JUDGMENT 1. The Plaintiff in the case sues four Defendants for khas possession of certain lands in which he claims a mokurari right on the ground of a denial of his right as a landlord by the Defendants Nos. 1 to 3 who were his tenants, and the Defendant No. 4 is added as he has been put forward as landlord. The Plaintiff's case is that by the end of 1898 he had acquired the mokurari right in the land in question by reason of two sales on rent decrees in one of which he was the transferee of the purchaser. Acting on the title he had so acquired he brought a suit in 1899 against the present Defendants Nos. 1 to 3 to have it declared that he was entitled to the land free of an encumbrance claimed by the Defendants. Defendant No. 1, Jadu Mahto, pleaded among other things that he was not aware of the Plaintiff's predecessors-in-title having any interest in the land, that the decree, auction-sale and kobala on which the Plaintiff based his claim were collusive and fraudulent, that he had a jungle-buri right in the land. The second Defendant, Akhoy Mahto seems to have pleaded to much the same effect. An issue was framed as to whether the sale, decree and kobala were collusive and fraudulent and was decided in the Plaintiff's favour, tut the suit was decreed for the Defendants on the determination of the point relating to the jungle-burl right. Meanwhile the Plaintiff had brought a rent suit No. 1627 of 1903 against Jadu Mahto alone, he being the registered tenant. To the claim in this suit the Defendant pleaded that he did not know whether the Plaintiff was entitled to rent, that he had already paid the rent claimed to Lalit Ghose, the present Defendant No. 4, and nothing more was due, and that he had never paid a higher rate of rent than he had stated. He afterwards gave evidence in the case, and the Judge's note of what he said is as follows : "I have no relation of landlord and tenant with Mr. Mathewson, the Plaintiff in this suit. I owe no money to him. He afterwards gave evidence in the case, and the Judge's note of what he said is as follows : "I have no relation of landlord and tenant with Mr. Mathewson, the Plaintiff in this suit. I owe no money to him. I am tenant of Lalit Ghose to whom I pay rent." This evidence was given on the 5th February 1904, and thereupon the Plaintiff dropped the rent suit, and brought the present suit on 4th July 1904. 2. The first question that we have to decide in this case is whether such a denial of the Plaintiff's title has taken place as to cause a forfeiture of the land held by the Defendants or any of them. It has been held by this Court in Debiruddi v. Abdar Rahim ILR 17 Cal. 196 (1888) following the two cases there mentioned, that a denial of the Plaintiff's title by the Defendants is itself a cause of forfeiture, and the point has not been questioned. What we have to decide, therefore, is whether any of the Defendants has in fact denied the Plaintiff's title. The law on the subject of what constitutes denial, as has been mentioned in the case of Mallika Dassi v. Makhan Lal Chowdhury9 C.W.N. 928 : s.c. 2 C.L.J. 389 (1905), is clearly laid down by Erle, C.J., in Jones v. Mills 10 C.B.N.S. 788 at p. 796 (1861), where quoting Tindal, C.J., in Williams v. Cooper 1 M. and G. 135 (1840) he says "A disclaimer, as the word imports, must be a renunciation by the party of his character of tenant, either by setting up a title in another, or by claiming title in himself. Here the tenant did not set up the title of another, neither did he affect to claim title in himself, but he required further information before be would pay rent to anybody. He acknowledged himself to be tenant and was ready to pay rent to the right person. What passed did not, in any judgment, amount to disclaimer." Byles, J. also in the same case points out that a refusal by a tenant to pay rent till he knew who was the right owner was no disclaimer. He acknowledged himself to be tenant and was ready to pay rent to the right person. What passed did not, in any judgment, amount to disclaimer." Byles, J. also in the same case points out that a refusal by a tenant to pay rent till he knew who was the right owner was no disclaimer. In Gray v. Stanion 1 M. & W. 695 (1836), Parke B, laid down that, "a disavowal by the tenant of the holding under the particular landlord by words only is sufficient" to estop the tenant from claiming a right to notice, but that to make a disclaimer sufficient for this purpose "it must amount to a direct repudiation of the relation of landlord and tenant, or to a distinct claim to hold possession of the estate, upon a ground wholly inconsistent with the existence of that relation which by necessary implication is a repudiation of it." Taking the law so laid down it is plain that nothing that occurred in the first suit, that relating to the encumbrance, worked a forfeiture. The relation of tenant and landlord between the Defendants and some one was not denied by the Defendant, though it was by the Plaintiff. What was denied by the Defendant was the Plaintiff's title to the interest of the landlord, and this seems to bring the case under the ruling of Tindal, C.J. above quoted, even though the auction sale and kobala on which the Plaintiff's title was based were impugned as collusive and fraudulent. It was admitted by implication, or what Byles, J., calls a negative pregnant with an affirmative, that under certain circumstances which might be proved in the case the Defendant would actually be the Plaintiff's landlord. The first words first quoted from the judgment in Gray v. Stanion 1 M. & W. 695 (1886), may seem to require a stricter construction, referring as they do to a disavowal of holding under a particular landlord, but they must be read with the judgment in the latter case, and the point of the sentence is that the disavowal may be by words only. The statements made in the rent suit are more decisive if they can be accepted. The statements made in the rent suit are more decisive if they can be accepted. In the written statement of the sole Defendant, the present Defendant No. 1, there is nothing that does not come under the ruling of Erle, J., as the statement that he had paid rent to a former owner and that nothing more was due might by itself be quite consistent with the Plaintiff's title. The terms of the Judge's note of the Defendant's deposition go further, as they undoubtedly represent the Defendant as setting up a title in Lalit Ghose. But we find it impossible to act on this statement as it comes before us. The note is not a document made in accordance with sec. 182 of the Civil Procedure Code, nor does it appear that the provisions of sec. 183 have been complied with in respect to it. We cannot say that such a note as the present could not be taken into account under some circumstances, but considering the strictness of proof that is required to prove a case such as that now put forward we certainly cannot trust to this note alone for the purpose. 3. The result is that the Plaintiff has not proved any denial of his title sufficient to cause a forfeiture, and we need not therefore consider the further points that have been raised by the Defendant as to the liability of No. 2 and 3 for the acts of No. 7, and as to the nature of the holding of the Defendants. The appeal is therefore dismissed with costs.