Judgement Appeal from a decree of the Chief Court of the Punjab (June 27, 1902), affirming a decree of the District Judge of Delhi (April 9, 1901). Appeal by special leave from a decree of the Court of the Political Agent to the Governor-General in Central India (November 17, 1902), affirming a decree made by the Court of the Political Agent at Sehore, September 4, 1901. The special leave was granted with liberty to the Secretary of State for India in Council to intervene upon the question whether His Majesty in Council should entertain an appeal in the suit on account of the authority from which the appeal is brought, being one from which such an appeal should not be admitted. The suits related to the estate of one Beni Pershad, deceased. He and his two brothers, Dwarka Das and Seth Jhandamal, were for some time previous to 1886 members of a Hindu joint family carrying on a mercantile business at Sehore, a British Cantonment in the territories of the Begum of Bhopal, and also at other places in Bhopal and the Punjab. On July 13, 1886, the respondent Dwarka Das instituted a suit for partition of the joint estate, other than that situate in the district of Karnal, in the Court of the Political Agent, Bhopal. The defendants to the suit were Beni Pershad and Jhandamal. In that suit the Political Agent made his decree on September 4, 1901. While it was pending Jhandamal on August 14, 1888, instituted another suit in the Court of the District Judge of Karnal against the appellants (representatives of Beni Pershad, deceased) and Dwarka Das for the partition of the whole of the joint estate, movable and immovable, situate not only in the Karnal district, but in the other places already mentioned, This suit was subsequently transferred to the Court of the District Judge of Delhi. The appellants pleaded that they were ready and willing to partition all that constituted the joint estate, but that the suit was barred in consequence of a reference to arbitration, and also in consequence of the pending suit in the Court of the Political Agent, Bhopal. The appellants pleaded that they were ready and willing to partition all that constituted the joint estate, but that the suit was barred in consequence of a reference to arbitration, and also in consequence of the pending suit in the Court of the Political Agent, Bhopal. On October 11, 1889, the District Judge of Delhi decided that the Political Agent at Bhopal had no civil jurisdiction, and on June 25, 1890, he struck out the appellants defence for failing to produce all the books of account filed in the Court at Sehore. On August 7, 1890, he made a decree ex parte in favour of the plaintiff; but on April 23, 1892, it was set aside by the Chief Court of the Punjab and the case remanded for retrial. The plaintiff then amended his plaint, and the appellants in a written statement reiterated their previous defence, and also challenged the jurisdiction of the Delhi Court to partition properties situate out of British India. On February 13, 1893, the District Judge decided that he had no jurisdiction in regard to property, movable or immovable, situate outside British India. This order was subsequently reversed in review by another District Judge in regard to the movable property. Various other proceedings followed, and on May 11, 1896, the Chief Court again remanded the case, and thereupon on August 28, 1897, the following agreement of reference to arbitration executed by the parties was placed before the Court— " We, the parties to this case, have, with our mutual consent, nominated Mr. S. Clifford, Divisional Judge, Delhi, as sole arbitrator to decide the matters in dispute in this suit. As has been already agreed upon between us, with our mutual consent, the arbitrator should, out of the joint capital, award Rs.95,000 to Seth Hans Raj, Amar Singh, and Mussammat Khemi, defendants, and Rs.25,000 to Seth Dwarka Das, defendant, over and above their shares, and should determine what joint property, movable and immovable, of every description, except the immov able property outside British India, is to be partitioned between the parties; and he should divide the same among the parties according to their respective shares, and award each party his proper share. It has also been agreed that all the account books will not be brought here (Delhi) from Sehore. It has also been agreed that all the account books will not be brought here (Delhi) from Sehore. But if the arbitrator thinks proper to examine any or the bahis, it will be produced before him. We, the parties, shall act upon and abide by the award to be filed by the said arbitrator in this case. It is therefore prayed that the case may be referred to the above-named arbitrator." A formal order of reference was made by the Court, and on November 7, 1898, a revised order of reference was made on the ground that the prior order was not quite in terms of the agreement. The award was dated May 25, 1900. Various objections were taken thereto by the appellants, mainly attacking the revised order of reference as illegal. On June 15 the