JUDGMENT Maclean, C.J. - This is a suit for accounts by the executors of the estate of a deceased principal against his gomastha, who was Defendant No. 1 and his surety, Defendant No. 2. The Subordinate Judge dismissed the suit on the ground that it was barred by limitation, holding that Art. 89 of the second schedule to the Limitation Act applied. The Officiating District Judge reversed that decision, holding that the case fell within Art. 116. There seems to be some difference of judicial opinion upon the question as to which article does apply. In the Privy Council case of Asghar Ali Khan v. Khurshed Ali Khan I. L. R. 24 All. 27 (1901), the Judicial Committee held that in a case of this nature Art. 89 applied and that the expression " moveable property " in that article included money. The same view was followed by this Court in the case of Jogendra Nath Boy v. Deb Nath Chatterjee 8 C. W. N. 113 (1903). The same view was also adopted in the case of Madhub Chunder Chuckerbutti v. Debendra Nath Dey 1 C. L. J. 147 (1901) and in the case of Sib Chander Boy v. Chunder Narain Mukerjee 1 C. L. J. 232 (1906). In this case, however, it appears that the contract under which the gomastha was appointed gomastha, is a registered document. The argument is that as it is a registered document, the case falls within Art. 116 of the second schedule to the Limitation Act: and, the Respondent relied upon a decision of a Division Bench of this Court also, Motilal Bose v. Amin Chand Chattopadhy 1 C. L. J. 211 (1902), which laid down that where the contract between the parties is under a registered document, the case is governed by Art. 116 and not by Art. 89. Had the matter rested there, my own view would have been that Art. 89 applied and not Art. 116. Art. 89 expressly applies to the case of a principal suing his agent for an account, whilst Art. 116 applies to a suit "for compensation for the breach of a contract in writing registered." To ascertain which article of the schedule applies, it is important to see what is the relief which the Plaintiff claimed. Art. 89 expressly applies to the case of a principal suing his agent for an account, whilst Art. 116 applies to a suit "for compensation for the breach of a contract in writing registered." To ascertain which article of the schedule applies, it is important to see what is the relief which the Plaintiff claimed. Now he Is not seeking here for compensation or damages for the breach of the contract entered into by the gomastha to furnish accounts as he contracted to do, but he is asking for an account simply upon the footing of principal and agent. And, as I have said, if the matter had rested there, I should have been disposed to say that Art. 89 and not Art. 116 applied. But the matter does not rest there: and, there is to my mind a very important point which has not been noticed by either Court. Both Defendants Nos. 1 and 2 hypothecated certain properties, to secure the moneys due from the agent by two documents, a security kabuliyat and a zaminnamah, and charged those properties with the payment of what might be found due on taking such accounts and by the third prayer of his plaint, the Plaintiff asked that in the event of Defendants Nos. 1 and 2 falling to pay within the time fixed by Court, the money which might be found due to the Plaintiff at the time of Nikes (that is, the accounts) an order might be passed directing recovery thereof from the property pledged by them and on its proving insufficient from the person and other properties of Defendants Nos. 1 and 2. " The result is that this suit is not merely a suit for an account, but is a suit to enforce in the Plaintiffs' favor the charge created to secure the moneys which might be found due from the agent to his principal on his accounts. That seems to me to be a case which falls within Art. 132 of the second schedule to the Limitation Act, which enacts that in a suit to enforce payment of money charged upon immoveable property, the period of limitation is twelve years from the time when the money sued for becomes due. The agent was dismissed at the commencement of Aghran 1308, the But was instituted on the 16th December 1904. The agent was dismissed at the commencement of Aghran 1308, the But was instituted on the 16th December 1904. Looking, therefore, at what is actually claimed by the Plaintiff in the suit, I think we cannot properly say that the case falls within Art. 89 to which I have referred. The appeal, therefore, must be dismissed with costs. The Respondent has nab filed any cross-objection, but is satisfied with the accounts which have been directed by the decree of the lower Appellate Court, which apparently are for the years 1306, 1307 and 1308 only. 2. We fix the hearing fee at four gold mohurs. Coxe, J. I agree.