JUDGMENT Maclean, C.J. - After stating the facts already set out). The question we have to decide depends upon the true meaning of sec. 14 of the Indian Limitation Act. That section runs as follows:-- In computing the period of limitation prescribed for any suit, the time during which the Plaintiff has been prosecuting with due diligence another civil proceeding, whether in a Court of first instance or in a Court of Appeal, against the Defendant, shall be excluded, where the proceeding is founded upon the same cause of action, and is prosecuted in good faith in a Court which from defect of jurisdiction, or other cause of a like nature, is unable to entertain it. What is meant by the words "a Court which from defect of jurisdiction, or other cause of a like nature, is unable to entertain it ?" The language is not, "unable to decide upon it," as in Act XIV of 1859. It is clear that the Court in which the first suit was brought had ample jurisdiction to deal with that suit. It exercised that jurisdiction by striking out the present Plaintiff as one of the Plaintiffs in that suit. We cannot say that "from defect of jurisdiction it was unable to entertain it." It did in fact entertain it, and held that the suit could not proceed, not from any lack of jurisdiction in the Court, but because the suit was improperly framed. 2. Can it then be said that the Court was unable to entertain the first suit, "from some other cause of a like nature to defect of jurisdiction ?" 3. One of the meanings attached to the word "entertain" in Webster's International Dictionary is "to receive and take into consideration." The Court did receive the first suit, and did take it into consideration, and held that, in its then form, it would not lie. In my opinion, the Court was able to, and did in fact, entertain it, though it could not decide it on its merits. 4. There is a marked difference between the language of the Act of 1859, and that of the existing Limitation Act. In my opinion, the Court was able to, and did in fact, entertain it, though it could not decide it on its merits. 4. There is a marked difference between the language of the Act of 1859, and that of the existing Limitation Act. In the present Act the words are "unable to entertain:" in the previous Act the words were "unable to decide upon it." A Court may be able to entertain a suit in its inception, but be unable to decide the same owing to some defect, not in jurisdiction, but in procedure. There must have been some reason for this change of language: and a possible reason is that the legislature intended to limit the benefit of the section to cases where the Court had no power to embark upon the case at all. 5. Assuming, however, the Court was unable to entertain it, can it be properly said that it was unable to entertain it by reason of a cause of a nature like to that of defect of jurisdiction? The cause here was the improper joinder of parties and of causes of action : it would, I think, be straining the language of the section to say this was a cause of a like nature to defect of jurisdiction. But, I think, a more conclusive answer to the Respondents' contention is that the Court could entertain, and did entertain, the suit, though it could not decide It on the merits. It Is not unworthy of notice that the present Plaintiff knew, on the 28th March 1906, from the de fence, that the objection which prevailed to have the pleadings amended by striking his name out as a Plaintiff, be would have had plenty of time within which to bring his present action. The Court could have entertained that application, and so entertained the suit for that purpose. 6. The learned Judge In the Court of first instance seemed to think that the case was concluded by authority: let us see how they stand. 7. An early and Important Full-Bench decision of this Court, which, if in point, Is binding upon us, does not seem to have been cited. I am referring to the case of Chunder Madhab Chakrabutty v. Bissesuree Debea 6 W.R. (Civ. H.)184 (1866). 7. An early and Important Full-Bench decision of this Court, which, if in point, Is binding upon us, does not seem to have been cited. I am referring to the case of Chunder Madhab Chakrabutty v. Bissesuree Debea 6 W.R. (Civ. H.)184 (1866). There it was held by a majority of the Court, Including the Chief Justice, Sir Barnes Peacock, that a Plaintiff Is not entitled to deduct the time occupied by him in prosecuting a former suit in which he was nonsuited. 