Judgement Consolidated appeals from two decrees of the High Court (July 20, 1903), modifying two decrees of the Subordinate Judge of Zillah Ranchi (December 20, 1899), and dismissing the appellants suit with costs. The main questions in this appeal are whether the suit is maintainable on the ground of champerty and Law. Rep. 35 Ind. App. 48 ( 1907- 1908) Raja Rai Bhagwat Dayal Singh V. Debi Dayal Sahu 2 maintenance, and whether two deeds of sale executed by certain Hindu women are valid and binding on the male reversioners to the estate of the last male owner in possession. The first of the two deeds of sale was executed on January 19, 1887, by Jileb Koer, widow of Thakurai Tilakdhari Singh, Aprup Koer, widow of Thakurai Kali Charan Singh, and Etraj Koer, widow of Thakurai Ram Saran Singh, in favour of the respondent Debi Dayal Sahu. The property sold consisted of the villages of Chiyanki and Ganka. The second deed of sale in dispute was executed on May 15, 1891, by the same three widows in favour of N. A. Hodges, who on December 1, 1893, sold to the said Debi Dayal Sahu. It related to the village of Lalgara. Jileb Koer died on November 22, 1894. She was grandmother to Narayan Singh, the last full owner of the villages in suit, and succeeded on his death in 1879 to the limited interest of a Hindu widow as his nearest heiress. On her death the second and third appellants became entitled as Narayans next heirs. They on November 29, 1895, sold the whole of their interest in Narayans estate to the first appellant, Raja Rai Bhagwat Dayal Singh, for Rs.52,600. Of this sum Rs.600 were paid ; the remainder was payable only in the event of the vendees success in recovering the property in suit. Two suits were brought in 1898 to recover, on behalf of the first appellant alone, possession of the villages from the respondent Debi Dayal Singh ; who was sole defendant to the first suit, his co-defendants in the second suit including Sowton, the executor of Hodges. Two suits were brought in 1898 to recover, on behalf of the first appellant alone, possession of the villages from the respondent Debi Dayal Singh ; who was sole defendant to the first suit, his co-defendants in the second suit including Sowton, the executor of Hodges. The defence to either suit was that the suit, as framed, was not maintainable and ought to be dismissed, on the ground that the conveyance to the appellant raja was without consideration, collusive and fraudulent, immoral, and opposed to public policy, being made for the purpose of gambling in litigation and the encouragement of unrighteous suits. It was further pleaded that the suit was barred by limitation, the possession of the three ladies being adverse to the vendors to the said raja, and the possession of Etraj Koer being adverse to the other two. Lastly, it was alleged that both the sales under which the respondent claimed were made under circumstances of legal necessity, binding on the reversioners to Narayan Singhs estate. The Subordinate Judge decided that no one of the three women who executed the deeds under which the respondent claimed had other than a Hindu woman ‘s estate in the villages in suit; that the true heiress of Narayan Singh was Jileb Koer; that Etraj Koer had not acquired a title by adverse possession against her; and that neither the three women jointly, nor any one of them, had acquired a title by adverse possession against the reversioners. He also decided that the appellants right to sue accrued on the death of Jileb Koer, and that in consequence the suit was not barred by limitation. But he held that the conveyance under which the first appellant claimed title from the other two was not a bona fide and valid deed, but was gambling in litigation, immoral, and not enforceable on grounds of public policy; and that, the conveyance failing, the title of the second and third appellants remained, and that they were entitled to a decree, notwrithstanding the relief claimed in the suit. He then dealt with the issue how far the sales in suit, that is, those executed by the three women, were justified by legal necessity, and found that legal necessity was proved as regards a sum of Rs.11,198, and gave decrees for possession to the said two appellants on payment of that amount. He then dealt with the issue how far the sales in suit, that is, those executed by the three women, were justified by legal necessity, and found that legal necessity was proved as regards a sum of Rs.11,198, and gave decrees for possession to the said two appellants on payment of that amount. The High Court in appeal concurred with the finding of the Court below as to the character of the transaction under which the first appellant claimed, but held that on this finding the suit should have been