District Judge remitted the award in order that an omission with regard to payment of certain interest should be rectified and the award rendered complete. The completed award was dated June 20, 1900, and on April 9, 1901, the District Judge dismissed all the objections and gave judgment according to the award. The appellants filed an appeal in the Chief Court, and in the alternative prayed for revision under s. 622 of the Code of Civil Procedure. On June 27, 1902, the Chief Court decided that it had no jurisdiction to interfere either on appeal or by way of revision, and made a decree in accordance with the judgment. The judgment of the Chief Court, delivered by Judge A. S. Reid, was as follows " This appeal has been referred to a Full Bench by the learned Chief Judge for determination whether any action can be taken on the appellate or revisional side of this Court having regard to the recent ruling of their Lordships of the Privy Council in Ghulam Jilani v. Muhammad Hassan, L. R. 29 Ind. Ap. 51." After referring briefly to the proceedings which led to the award, it continued — " Objections attributing misconduct and a faulty method of arriving at conclusions to the arbitrator, were filed by the defendants-appellants, and were disposed of by the District Judge of Delhi, who passed a decree in accordance with the award. Ap. 51." After referring briefly to the proceedings which led to the award, it continued — " Objections attributing misconduct and a faulty method of arriving at conclusions to the arbitrator, were filed by the defendants-appellants, and were disposed of by the District Judge of Delhi, who passed a decree in accordance with the award. From this decree this appeal has been filed, and the appellants have prayed that the memorandum of appeal be treated as an application for revision, if it be held that an appeal does not lie. " The objections now taken, that the appellants submitted to arbitration under pressure, apparently from this Court and from Mr. Clifford, that they unwillingly agreed to the appointment of Mr. Clifford and that the submission to arbitration was bad, were not taken below and cannot, in my opinion, be taken here. " The object of taking these objections is to set aside the award, and to allow them to be taken for the first time at this stage would be, as remarked by their Lordships in the case above cited, to defeat the provisions of art. 158, Sched. II., of the Limitation Act. " It is therefore unnecessary, for the purposes of this appeal, to decide whether an appeal lies on the ground that there v/as no submission to arbitration. It is sufficient to hold that the objection cannot be consideredin this appeal. Their Lordships ruling, above cited, is authority for holding that an appeal does not lie on the objections taken below. "In 74, Punjab Record (Full Bench), 1894, concurred in by their Lordships, Plowden, senior judge, said As it is clear that in the appeal before us, it is not alleged that the decree is not in accordance with the award delivered by the arbitrators to the Court, or that the decree is appealed against as being in excess of the award, I think our answer to the question must be that the appeal is prohibited by s. 522 of the Code of 1882. " Much stress has been laid on the objection that the Punjab Courts had not jurisdiction and that the reference to arbitration was therefore void. " Much stress has been laid on the objection that the Punjab Courts had not jurisdiction and that the reference to arbitration was therefore void. " The arbitrator was seised of the whole matter in dispute between the parties, except so much as was specifically excluded, and, as remarked by their Lordships of the Privy Council, in the case above cited, the question whether the suit was competent was one of the issues in the suit, and as such, referred to the arbitrators. The fact that the issue as to competence was framed and decided by the Court below, before the final remand, does not affect the arbitrators competence to decide it as one of the issues between the parties, and, as remarked by their Lordships, the arbitrator was not bound to give an award on each point. "Counsel for the appellant cited Raja Har Narain Singh v. Chaudhrain Bhagwant Kuar (( 1891) L. R. 18 Ind. Ap. 55; S. C. I. L. R. 13 Allah. 300.), as authority for the proposition that an appeal lies from a decree in accordance with an award, delivered after the date fixed. Their Lordships decided that case entirely on the construction of ss. 508, 514 and 521 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and held that the words in s. 521, No award shall be valid unless made within the time allowed by the Court/ would be rendered inoperative if s. 508 were treated as merely directory and not as mandatory and imperative. Their Lordships held that there was no award on which a decree could be based and that they were bound to take judicial notice of the words in the statute although the objection had not been raised below. " This case is clearly distinguishable from that before us, in which there was an award