these cases could in no case be tried before the District Magistrate unless the Petitioner consented, and he never intended they should be, as he took cognizance under sec. 190 (1) (c). The Advocate-General suggests, and the Petitioner's Counsel agrees to this, that an officer should be specially deputed to deal with these cases at Bhagalpur which will be for the convenience of both sides. We accordingly order that all the cases be taken up by a Joint-Magistrate of at least 8 years' standing. He will proceed to deal with the 7 cases already subjudice under Chap. XX or XVIII, if necessary, and will have full authority to deal with the other cases in which informations have been or may be laid in respect of the same matter under see. 200, Criminal Procedure Code.