dismissed. They, however, went on to consider with reference to the evidence the two questions whether there was legal necessity for the alienations under which the respondent claimed, and Law. Rep. 35 Ind. App. 48 ( 1907- 1908) Raja Rai Bhagwat Dayal Singh V. Debi Dayal Sahu 3 whether they were made for adequate consideration. Both of these questions they answered in the affirmative in favour of the respondents. As to the first question, they pointed out that by reason of the fact that the widows failed to pay interest on the debts left by Ram Saran, and failed to discharge those debts for many years, the amount of liability on those ancestral debts eventually amounted to a very large sum, which in their view should be taken in its entirety as chargeable against the reversioners. With regard to the question of the costs incurred in litigation, they pointed out that the women paid their pleaders at extravagant rates, and that the exact amount spent in this way was not established by the evidence. But the learned judges considered that the estimate of the expenditure under this head given by the defendants in their written statement, namely, Rs.20,000, was not excessive, and they considered that this sum, together with interest at the high rates charged by the money-lenders for many years, constituted a charge which justified the alienations of the family estate. With regard to the expenses of the marriages which took place in 1884, the learned judges considered that they must have amounted to not less than Rs.12,000. This sum, they observed, was also borrowed at heavy rates of interest, and, by reason of the failure of the widows for many years to discharge either principal or interest, the accumulated liability must have amounted to not less than double or treble the original amount. This sum, they observed, was also borrowed at heavy rates of interest, and, by reason of the failure of the widows for many years to discharge either principal or interest, the accumulated liability must have amounted to not less than double or treble the original amount. This outstanding total was also regarded as a circumstance of legal justification for the alienations in question. The High Court then pointed out that in their opinion there was no ground for the conclusion that the purchasers had taken advantage of the widows ; and they also said " It is clear that the purchasers made sufficient inquiries as to the existence of necessities which would have justified the ladies in alienating the family property, even if the debts which they had to pay were debts of their own contracting, or debts for the liquidation of which they would not be legally entitled to sell the property." In the result the High Court reversed the decision of the Subordinate Court, and passed decrees dismissing both of the suits with costs throughout. Cohen, K.C., and Kenworthy Brown, for the appellants, con-tended that the assignment by the second and third appellants to the first appellant was valid and binding. Accordingly the first appellant was entitled to maintain this snit; otherwise his assignors title to maintain it as the next heirs of the deceased Narayan was not impeached, and they at least were entitled, if their assignment was invalid, to decrees for possession, with mesne profits. The suits should not have been dismissed. With regard to the doctrine of champerty and maintenance, that had no application in India. As regards English law on that subject, reference was made to Bradlaugh v. Newdegate (( 1883) 11 Q. B. D. 1.) ; Alabaster v. Harness. ([ 1894] 2 Q. B. 897.) As regards Indian law on that subject, see Ramcoomar Coondoo v. Chunder Kanto Mookerjee (( 1876) L.R.4 Ind.Ap.23,39,47.) ; Kunwar Ramlal v. Nilkanth (( 1893) L.R.20 Ind.Ap.112,115.); Achal Ram v. Kazim Hussain Khan, (( 1905)L.R Ind.Ap.ll3,118.) It was settled law in India that the doctrine of champerty and maintenance did not apply, and it was too late to contend that the assignment in question was invalid and illegal as being opposed to public policy. It was also contened that the respondent could not support a title derived from the conveyances in 1887 and 1891 by the three widows, who apparently were in possession of the property from the time of Narayans death. They were the result of undue influence, were unfair and unconscionable, were entered into without any independent advice, and their nature was not duly explained. Further, the payment of the consideration was not proved, nor was it shewn that there was any sufficient legal necessity to justify the alienations, nor that the purchasers made due inquiries as to the existence of any such necessity and in good faith believed it to exit. The respondents pleadings shewed that he Law. Rep. 35 Ind. App. 48 ( 1907- 