and a decree in accordance with it, and the only objections taken within the period allowed were those above set out. Their Lordships later ruling is clear, and the Code contains no mandatory provision as to reference similar to that as to the award being made within the period allowed. The appellants could have objected that there had been no reference to arbitration, and their failure to do so does not entitle them to appeal on that ground. Their Lordships later ruling is clear, and the Code contains no mandatory provision as to reference similar to that as to the award being made within the period allowed. The appellants could have objected that there had been no reference to arbitration, and their failure to do so does not entitle them to appeal on that ground. The order of November 7, 1898, referring the suit to arbitration provided that the costs should abide the result of the finding of the arbitrator. It has not been shewn that the decree for costs is not in accordance with the award, and I have no hesitation in holding that the appellants were largely responsible for the delay in the proceedings. " For these reasons the appeal should, in my opinion, be dismissed with costs. " On the question of revision the ruling of their Lordships in the Privy Council is conclusive. The reasons above stated for holding that the objection on the ground that there was no reference to arbitration cannot be entertained at this stage in appeal apply equally to the application for revision, and the finding that there was a reference to arbitration, an award and a decree in accordance with that award, to passing which the Court below had no alternative, the application to set aside the award having been refused precludes revision. The Court below has not exercised a discretion not vested in it by law, or failed to exercise the discretion so vested, or acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction, illegally or with material irregularity. The application for revision therefore fails." In the Central India suit, and on May 14, 1901, Dwarka Das applied to the Political Agent at Sehore for a decree to be made at Sehore in accordance with the said award of Mr. Clifford, and on September 4, 1901, he made a decree accordingly. On November 18, 1901, the appellants appealed to the Court of the agent to the Governor-General in Central India, and on November 17, 1902, that Court dismissed the appeal, and on July 11, 1903, refused leave to appeal to His Majesty in Council. De Gruyther and H. Mitra, for the appellants in both appeals, contended, as regards the first appeal, that the Chief Court of the Punjab had jurisdiction to grant the appellants relief either by appeal or by revision. De Gruyther and H. Mitra, for the appellants in both appeals, contended, as regards the first appeal, that the Chief Court of the Punjab had jurisdiction to grant the appellants relief either by appeal or by revision. The Civil Procedure Code, in pro-hibiting an appeal from a decree made in accordance with an award, assumed that the award itself was valid and binding and legal. It did not preclude an investigation into the question of its legality merely because a decree had been passed in accordance with it. Here the referring Court had no jurisdiction as to the property outside British India. It had itself so decided on February 13, 1893, and the review of that decision by another judge who reversed it as regards movables was incompetent. The Court, therefore, hadno jurisdiction to refer, and accordingly the arbitrator had no jurisdiction to decide. Moreover, there was misconduct on the part of the arbitrator. The submission provided " that all the account books will not be brought here (Delhi) from Sehore. But if the arbitrator thinks proper to examine any of the bahis it will be produced before him." From their number and bulk it was impossible to produce them. He nevertheless ordered their production, and on the appellants failing to produce them on May 21, 1900, he made his award on the 25th, and in doing so drew inferences against the appellants from the absence of the books. Reference was made to Civil Procedure Code, ss. 518, 521, 522 and 624 Mothooranath Tewaree v. Brindabun Tewaree (( 1870) 14 Suth. W. R, 327.) ; Kali Prosanno Ghose v. Rajani Kant Chatterjee (( 1897) I. L. B. 25 Calc. 141.); Rameshchandra Dhar v. Karunamoyi Dutt (( 1906) I. L. R. 33 Calc. 498.); Najmuddin Ahmad v. Puech (( 1907) I. L. R. 29 Allah. 