JUDGMENT 1. Durga Charan, Bishun Charan, and Hari Charan were three brothers, sons of one Ram Sundar Mukherjee. Durga Charan died in July 1898 leaving a son, Modhusudan, who was then a minor, and his widow Raj Lakshmi, mother of Modhusudan. Shortly after the death of Durga Charan, a dispute arose as to the share, if any, of Bishun Charan and Hari Charan to certain properties which they claimed to be the joint properties of the family. On the 5th October 1898 an instrument, in the nature of a family arrangement, was executed by Bishun Charan, Hari Charan and by Raj Lakshmi, on behalf of Modhusudan, by which Modhusudan's share was fixed at 8 annas, Hari Charan's share 41/2 annas, and that of Bishun Charan 31/2 annas. It does not distinctly appear how the properties covered by the instrument were possessed from 1898 to the year 1900, but it would seem that they were possessed in the shares indicated in the instrument of 5th October 1898. Thereafter, Bishun Charan applied for the appointment of himself to be the guardian of the property of the minor, Modhusudan. An order was made on the 26th March 1900, by the District Judge of Noakhali appointing him guardian. On appeal, however, to this Court, the order of the District Judge was set aside on the 28th January 1902, and this Court expressed its opinion to the effect that an administrator to the estate of the deceased Durga Charan should be appointed instead of a guardian of the property of the minor. In the proceedings which took place in the lower Court subsequent to the order of this Court, the Plaintiff Rajani Mohan Roy was appointed administrator, and he practically became, by such appointment, the guardian of the properties of Modhusudan. Rajani Mohun took possession as such administrator, on the 26th February 1902, of the properties of the minor. Thereafter, Bishun Charan submitted his account to the District Judge for the period of his management of the minor's estate, that is, from 18th June 1900 to 26th February 1902. 2. Rajani Mohun took possession as such administrator, on the 26th February 1902, of the properties of the minor. Thereafter, Bishun Charan submitted his account to the District Judge for the period of his management of the minor's estate, that is, from 18th June 1900 to 26th February 1902. 2. The present suit was instituted on the 2nd January 1905, by Rajani Mohon Roy for the purpose of an enquiry into the correctness of the account submitted by Bishun Charan, for a decree for such sum or sums of money as might be found due on the taking of account, and for recovery of the same from Bishun Charan or from the other Defendants who had become sureties for Bishun Charan in the proceedings for realization of the debts due to the estate of Durga Charan, under Act VII of 1889, or for management of the minor's properties, under Act. VIII of 1890. 3. Bishun Charan is the Defendant No. 1 in this case. The Appellant Sarat Chandra Roy is the Defendant No. 2, and he executed a bond for twenty thousand rupees as surety of Bishun Charan for his due administration of the estate of the minor. The bond is dated the 13th June 1900 and runs as follows:--"The condition of the aforesaid bond is this, that, the said Bishun Charan Mukhopadhya renders a just and true account of the credits received on account of the properties of the said Modhusudan Mukhopadhya when the same will be called for from him, and if the said Bishun Charan Mukhopadhya abides by, observes and carries out all the orders of the Court of the said District Noakhali with respect to the estate of the said minor and goods etc, of his estate and with respect to any money and estate that may be received by the said Bishun Charan Mukhopadhya as such guardian, and if he acts properly in all matters, then the bond or deed of liability mentioned above shall become null and void; otherwise, the same shall be in full force and effect." The other Defendants, namely, the Defendants Nos. 6 and 7 stood sureties for the Defendant No. 1 for realization of debts under Act VII of 1889. 4. Various pleas were raised in the suit by the Defendants in the lower Court, but it is not necessary to refer to them for the purposes of the present appeal. 6 and 7 stood sureties for the Defendant No. 1 for realization of debts under Act VII of 1889. 4. Various pleas were raised in the suit by the Defendants in the lower Court, but it is not necessary to refer to them for the purposes of the present appeal. The Defendants, other than Defendant No. 2, have, apparently, accepted the judgment of the Subordinate Judge directing an account to be taken by a Commissioner according to the directions given in that judgment. 