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1908 DIGILAW 22 (SC)

RAMGOPAL SAHU v. BARSATI SINGH

1908-12-15

LORD ATKINSON, LORD MACNAGHTEN, SIR ANDREW SCOBLE, SIR ARTHUR WILSON

body1908
Judgement Appeal from a decree of the High Court (June 2, 1905) reversing a decree of the Subordinate Judge of Mozufferpur (July 16, 1904). The property in suit had been sold on August 18, 1903, in execution of a decree on a mortgage. The question raised in this appeal was as to the validity of the sale under the following circumstances. The mortgage was dated September 25, 1899, the decree thereon December 20, 1900, an appeal from which was entered by the decree holders in order to enhance its amount. The Subordinate Judge refused an order absolute for sale pending the appeal. The High Court, however, directed him to make the necessary order, and on April 14, 1902, an order absolute for sale was made, and the sale was effected on August 18, 1903, and confirmed by the Subordinate Judge on January 4, 1904. Thereafter, on January 27, 1904, the High Court in appeal enhanced the amount decreed, and erroneously ordered a sale conditional on payment of the whole amount thereby decreed within six months. Attempts on the part of the appellants to obtain possession of the property purchased by them were opposed, but on April 18, 1904, the High Court decided that they were entitled to possession, and early in May, 1904, they obtained it. On May 19, 1904, the respondents applied to the Subordinate Judge under s. 244 of Act XIV. of 1882, claiming a restoration to possession of the said properties by setting aside the sale made on August 18, 1903, on the ground that the High Courts decree of January 27, 1904, had modified the decree of Decem ber 20, 1900, and awarded the appellants a larger sum as due under the mortgage. In answer thereto the appellants insisted on the validity of the sale, urged that the only remedy to set it aside was by application under s. 311 of Act XIV. of 1882, a remedy which was barred by limitation and had already been exhausted. It was also pleaded that the orders of the High Court of April 14, 1902, and April 18, 1904, were final as against the respondents. On July 16, 1904, the Subordinate Judge dismissed the application with costs. He decided that the respondents could only apply under s. 311 of Act XIV. of 1882, and that such application was barred by limitation. On July 16, 1904, the Subordinate Judge dismissed the application with costs. He decided that the respondents could only apply under s. 311 of Act XIV. of 1882, and that such application was barred by limitation. He also held that the decree of the High Court of January 27, 1904, did not invalidate the sale. The High Court on June 2, 1905, reversed the decree of the x Court below, and directed a restoration to the respondents of possession of the property. They held that the sale was invalid, as the only decree capable of execution was the decree dated January 27, 1904, and that the proper remedy was by application under s. 244 of Act XIV. of 1882. De Gruyther, K.C, and Kyffin, for the appellants, contended that the decree of the High Court was wrong. Under no circumstances could the respondents be entitled to possession without redeeming their mortgage. The sale of August 18, 1903, was valid and had been confirmed by order of Court. The only remedy to set it aside was under s. 311 of Act XIV. of 1882, which was disposed of by the order of confirmation, and was in any event now barred by limitation. Reference was made to the Transfer of Property Act (IV. of 1882), ss. 88 and 89, and to s. 545 of the Civil Procedure Code. The orders of the High Court of April 14, 1902, and April 18, 1904, were a complete answer to the respondents claim. The High Court had no jurisdiction to set aside or reverse its own order of April 18, 1904, which, never having been appealed from, had become final and conclusive as to the appellants right to possession under a valid sale see Cheda Lal v. Badullah. (( 1888) I. L. R. 11 Allah. 35, 38.) It had no jurisdiction to extend the time fixed for sale, especially after the sale had been effected see s. 93 of the Transfer of Property Act, and Mungal Pershad Dichit v. Grija Kant Lahiri. (( 1881) L. R. 8 Ind. App. 123.) Rreference was also made to form] 28 of the Civil Procedure Code. The respondents did not appear. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by LORD MACNAGHTEN. This appeal was heard ex parte. (( 1881) L. R. 8 Ind. App. 123.) Rreference was also made to form] 28 of the Civil Procedure Code. The respondents did not appear. