JUDGMENT Maclean, C.J. - This is an application under sec. 622 of the Code of Civil Procedure, in which a rule has been granted, and the object of the rule is to have the decree of the District Judge of Hughli dated the 10th of May 1907, set aside on the ground that he had no jurisdiction to pass such a decree. The suit was one for rent, and originally it was for a sum amounting to Rs. 117-6; but when the matter came on for trial in the Munsif's Court, the Plaintiff put in a petition withdrawing his claim to certain increased rent on the ground of alteration of area and asking for leave to bring a first suit for that: and, that application apparently was granted, the result of which was to reduce his claim, in the present suit to sue for rent, amounting only to Rs. 7-8. The Munsif held that the relationship of landlord and tenant did not exist, and dismissed the suit. Then there was an appeal to the District Judge: and the District Judge took the view, notwithstanding the objection of the Defendant, that he could entertain the appeal, on the ground that the question in appeal involved a right to receive rent. The question really was whether the relationship of landlord and tenant existed; but the District Judge dealt with the case, as I have said, upon another footing, which I think is not well founded. 2. It is now urged before us that the District Judge had no jurisdiction to deal with the matter, having regard to the language of sec. 153 of the Bengal Tenancy Act. I think it is quite clear that the decree passed by the Munsif in this case did not "decide any question relating to title to land or to some interests in land as between parties having conflicting claims thereto, or a question of a right to enhance or vary the rent of a tenant, or a question of the amount of rent annually payable by a tenant." It only decided the question of whether or not the relationship of landlord and tenant existed. Prim facie no appeal would lie. No attempt has been made by the opposite party on this application to support the view of the District Judge on the grounds stated by him. Prim facie no appeal would lie. No attempt has been made by the opposite party on this application to support the view of the District Judge on the grounds stated by him. But two points have been taken; first, it is urged that the amount claimed in the suit exceeded Rs. 50. I have stated the facts. No doubt, the original claim was more than fifty-rupees, but when the suit came on for trial, the claim was reduced to Rs. 7-8. I think the consequence would be a little dangerous if we were to accept the Plaintiff's argument and say, in the circumstances such as these, that the claim exceeded fifty rupees. 3. Then, another point was taken, namely, whether the Munsif, who was a Munsif of Hughli when he tried this suit, was specially empowered by the local Government to exercise final jurisdiction under sec. 153 of the Bengal Tenancy Act. What happened is this. On the 31st of July 1896, this gentleman, who was then a Munsif of Baruipur, was specially empowered to exercise final jurisdiction under sec. 153 (b) of the Bengal Tenancy Act; but after that power had been conferred upon him he was transferred to Hughli. It is contended that he could not after his transfer to Hughli exercise the power which had been conferred upon him when be was a Munsif of (sic)Baruipur, and that fresh power ought to have been specially conferred upon him, I understand that for many years the practice has been in such and similar cases not to confer any fresh power and that it has always been regarded that the power having once been conferred, remains, vested in the Judicial Officer in question, notwithstanding he has been transferred from one district to another. It is very difficult for us, considering that many decisions have undoubtedly been passed upon this view which has been held for very many years, now to interfere. I am bound to say, speaking for myself, that looking at the language of sub-sec. (6) of sec. 153, there is nothing in it to suggest that, when a Judicial Officer has once been specially empowered by the Local Government to exercise final jurisdiction under the section, that power determines because he is transferred to another district, or that any necessity exists that he should again be specially empowered, by reason of such transfer. (6) of sec. 153, there is nothing in it to suggest that, when a Judicial Officer has once been specially empowered by the Local Government to exercise final jurisdiction under the section, that power determines because he is transferred to another district, or that any necessity exists that he should again be specially empowered, by reason of such transfer. For these reasons, I think the rule must be made absolute with costs, hearing fee two gold mohurs. Coxe, J. I agree.