JUDGMENT 1. This is a rule, calling upon the District Magistrate of Murshidabad and also upon the opposite party to show cause why the order of the Deputy Magistrate of Jangipur, dated the 3rd January last, should not be set aside. The order purports to be one under sec. 145, C. Cr. P. The facts are these. On the 19th December last the same Magistrate passed an order under sec. 145, C. Cr. P., directing that the second party should remain in possession of the disputed land, until evicted in due course of law. But be afterwards discovered that this order had been passed ex parte, and accordingly proceeded, as he says, to review it. He considered himself entitled to do so, because, he says, "It appears that an order under sec. 145, C. Cr. P., is not a judgment within the meaning of sec. 369, C. Cr. P. and so I hold that it can be reviewed." He then goes on to say:--" I therefore review the case and direct both parties to put in fresh written statements on the 10th January 1908. In the meantime the Receiver will retain possession. This order is to be communicated to the Receiver and the Police by special messenger to-day." 2. Now, it has been contended before us that this order is entirely without jurisdiction, because the Deputy Magistrate, having on the 19th December 1907 previously declared the second party in possession, had no right to review his order. We consider that this contention must prevail. There is no authority for holding that a Magistrate can review a final order passed by himself under sec 145, C. Cr. P. 3. The pleader for the opposite party has not been able to show us any direct authority for such a proposition as this. He calls attention to certain cases decided by this Court in its Civil Revisional Jurisdiction, and contends that every Court has inherent power to review its own orders. It is unnecessary for us to consider this question. All we need say is that, so far as we are able to see, a Criminal Court has no right or authority to review final orders passed by it under sec 145, C. Cr. P. We therefore consider that the order of the 3rd January last is entirely without jurisdiction; and we set it aside, making this rule absolute.