1908) Raja Rai Bhagwat Dayal Singh V. Debi Dayal Sahu 4 acted as if he were dealing with an absolute owner, who had acquired title by adverse possession, and not with a widow heiress with a limited title. The onus was on him to prove the affirmative of these questions, and his former contention that he derived title from Etraj Koer, and not from the heiress Jileb Koer, together with the evidence shewing that his transactions and negotiations were chiefly with Etraj, and not with Jileb, justify a strict scrutiny of the evidence by which he seeks to discharge that onus. The bulk of the consideration of the earlier deed comprised debts incurred by Etraj Koer with the accretion of interest. As regards the items allowed as necessary by the Subordinate Judge, no question was raised in this appeal. They were not sufficient to validate the deeds. Reference was made to Collector of Masulipatam v. Caraly Vencata Narrainapah (( 1861) 8 Moo. Ind. Ap. 529.); Amarnath Sah v. Achan Kuar (( 1892) L. R. 19 Ind. Ap. 196,202.); Kameswar Pershad v. Run Bahadoor Singh (( 1880) L. R. 8 Ind. Ap. 9.) ; Shamsunder Lal v. Achhan Kunwar (( 1898) L. R. 25 Ind. Ap. 183,191.) ; Tika Ram v. Deputy Commissioner of Barabanki (( 1899) L. R. 26 Ind. Ap. 97, 99.) ; and Deputy C commissioner of Kheri v. Khanjan Singh. (( 1907) L. R. 34 Ind, Ap. Ap. 9.) ; Shamsunder Lal v. Achhan Kunwar (( 1898) L. R. 25 Ind. Ap. 183,191.) ; Tika Ram v. Deputy Commissioner of Barabanki (( 1899) L. R. 26 Ind. Ap. 97, 99.) ; and Deputy C commissioner of Kheri v. Khanjan Singh. (( 1907) L. R. 34 Ind, Ap. 72.) It was contended that the Subordinate Judges decree should be restored, subject to the important modification that it should be in favour of the first appellant, but retaining the same conditions as those under which it was made in favour of the second and third appellants. They all three joined in enforcing the title of the first appellant, and, so far as any questions were capable of being raised between assignor and assignee, they were not raised, and could not be raised, between them in this suit; and the respondent was not affected by them, and could not rely on them for the purpose of impeaching this conveyance. Sir R. Finlay, K.C., and De Gruyther, for the respondents, contended that the conveyance under which the first appellant claimed was void. The English law of champerty and maintenance is not as such applicable to India; but it was contrary to public policy to permit a transaction of the nature of that in question, where a stranger comes in to buy, at an unfair and inadequate price and in a spirit of gambling, a right to litigate in reference to property and transactions in which he had no interest, for the mere chance of carrying that litigation to a successful issue, the payment by him of the bulk of the purchase-money being dependent on his success in recovering the property. The result would be to encourage speculative litigation and the acquisition of doubtful interests in that view. There is a distinction between an actual sale of property the subject of litigation and a contingent sale subject to its being recovered. Reference was made to Tarasoondaree Chowdhrain v. Collector of Mymensingh (( 1873) 13 Beng. L. R. 495,); Achal Ram v. Kazim Hussain Khan (L. R. 32 Ind. Ap. 113, 118.); Stephens Commentaries, 14th ed. vol. 4, bk. 6, c. 8 (heading 13, " Champerty "), p. 235 ; Digest, bk. 44, tit. 6, pars. 1, 2, 3; Code, bk. 4, tit. 35, par. 22; bk. 8, tits. 36, 37, pars. 2, 4 ; Troplongs Droit Civil Explique, 5th ed. 1856, tit. Ap. 113, 118.); Stephens Commentaries, 14th ed. vol. 4, bk. 6, c. 8 (heading 13, " Champerty "), p. 235 ; Digest, bk. 44, tit. 6, pars. 1, 2, 3; Code, bk. 4, tit. 35, par. 22; bk. 8, tits. 36, 37, pars. 2, 4 ; Troplongs Droit Civil Explique, 5th ed. 1856, tit. "De la vente’ vol. 2, p. 482, par. 985. The Transfer of Property Act, s. 135, does not apply to a claim to immovable property. It was further contended that the Subordinate Judge ought to have dismissed the suit, having regard to the terms of its prayer, when be found that the conveyance to the first appellant was void. To make a decree in favour of the other appellants was not justifiable under the prayer for general relief, and involved an amendment to the plaint, after the trial was concluded. Reference was made to the Civil Procedure Code, s. 53 and s. 13, expls. 