8. There the Chief Justice says:--"It appears to me that, where a Plaintiff is non-suited, he cannot be said to have prosecuted bond fide, &c, with due diligence. Further, I am of opinion that the words, ' or other cause,' must mean a cause of like nature. Defect of jurisdiction would be a cause " that would not Include any neglect on the part of the Plaintiff either in stating his case or in other respects. For instance, if the Plaintiff should fail to appear or produce his witnesses on the day fixed for the hearing, the Court would be unable to decide upon his cause of action. But that would not be a cause for which time ought to be deducted under the section for it could not be said that the Plaintiff was prosecuting his suit bond fide and with due diligence, or that the Court was prevented by want of jurisdiction or other cause not connected with the Plaintiff's own negligence from deciding upon the case." 9. I do not think that a Plaintiff can be said to have prosecuted a suit with due diligence when, owing to his own default, the suit is so framed that the Court cannot try it out on the merits. 10. The language In sec. 14 of the Act, XIV of 1859, is not altogether similar to sec. 14 of the present Limitation Act. The dissimilarities for the purposes of the present discussion are "other cause," instead of "other cause of a like nature," and "shall have been unable to decide upon it," instead of " unable to entertain it." This change of language does not tell in favor of the present Plaintiff. 11. The next case in this Court is that of Deo Prosad Sing v. Pertab Kairee ILR 10 Cal. 86(1883). 11. The next case in this Court is that of Deo Prosad Sing v. Pertab Kairee ILR 10 Cal. 86(1883). It is difficult to reconcile this decision with the Full Bench one, which was binding on the Divisional Bench. 12. The next case is that of Mullick Kefait Hossain v. Sheo Persad Sing ILR 23 Cal. 821 (1896). This is in favor of the Plaintiff; but the Court there declined to lay down any general proposition on the subject. These are all the cases in this Court. 13. The cases in the Madras High Court are somewhat conflicting: but the later cases [I may refer to Arsan v. Pathumma ILR 10 Cal. 86 (1883)], support the view taken in Mullick Kefait Hossain v. Sheo Pershad Sing ILR 23 Cal. 821 (1896). In Arsan v. Pathumma ILR 22 Mad. 494 (1897), the Full Bench case in this Court was not cited. The only case I can find in the Bombay High Court is that of Bai Jamna v. Bai Ichha ILR 10 Bom. 604 (1886), where Sir Charles Sargent, C.J., appears to have supported the principle of the Full Bench case in this Court. 14. In the Allahabad High Court, there have been differences of opinion, but in the latest case, Mathura Singh v. Bhowani Singh ILR 22 All. 284 (1900) the Court took the same view as in the case of Seo Prosad Singh v. Pertab Kairee ILR 10 Cal. 86 (1883). In the Allahabad case, the Chief Justice read "unable to entertain," as substantially identical with "unable to decide." But, I have pointed out the distinction in language in the two statutes. 15. In this conflict of judicial view, I feel constrained to express my opinion with considerable diffidence. I, however, agree with Sir Barnes Peacock and Sir Charles Sargent, and I do not think that the section was intended to apply to a case in which the first suit had failed entirely by reason of the negligence and laches of the Plaintiff himself: in other words, I do not think that an improper joinder of parties or of causes of action is "a case of a like nature" within the meaning of sec. 14 of the Limitation Act. so to hold, would be putting a premium on carelessness and laches. 14 of the Limitation Act. so to hold, would be putting a premium on carelessness and laches. If a Plaintiff, with the Code staring him full in the face, and through his own negligence, so frames his suit as to prevent the Court from deciding it on the merits, which to my mind is a different thing from entertaining it in its inception, I do not think, he can claim the benefit of sec. 14. I am not much impressed with the argument that, if a Plaintiff brings his suit in a Court which cannot entertain it through a defect of jurisdiction, such selection of the Court is as much attributable to his own negligence, as say, a misjoinder of parties. In India, it is often a very nice question which Court has jurisdiction: and a Plaintiff may make a bona fide mistake in his selection of a Court: and it is to meet that class of case that sec. 14 was enacted. But these considerations cannot apply to the case of a misjoinder of parties or causes of action, when the law and the practice are so well established. For these reasons, I consider this suit is barred by limitation. The decree of the Court of first instance must be discharged, and the suit dismissed with costs, both here and in the Court of first instance. Harington, J. I agree. Fletcher, j. I also agree.