JUDGMENT 1. This was an appeal by the tenant of certain lands on the basis of a compromise effected in a suit some years ago. That suit was brought by one Banku and others, who asserted that they were the tenants of the land, and sued for recovery of possession, making the present Appellant and the landlords Defendants to the suit. The suit was settled by an arrangement of a nature which is not uncommon, that the pre sent Appellant, who seem to be the real tenant of the land, should retain possession and should pay a certain rent, namely, Rs. 61. As the Appellant now pleads that the rent is Rs. 7-14, it is a fairly safe inference that the rent agreed upon by the compromise was to some extent an enhanced rent. The lower Appellate Court has given effect to this compromise and the Defendant appeals. The principal argument put forward in his favour is that the former suit related to the title of the land and was not concerned with the rent: and that therefore the compromise inasmuch as it dealt with matters beyond the scope of the suit, is inoperative. We have been referred to a large number of decisions which deal with the value to be attached to compromises of suits that go beyond the subject-matter of those suits. But we think it unnecessary to refer to them at length, because in this case the compromise pleaded did not, in our opinion, go beyond the scope of the suit in which it was arrived at. If a Plaintiff sues to establish a claim and in the end agrees to abandon his claim on the Defendant agreeing to pay him Rs. 1,000 it seems to us impossible to say that the agreement to pay Rs. 1,000 is beyond the scope of the suit, and is therefore inoperative. And it cannot make any difference whether the agreement is to pay Rs. 1,000, or as in this case to pay Rs. 61 a year. Nor can it make any difference whether the agreement is to pay the money to the Plaintiff or to a third person. An agreement to pay money to a third person would be a perfectly valid consideration for a contract and must be an equally valid consideration for a compromise. 61 a year. Nor can it make any difference whether the agreement is to pay the money to the Plaintiff or to a third person. An agreement to pay money to a third person would be a perfectly valid consideration for a contract and must be an equally valid consideration for a compromise. Of course it may be that, if the landlords had not been parties to the compromise they could not have sued upon it, but that is not the case here. The Appellant's first contention that the compromise is invalid, as being beyond the scope of the suit in which it was effected, must in our opinion fail. 2. Secondly, it is argued that the rent was not the consideration for the compromise. This is a question of fact with which we have no concern in second appeal, but we think that there is nothing in the contention. All the probabilities of the case, and all ordinary experience are in favour of the supposition that the rent was the consideration. The only other consideration that the learned pleader for the Appellant can suggest is that the then Plaintiffs may have agreed to waive their costs. But in that case, it may be asked, why did they bring the suit at all. It is practically admitted in the pleadings of this suit that there were only two sides to the former suit, and that the landlords were on one side and the present Defendant on the other. The landlords say that Banku and his companions were in collusion with the present Appellant, while the latter says that Banku was in collusion with the landlords. If the pleadings of the Appellant be accepted, there is no escape from the finding that the former suit and the compromise in which it ended were between the landlords and the Appellant, and that Banku was a mere shade. 3. Thirdly, it is contended that the compromise decree is not admissible in evidence because the subject-matter of the two cases is not the same, which, it is said, is an essential condition to the admission in evidence of judgments, which are not inter partes. We are not prepared to admit that this decree, to which the landlords and the Appellant were both parties, was not inter partes and would refer in this connection to Magniram v. Mehdi Hossein I. L. R. 31 Cal. We are not prepared to admit that this decree, to which the landlords and the Appellant were both parties, was not inter partes and would refer in this connection to Magniram v. Mehdi Hossein I. L. R. 31 Cal. 95 (1903). Nor is it clear that the subject-matter was so different as to attract the consequences contended for by the learned pleader for the Appellant. The former suit related to title and the present suit is for rent of the same land. The case he cites, Tepu Khan v. Rajani Mohun Das I. L. R. 25 Cal 522 (1898) followed Ram Ranjan v. Ram Narain L. R. 22 I. A. 60: S. C. I. L. R. 22 Cal. 533 (1894) a decision which admitted previous judgments in rent suits in evidence in subsequent suits relating to title. But we do not base our decision on these considerations. The decree is in our opinion admissible as being the legal record of the agreement entered into between the parties, which is itself a fact in issue and an admission of the Appellant. That it is available to the parties as evidence seems clear from the decision in Pranal Annee v. Lakshmi Annee 3 C. W. N. 485 : S. C. I. L. R. 22 Mad. 508 (1899). 4. Finally it is argued that the learned District judge was wrong in holding the decree to be binding on the Appellants, or to be more than a mere piece of evidence. The District Judge says "I think that the Respondents were any how bound by their statements recorded in their petition of compromise." The word " anyhow " seems to mean " even if the decree in which the compromise is embodied is not operative." Doubtless the learned District Judge knows perfectly well that an admission in a petition, which is not a decree, need not be conclusive proof, though of course it is usual in such cases to say that the persons who made the admission are bound by it. We see no reason for supposing that the District Judge placed an exaggerated value on this admission. We think therefore that the decision of the District Judge was right and dismiss the appeal with costs.