1 and 2; Cargill v. Bower. (( 1878) 10 Ch. D. 502, 508.) It was further contended that the High Court was right in finding, on the evidence, that the alienations under which the respondent claimed were valid as having been made under justifying necessity see Maynes Hindu Law, 7th ed. s. 634, pp. 852-4. Cohen, K.C., in reply, as to the assignment to the first appellant, contended that the French authorities cited were irrelevant. The Roman authorities were unnecessary, for English law makes champerty and maintenance illegal. Reference was made to Hutley v. Hutley (( 1873) L. R. 8 Q. B. 112.); Principles of German Civil Law, bj E. J. Schuster, 1907, p. 119, par. 120; Tarachand v. Suklal (( 1888) I. L. R. Law. Rep. 35 Ind. App. 48 ( 1907- 1908) Raja Rai Bhagwat Dayal Singh V. Debi Dayal Sahu 5 12 Bomb. 559.); Indian Contract Act, s. 30. As to the alienations to the respondent, see Raj Lukee Dabea v. Gokool Chunder Chowdhry. (( 1869) 13 Moo. Ind. Ap. 209.) The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by SIR ARTHUR WILSON. These Consolidated appeals relate to three villages, Chiyanki, Ganka, and Lalgara, and the substantial conflict is between the first appellant and the first respondent. The villages, with others, were formerly the property of Ram Saran Singh, who on his death was succeeded by his infant son Narayan. Ap. 209.) The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by SIR ARTHUR WILSON. These Consolidated appeals relate to three villages, Chiyanki, Ganka, and Lalgara, and the substantial conflict is between the first appellant and the first respondent. The villages, with others, were formerly the property of Ram Saran Singh, who on his death was succeeded by his infant son Narayan. Narayan died, while still an infant and unmarried, on August 7, 1879, and left surviving him his grandmother Jileb Koer, an aunt Aprup Koer, widow of Ram Sarans brother, and a stepmother Etraj Koer, widow of Ram Saran. Of these, the grandmother was heir to the boys property, with the limited interest of a Hindu female inheriting from a male. The three ladies appear to have lived together down to the death of the grandmother, which took place on November 22, 1894. On the death of the grandmother the inheritance again opened, and the second and third appellants, Bhanpertap Singh and Kirpa Narayan Singh, were then the nearest male heirs of the deceased boy. Those two persons, on November 29, 1895, purported to sell the three villages in question to Rajah Bhagwat Dayal Singh, the first appellant. And that is the title under which he claims. The first respondent, on the other hand> as the case is now put on his behalf, claims under two sale deeds executed, as it is now said, by or on behalf of the grandmother, Jileb Koer, the sales being, it is contended, justified by necessity so as to pass the whole inheritance. The first of these deeds bore date January 19, 1887. It purported to be a conveyance by way of sale, by the three ladies who have been mentioned, of the two villages Chiyanki and Ganka to the first respondent. The second deed was dated May 15, 1891. It purported to be executed by the same three ladies in favour of one Hodges, and to convey to him by way of sale the village Lalgara. Hodges afterwards conveyed to the first respondent. The present suits were brought on August 29, 1898, in the Court of the Subordinate Judge at Ranchi. The plaintiffs were the first appellant and the two persons from whom he purchased. The sole defendant in one suit and the substantial defendant in the other was the first respondent. Hodges afterwards conveyed to the first respondent. The present suits were brought on August 29, 1898, in the Court of the Subordinate Judge at Ranchi. The plaintiffs were the first appellant and the two persons from whom he purchased. The sole defendant in one suit and the substantial defendant in the other was the first respondent. The first suit related to the village Lalgara, the second suit to the villages Chiyanki and Ganka. The claim in each case was for possession and mesne profits. The first question raised in the case and argued on the appeals was whether or not the sale by the second and third appellants to the first appellant was void in law, so as to pass no title, on the ground that it was champertous or contrary to public policy. For the respondents it was boldly argued that, although the English law as to maintenance and champerty is not, as such, applicable to India, yet on other grounds what is substantially the same law is there in force. Their Lordships are of opinion that that proposition cannot be supported. In three cases— Ram Coomar Coondoo v. Chunder Canto Mookerjee{ L. R 4 Ind. Ap. 23.) ; Kunwar Ram Lal v. Nil Kanth (L. R 20 Ind. Ap. 112.); Achal Ram v. Raja Kazim Hussain Khan (L. R. 32 Ind. Ap. 113.)