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by LORD MACNAGHTEN. This appeal was heard ex parte. It certainly presents something like a puzzle owing to complications which have resulted from an error committed by the appellants at one stage of the proceedings. On the whole, however, their Lordships are of opinion that the appeal ought to succeed. On December 20, 1900, the appellants obtained from the Subordinate Judge of Mozufferpur an ordinary decree for a sale of some mortgaged property. The amount for which the decree was passed was Rs. 114,000. The appellants claim was for a considerably larger amount. They appealed to the High Court for a modification of the decree on the ground that the amount allowed was inadequate. In August, 1901, before the appeal to the High Court came on for hearing, the appellants applied to the Subordinate Judge for an order absolute for sale. The Subordinate Judge refused the application pending the appeal. But the High Court, on the petition of the appellants, directed the Subordinate Judge to make the necessary order. In their judgment the learned Judges of the High Court say "It is suggested that in the appeal to this Court there may be an order or a decree for a further sum in favour of the petitioners and some confusion may result. But we have not to consider that matter at present, nor is it clear that any confusion will arise." On April 14, 1902, the order absolute was made. The property was put up for sale on August 18, 1903. It was purchased by the appellants. The sale was confirmed on January 4, 1904. But the Subordinate Judge, on the objection of the respondents, refused to put the appellants in possession. On January 27, 1904, the appeal of the present appellants from the original decree of December 20, 1900, came on to be heard. The Court made an order modifying the decree in the appellants favour, directing the respondents to pay the whole amount adjudged within six months, and, in case of default, directing the property to be sold. On January 27, 1904, the appeal of the present appellants from the original decree of December 20, 1900, came on to be heard. The Court made an order modifying the decree in the appellants favour, directing the respondents to pay the whole amount adjudged within six months, and, in case of default, directing the property to be sold. The next important date is April 18, 1904, when an appeal from the refusal of the Subordinate Judge to put the appellants in possession of the property was heard. The High Court, after hearing both parties, decided that the appellants were entitled to possession. They were accordingly put into possession and have remained in possession ever since. As the respondents were represented by counsel or pleaders on that occasion, it cannot be doubted that the attention of the High Court was called to the fact that the six months allowed by the decree of January 27, 1904, had not expired, and that the sale had taken place under a decree of the Subordinate Judge inconsistent with the subsequent decree of the High Court. The objection was apparent. It could not have been overlooked. How the High Court dealt with it does not appear. It may not have been pressed by the respondents, or the High Court may have been satisfied that, under the circumstances of the case, the form of the decree was a mere slip on the part of the appellants or the Registrar of the Court, which misled nobody. The next step was that the respondents on May 19, 1904, applied to the Subordinate Judge claiming restoration to possession by setting aside the sale of August 18, 1903. The Subordinate Judge dismissed the application with costs. On appeal, however, to the High Court, that Court reversed the decree of the Subordinate Judge, set aside the sale, and directed that possession of the property should be restored to the respondents. From that decree the appellants have appealed to His Majesty in Council. Pending the appeal the High Court has refused to disturb the possession of the appellants, observing that " the case is in its circumstances very peculiar." The appellants take their stand on the order of the High Court of April 18, 1904. From that decree the appellants have appealed to His Majesty in Council. Pending the appeal the High Court has refused to disturb the possession of the appellants, observing that " the case is in its circumstances very peculiar." The appellants take their stand on the order of the High Court of April 18, 1904. Their Lordships think that the appellants are right and that the order now under appeal is inconsistent with the order of April 18, 1904, against which no appeal was brought, and which, in their Lordships opinion, ought not now to be treated as null and void. The merits of the case are not with the respondents. If they were allowed to take advantage of the error in the decree of January 27, 1904, it would only lead to expense and delay. They have not offered to redeem, and probably are not in a position to redeem, the property. Their Lordships will therefore humbly advise His Majesty that the appeal ought to be allowed, and that the order of June 2, 1905, ought to be discharged, but without costs, and the decree of the Subordinate Judge of July 16, 1904, restored, and that any costs paid under the order of June 2, 1905, ought to be repaid. Their Lordships do not think it is a case for giving the appellants any costs of the appeal.