JUDGMENT 1. In this case the Land Acquisition Collector of Dacca awarded a certain sum as compensation for acquired land and paid it to the persons to whom compensation bad been awarded, apparently having no reason to think that payment should be withheld by reason of any of the contingencies mentioned In cl. 2 of sec. 31 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. One of the persons to whom compensation was awarded was the present Petitioner who is a Hindu widow. Almost six months after the award her daughter applied for a reference to the Civil Court. The Collector made the reference accordingly and the District Judge found that the Petitioner was a Hindu widow, not competent to alienate the property, and so passed the following order : "I direct that the opposite party Gobinda Rani do repay the amount of compensation wrongfully taken by her and that it be dealt with according to the provisions of sec 32 of the Land Acquisition Act." The Petitioner has obtained this rule on the opposite party to show cause why this order should not be set aside as passed without jurisdiction. 2. An objection is taken that the petitioner is not entitled to come under sec. 622, C.P.C, inasmuch as the order is open to appeal. It is argued on behalf of the opposite party that this is in effect an order under sec. 32 of the Land Acquisition Act and that the order that the Petitioner should repay the compensation which she had withdrawn, is merely subsidiary to, and must be taken as part of, the order under sec. 32. 3. We are unable to agree with this contention. The District Judge was not, and is not yet in a position to pass any order under sec. 32. That section prescribes how the Court shall deal with money deposited in Court by the Collector and it is. perfectly dear that, until the money is in the custody of the Court, the Court cannot proceed to deal with It. in our opinion, the effectual part of the order against which this application has been made and a part which can be regarded as distinct and separable from the rest of the order and cannot be regarded as made under sec. 32 is the order that the Petitioner should repay the amount of compensation. The order under sec. in our opinion, the effectual part of the order against which this application has been made and a part which can be regarded as distinct and separable from the rest of the order and cannot be regarded as made under sec. 32 is the order that the Petitioner should repay the amount of compensation. The order under sec. 32 at present cannot be regarded as an effectual order at all and cannot come into operation until the money is in the custody of the Court. Taking the order then as being an order to repay the compensation we are unable to see how the District Judge can have jurisdiction to pass an order of this kind. It appears to us open to doubt whether sec. 18 which deals inter alia with objections as to the persons to whom compensation is payable, or sec. 30 which deals with disputes as to the persons to whom compensation is payable, can have any application after the money has actually been paid away. The rights of the real owner are sufficiently safeguarded by the last proviso to cl. (2) of sec. 31. But assuming, without admitting, that the reference was intra vires, we can find no authority for holding that the District Judge has power to order a refund of money paid under cl. (1) of sec. 32. A Court may have Inherent power to order a refund of money which has been wrongfully obtained from It by any party by an abuse of its process but that principle does not authorise a District Judge to order a refund of money paid by a Collector under the Laud Acquisition Act without any irregularity apparent at the time and without any order from the Civil Court. We think therefore that this rule should be made absolute and the order of the District Judge, dated the 25th June 1908, should be set aside. The Petitioner will be entitled to her costs.