—before this Board a contrary doctrine has been laid down. In the last of those cases full effect was given, under circumstances closely analogous to those of the present case, to an agreement which would certainly have been void if champerty avoided transactions in India. Law. Rep. 35 Ind. App. 48 ( 1907- 1908) Raja Rai Bhagwat Dayal Singh V. Debi Dayal Sahu 6 It was further argued that the transaction in question was contrary to public policy, and void on that ground, by reason of the provision as to payment of the purchase-money by the first appellant to the second and third. The purchase-money was fixed at Rs.52,600, of which Rs.600 was to be paid down, and the balance when the property should be recovered. Their Lordships are unable to agree to this argument. In their opinion the condition so introduced does not carry the case any further than does the champertous character of the transaction generally. The purchase-money was fixed at Rs.52,600, of which Rs.600 was to be paid down, and the balance when the property should be recovered. Their Lordships are unable to agree to this argument. In their opinion the condition so introduced does not carry the case any further than does the champertous character of the transaction generally. It was further said, and this was relied upon in the Courts in India, that the transaction was an unfair and unconscionable bargain for an inadequate price. But that is a question between assignor and assignee. It is unnecessary to consider what the decision ought to have been if this had been a litigation between the assignors and the assignee in which the former sought to repudiate the assignment. In the present case the assignors do nothing of the kind. They maintain the transaction and ask that effect be given to it, and for that purpose they join as plaintiffs in the present actions. Their Lordships are therefore of opinion that the attack upon the title of the first appellant upon any such grounds as those indicated must fail. The second question that has to be considered is whether the respondent has shewn a good title in himself by purchase from Jileb Koer, the grandmother, under the two sale deeds mentioned, and under such circumstances as to make that title effectual against the reversionary heirs. The Subordinate Judge, who tried the cases, held that the conveyances were not good? but he allowed, in favour of the first respondent, certain sums which he considered to have been advanced for purposes of legal necessity; and, whilst giving a decree to the appellants and plaintiffs for possession of the property, he made that decree conditional upon the payment to that respondent of the sums held to have been advanced for legitimate necessities. On the argument of these appeals Mr. Cohen, for the appellants, accepted the propriety of this mode of dealing with the case, and assented to the allowance so made by the Subordinate Judge. The High Court, on appeal, differed from the first Court, and held that the necessity for the sales in question was established. Before dealing further with this question, it must be noticed that the case now contended for is not the case raised on the pleadings and relied upon at the trial. The High Court, on appeal, differed from the first Court, and held that the necessity for the sales in question was established. Before dealing further with this question, it must be noticed that the case now contended for is not the case raised on the pleadings and relied upon at the trial. The respondent in his written statement alleged a title derived, not from Jileb Koer, but from Etraj Koer. He said, in paragraph 21, that " Etraj Koer was no heir to Narayan Saran Singh, and that she acquired an absolute right by adverse possession M; in paragraph 23, " that it is not true, as the plaintiffs allege, .... that on the death of Narayan Saran Singh, Jileb Koer succeeded as heir and was in possession up to her death ; the fact is .... that Etraj Koer alone was in such possession until her death" ; and in paragraph 25, that "Jileb Koer and Aprup Koer never took the estate of Narayan Saran Singh as heir, and the fact of their joining in the documents as persons executing the deeds of sale and the prior deeds was a matter of form of evidence of members dependent for maintenance on Etraj Koer, and was merely a surplus age" ; and it was added in paragraph 26 that, " even if Jileb Koer were to have taken the estate .... by inheritance, she would take it in absolute state . . . under the provisions of Mitakshara law, and so also if she was made a co-sharer by Etraj Koer in Etraj Koers right." In his evidence given at the trial the respondent endeavoured to maintain the case that his title was derived from Etraj Koer and was good on that account. One who claims title under a conveyance from a woman, with the usual limited interest which a woman takes, and who seeks to enforce that title against reversioners, is always subject to the burden of proving not only the genuineness of his conveyance, but the full Law. Rep. 35 Ind. App. One who claims title under a conveyance from a woman, with the usual limited