584.) ; Venkayya v. Venkatappaya. (( 1891) I. L. R. 15 Madr. 348.) The case was not governed by Ghulam Jilani v. Muhammad Hassan. (6) In the Central India suit it was contended that the award was invalid and could not affect property outside the jurisdiction of the referring Court. Neither the reference nor the award operated as regards the property within the jurisdiction of the Sehore Court. The Political Agent had no jurisdiction to decide a suit pending in his Court based on this award without any inquiry or trial by himself. Neither the reference nor the award operated as regards the property within the jurisdiction of the Sehore Court. The Political Agent had no jurisdiction to decide a suit pending in his Court based on this award without any inquiry or trial by himself. Nor could he make a decree based on this award before it had been finally decided to be a valid award. Cowell, for the respondents in both cases, contended, as regards the first appeal, that the Chief Court had rightly held that the appeal thereto was incompetent both under s. 522 of the Code and in accordance with the judgment in Ghuam Jilani v. Muhammad Hassan. (( 1901) L. R. 29 Ind. Ap. 51.) The section and the judgment were conclusive. With regard to the second appeal, the appellants were concluded by their agreement to abide by the award. They for years acquiesced in the Sehore Courts proceedings, awaiting the result of the decision of the Punjab Courts, which had the same parties and the same issues before them. They never raised any objection to that course being adopted, and the decision of the Political Agent and the Governor-Generals Agent to dispose of the Sehore suit in accordance with the award cannot be now impugned, and should be upheld for the reasons there given. Cohen, K.C., and Ross, for the Secretary of State in the second appeal, while not conceding that the appeal lay, or that any special leave to appeal should have been given, the appeal from a political jurisdiction being to the Secretary of State, said that the Political Agent in Bhopal, in such a case as the present, would be guided by the decision of the Punjab Chief Court if affirmed. De Gruyther replied. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by LORD MACNAGHTEN. The parties to these two appeals or their predecessors in title have been in litigation now for more than twenty years. The subject of litigation is the property of a joint Hindu family engaged in business, with branches in different parts of the country. Part of the family property is situated in British India; part in native States. The litigation was begun in 1886, in the Court of the Political Agent at Sehore, in Bhopal, by a suit for partition of so much of the family property as was within his jurisdiction. Part of the family property is situated in British India; part in native States. The litigation was begun in 1886, in the Court of the Political Agent at Sehore, in Bhopal, by a suit for partition of so much of the family property as was within his jurisdiction. The next proceeding was a suit for partition, commenced in 1888, in the Court of the District Judge of Karnal, in the Punjab. In August, 1897, after prolonged litigation, the parties to the Punjab suit nominated Mr. S. Clifford, Divisional Judge of Delhi, sole arbitrator to decide the matters in dispute in the suit. The arbitrator was to determine what joint property, movable and immovable, except the immovable property outside British India, was to be partitioned between the parties. The appointment of Mr. Clifford was duly confirmed by the Court. The arbitrator finally submitted his award on June 29, 1900. The appellants filed a great number of objections to the award. These objections were considered and disposed of by the District Judge of Delhi, who passed a decree in accordance with-the award. The objections filed by the appellants were all more or less frivolous. In some the arbitrator was charged with misconduct, but, on the face of the objections, it is perfectly clear that there was no misconduct within the meaning of that expression in the chapter on arbitration in the Civil Procedure Code, nor any-thing that could justify the Court in setting aside or remitting the award. From the decree of the District Judge the appellants appealed to the Chief Court of the Punjab. The Chief Court dismissed the appeal on the ground that the appeal was incompetent, inasmuch as it did not appear that the decree was in excess of, or not in accordance with, the award. In the meantime the Political Agent in Bhopal had made a decree in accordance with Mr. Cliffords award. There was an appeal to the Court of the Agent to the Governor-General in Central India, but the appeal was dismissed. Special leave to appeal against the order of the Agent to the Governor-General was granted by this Board on the representation that there was or might be an important question as to the jurisdiction of the Court of the Political Agent; and liberty was reserved to the Secretary of State for India in Council to intervene in his official capacity. Mr. Mr. Cohen, who appeared for the Secretary of State, not admitting that an appeal would lie to His Majesty in Council from the order of the Agent to the Governor-General in India, intimated that the Court of the Political Agent in Bhopal would be guided by the decision of the Chief Court of the Punjab if His Majesty thought fit to affirm that decision. In their Lordships opinion the decision of the Chief Court is perfectly right. Their Lordships will therefore humbly advise His Majesty that both appeals should be dismissed. The appellants will pay the costs of the appeals other than the costs of the intervenant.