5. The Defendant No. 2 has appealed from the order of the Subordinate Judge but his contention before us is limited to the ground that as surety he is not bound to pay any amount that may be found due by the Defendant No. 1 on account of the income and disbursements with respect to such share of the properties which under the instrument of the 5th October 1898, came into the hands of Bishun Charan and Hari Charan. The lower Court held that the properties covered by this instrument exclusively belonged to Durga Charan, and that Bishun Charan and Hari Charan had no share in them, and that the instrument was executed by Raj Lakshmi when she was very young and did not understand the true import and effect of it and was, therefore, of no effect. The lower Court, therefore, directed that Bishun Charan must render an account of the income and disbursement with respect to the whole of the property left by Durga Charan irrespective of the shares allotted to Bishun Charan and Hari Charan. 6. The learned Vakil for the Appellant has not questioned the finding of the lower Court as to Durga Charan having himself acquired the properties covered by the instrument of 1898, nor has he questioned the finding as to the want of capacity of Raj Lakshmi to execute that instrument. We must hold that, for the purpose of the present suit, Bishun Charan had no right to receive for himself the income of the share allotted to him. 7. We must hold that, for the purpose of the present suit, Bishun Charan had no right to receive for himself the income of the share allotted to him. 7. The substantial grounds urged before us are that Bishun Charan having been appointed guardian of the property of Modhusudan such as was described in the petition for the appointment of guardian, the Appellant, as surety, is responsible only for the conduct of Bishun Charan with respect to such property and not any share of the property which was not covered by that petition, and that the District Judge having found, in the proceeding appointing Bishun Charan as guardian, that the three brothers Durga Charan, Bishun Charan and Hari Charan were joint, there is bar in the nature of estoppel to any claim as against a surety for any money with respect to the share that came to Bishun Charan and Hari Charan by the deed of 1898. 8. The terms of the security bond are very wide. The Appellant became surety for the credits received on account of the properties of the minor and not of any specified properties. He bound himself, as such surety, in respect of any money that might be received by Bishun Charan on account of the estate of the minor. There was no limitation to the Appellant's liability under the bond, up to Rs. 20,000. If a contrary view were taken, the result would be serious to the minor. The guardian might derive income from the minor's property not mentioned in his petition, and to hold that the guardian's surety would not be bound to indemnify for such receipts would seriously prejudice the minor and contravene the provisions of sec. 128 of the Contract Act. Bonds executed in proceedings under Act VIII of 1890, as, in fact, administration bonds generally, must be construed according to the conditions contained in them. This ground of the Appellant must therefore fail. 9. The plea of estoppel is equally untenable. There was no representation made by the Court and certainly none by the minor. The ground of estoppel cannot be pleaded against an infant. The ground of misrepresentation by the Court, and mutual mistake of the Court and the surety, was raised in Debendra Nath Dutt and Banku Behary Banerjee v. The Administrator-General of Bengal 10 C.W.N. 673: s.c. ILR 33 Cal. The ground of estoppel cannot be pleaded against an infant. The ground of misrepresentation by the Court, and mutual mistake of the Court and the surety, was raised in Debendra Nath Dutt and Banku Behary Banerjee v. The Administrator-General of Bengal 10 C.W.N. 673: s.c. ILR 33 Cal. 713 (1906) as a defense to an action on an administration bond. Three out of the five learned Judges who decided the case were of opinion that the bond could not be invalidated on the ground of mutual mistake, and as regards the ground of misrepresentation all the five Judges were unanimous in the view that it was untenable. 10. We are, therefore, of opinion that the Appellant as surety is bound to pay for any wrongful conduct of the Defendant No. 1, with respect to all the properties to which the minor was entitled. But if a third person was wrongfully in possession, as Hari Charan was, of a share of 41/2 annas, and Defendant No. 1 did not receive the profits with respect to such share, neither he nor his surety would be liable for them. The liability extends to profits actually received, or to profits which could have been received but for gross and willful default of the Defendant No. 1. 11. We may add that the argument somewhat faintly pressed before us, that the bond was not properly assigned to the Plaintiff, to enable him to sue the sureties, is clearly untenable. The law does not require that there should be written assignment by the District Judge (sec. 35, Act VIII of 1890). Subject to the limitation indicated above, we dismiss this appeal with costs.