interest which a woman takes, and who seeks to enforce that title against reversioners, is always subject to the burden of proving not only the genuineness of his conveyance, but the full Law. Rep. 35 Ind. App. 48 ( 1907- 1908) Raja Rai Bhagwat Dayal Singh V. Debi Dayal Sahu 7 comprehension by the limited owner of the nature of the alienation she was making, and also that that alienation was justified by necessity, or at least that the alienee did all that was reasonable to satisfy himself of the existence of such necessity. And this burden lies the more heavily on one who comes into Court with the case that he did not take from a limited owner, but from one whose title he alleges to have been adverse to that owner. These considerations apply with special force to the present case. The earlier transactions of the first respondent were with Etraj Koer, and there is no satisfactory evidence to shew that Jileb Koer, the real owner, took part in them, or authorized them in any way. It was argued, however, that, if Jileb Koer was not shewn to have authorized the earlier transactions, she had ratified them by being a party to the later documents, and particularly the two sale deeds. Ratification in the proper sense of the term, as used with reference to the law of agency, is applicable only to acts done on behalf of the ratifier. And this rule is recognized in s. 196 of the Indian Contract Act. Looking to the substance of the matter, it would be a serious extension of the law, as hitherto applied, to hold that a woman with a limited interest could, by acts ex post facto, charge upon the estate which she represents obligations not originally binding upon it. With regard to the first of the sale deeds now in question, when the details which make up the consideration come to be examined, it appears that they include one sum of Rs.1500 which the Subordinate Judge credited to the first respondent in the manner already explained. Apart from this sum the great bulk of the consideration for this sale deed consists of debts originally incurred by Etraj Koer with accretions of interest and compound interest. Apart from this sum the great bulk of the consideration for this sale deed consists of debts originally incurred by Etraj Koer with accretions of interest and compound interest. Their Lordships are of opinion that this deed was correctly estimated by the Subordinate Judge. The case as to the second sale deed is not quite so simple. With regard to it the Subordinate Judge gave credit to the first respondent for considerable sums as having been advanced for real necessities. As to the rest of the consideration for that deed, he held that necessity had not been established. In coming to this conclusion, he took into account not only the more general considerations already referred to, but also certain circumstances peculiar to the case—that the lady who alone had any power to convey was old, and had no independent advice to guide her, and that the first respondent was in a position to exercise considerable influence over her affairs. Their Lord-ships think the Subordinate Judge was justified in taking all these matters into his consideration; and they see no sufficient ground for rejecting his conclusions. There remains one other point for consideration. The plain-tiffs claimed not only possession, but mesne profits. The Subordinate Judge rejected the latter claim. Their Lordships are of opinion that, as the deeds of sale are not good as such, the claim for mesne profits is well founded. In argument it was conceded that on the other side of the account interest at 6 per cent should be allowed on the sums credited to the first respondent. The amounts thus to be allowed on the one side and on the other can be adjusted in execution proceedings. Their Lordships will humbly advise His Majesty that the appeals should be allowed, that the decrees of the High Court should be discharged, with costs to be paid as regards the first decree by the present respondents other than Sowton, and as regards the second decree by the first respondent; that the decrees of the Court of the Subordinate Judge should be discharged, and that instead thereof it should be ordered that, upon the first appellant paying to the first respondent the sums found in favour of the latter by the Subordinate Judge with interest at 6 per cent. per annum, the first appellant do recover possession of the property in suit together with mesne profits to be ascertained in execution Law. Rep. 35 Ind. App. 48 ( 1907- 1908) Raja Rai Bhagwat Dayal Singh V. Debi Dayal Sahu 8 proceedings, and costs to be paid by the first party defendants in the first suit and by the sole defendant in the second suit. The respondents other than Sowton will pay the costs of these appeals.