JUDGMENT Fletcher, J. - This is a suit in ejectment. The Plaintiff claims under a lease executed on the 17th September 1907 for a term of twenty years, and granted to him by one Satya Bhupal Banerjee. He sets out in his plaint that the Defendant who is in occupation of the premises, is there as a monthly tenant and that he has given her notice to quit. 2. The Defendant sets up a separate title in her written statement, namely, that she is in possession under an unexpired lease for a term of five years granted prior to the lease of the Plaintiff. 3. As regards the case set up by the Plaintiff, the following objections are raised by learned counsel for the Defendant:-- 4. First, the lease granted to the Plaintiff has never been completed by an entry and, therefore, operates only to grant to the Plaintiff an interesse termini and that a person who has an interesse termini is not competent to give notice to quit. In my opinion that is not so; an interesse termini is an existing real right vested in the Plaintiff which gives him an immediate right of entry, and that being bo, the person entitled to make an immediate entry is entitled to serve notice to quit. 5. The second point set up against the Plaintiff's case is that the notice to quit is bad, and reliance is placed on the case of Bradley v. Atkinson ILR 7 All. 899 (1885). In my opinion that case is not the same as this case. The notice in this case cannot be distinguished from the notice in the case of Ahearn v. Bellman (2). Notice in that case was as follows:-- I hereby give you notice to quit and deliver up possession of the shop-premises and show-rooms situate at and being 20 Moss Street, Liverpool, and now held by you as tenant from me on or before the 1st day of May 1878 and I hereby further give you notice that should you retain possession of the premises after the date before-mentioned, the annual rental of the premises now held by you from me will be 160 payable quarterly in advance. 6. 6. The majority of the members of the Court of Appeal held that it was a perfectly good notice, because it was a clear notice to quit and it was not vitiated by the terms in the second portion of the notice, which only laid down what would happen, if the Defendant failed to quit. In that case, the Court distinguished the case of Doe v. Jackson 1 Douglas 175 (1779), which is the decision relied upon in the case in Bradley v, Atkinson ILR 7 All. 899 (1885). Sitting here as a single Judge and being free to follow the decision in either of those cases, I prefer to follow the decision of the English Court of Appeal. The notice in the case of Ahearn v. Bellman 4 Exch. D. 201 (1879) is not distinguishable from the notice in the present case. I, therefore, hold that the notice to quit is a good notice. 7. The next point of objection is that the notice is bad as it is made to expire on the 29th February. It is said it ought to expire on the 1st March instead of the 29th February. There is however distinct authority that, although it would be more usual to make the notice to expire on the 1st March, yet, if it is given to expire on the 29th February, the notice is good. See, Sidebotham v. Holland [1895] 1 Q.B. 378 (1894). That being so, unless the Defendant can establish the lease she sets up, I am of opinion that the Plaintiff is entitled to succeed. 8. Now, how does the evidence relating to the lease set up by the Defendant stand ? The defendant has been in possession of these premises for a considerable number of years and she says in the third paragraph of her written statement this:-- After considerable negotiation in the months of February and March 1904, between the Plaintiff (it ought to be the Defendant), on the one hand and the said Satya Bhupal Banerjee on the other, it was agreed by and between them that the property No. 145 Dhurrumtolla Street should be leased to the Defendant for a period of five years commencing from the 1st April 1904, to the 31st March 1909, at a monthly rental of Rs. 140 and thereupon the Plaintiff (should be the Defendant), with her husband and children, who had been living in the said premises from 1903, continued to live in and occupy the same on and from the 1st April 1904, under the said lease. The terms and conditions of the Plaintiff's lease or kabuliyat having been embodied in writing on paper, the same was duly submitted to the said Satya Bhupal Banerjee who signed and accepted the paper-writing aforesaid on the 9th May 1904 which the Defendant holds and thereafter a fair-copy of the said document having been prepared on stamped paper was duly executed and then registered on the 1st October 1904 by the Defendant and her former husband V. Jacob, since deceased, and the Defendant has been ever since in occupation of the said property paying the said sum of Rs. 140 as monthly rent to the said Satya Bhupal Banerjee. 9. Now, the draft of this lease has been put in before me. On the evidence, I am not satisfied that Mr. Banerjee ever assented to this lease. The evidence on this point is not at all satisfactory. The only evidence that there was an agreement on which the parties agreed to take the lease is this:--The Defendant and her husband executed a counterpart or kabuliyat in terms of that agreement and they took it to the registration office and registered it there. It is said that a certain man appeared there on behalf of Mr. Banerjee and witnessed the registration. I am not satisfied that he did. It is very unusual for the lessee to register the counterpart of the lease; it would be the duty of the lessor to do that. 10. Moreover, on the 28th May 1907, Mr. Banerjee served the Defendant with a notice to quit. No doubt nothing was done pursuant to that notice but that was because Mr. Banerjee shortly afterwards leased the property to the Plaintiff. 11. In my opinion, the Defendant has failed to prove that she had got a lease of the premises. That being so, the Defendant must give up possession of the premises to the Plaintiff. 12. The only question remaining to be dealt with is what amount ought to be awarded to the Plaintiff for rental value of the premises during the time the Defendant remained in possession after the expiration of the notice to quit. That being so, the Defendant must give up possession of the premises to the Plaintiff. 12. The only question remaining to be dealt with is what amount ought to be awarded to the Plaintiff for rental value of the premises during the time the Defendant remained in possession after the expiration of the notice to quit. It was pointed out by Mr. Stokes that the case of Gillard v. Cheshire Lines Committee 32 W.R. (Eng.) 943 (1884) establishes that a Plaintiff who has an interesse termini and therefore has a right to make an immediate entry may, if his right is interfered with, maintain an action for damages. The Defendant by her action has prevented the Plaintiff from making an entry on the premises. The Plaintiff gave her notice that if she prevented him from making the entry, she would have to pay rent at the rate of Rs. 350 a month. In my opinion, the Plaintiff is entitled to recover against the Defendant arrears of rent at the rate of Rs. 350 a month, as from the date of expiration of notice to quit, until she gives up possession. 13. There remains only one matter which I have omitted to mention and that is as to the form of one of the rent receipts given after the expiration of the notice to quit. I am satisfied on the evidence that that receipt was given by a mistake. The Defendant, however, says that if there was an acceptance of rent, after the notice to quit, it amounted to conclusive evidence of a waiver of the notice to quit. But that Is not so. The question whether the acceptance of rent after the expiration of the notice to quit is a waiver of the notice to quit is a matter for the jury. Sitting here and exercising the functions of a jury, I have no hesitation in holding that, even if the sum in question was paid as rent, it was never intended between the parties that it should operate as a waiver of the notice to quit. The Defendant having failed in the suit, she must pay the Plaintiff's costs of suit on Scale No. 2.