JUDGMENT 1. This is an appeal against an order of the Subordinate Judge of Midnapur, dated the 28th March 1907. He has held that a certain decree is barred by limitation. The first application for execution was made on the 5th June 1902 the second on the 19th August 1905, the third on the 16th September 1905 and the fourth on the 9th November 1905. The present application was made on the 3rd February 1906. It is clear that a period of more than three years elapsed between the dates of the first and second applications. At the date of the second application it would seem that execution of the decree was barred by limitation. The decree-holder, however, contends that he is saved by the application of the 16th September 1902, which he presented to the Court, praying for leave to bid at the sale. The Subordinate Judge has pointed out that the rulings on this point are conflicting. The rulings of the Allahabad High Court and of the Bombay High Court are apparently in favour of the view that such an application is a step in aid of execution. See the cases of Band v. Sikreemal ILR 13 All. 211 (1890), Vinayakrao Gopal v. Vinayak Krishna ILR 21 Bom. 331 (1895) and Dalel Singh v. Umrao Singh ILR 22 All. 399 (1900). The learned Subordinate Judge, however, observes that the Calcutta High Court has taken an opposite view; and he cites the cases of Torce Mahomed v. Mabood Bux ILR 9 Cal. 730 (1883), Raghunandan v. Kallydut ILR 23 Cal. 690 (1896). He further points out that the correctness of this view has been doubted by Banerjee, J., in the case of Troylokya Nath Bose v. Jyoti Prokash Nandi ILR 30 Cal. 761, 769 (1903), and by Mookerjee, J. in the case of Hira Lal Bose v. Dwija Charn Bose 10 C.W.N. 209 (1905). 2. The point is a somewhat important one; and it might have been necessary to refer it to a Full Bench for decision. 761, 769 (1903), and by Mookerjee, J. in the case of Hira Lal Bose v. Dwija Charn Bose 10 C.W.N. 209 (1905). 2. The point is a somewhat important one; and it might have been necessary to refer it to a Full Bench for decision. We are, however, relieved of the necessity of doing so by the fact pointed out by the learned pleader for the Appellant that the decree-holder in his application of the 16th September 1902 did not merely ask for leave to bid at the sale, but further prayed that the amount which he bid might be set off against the decretal amount due to him; and this application was granted and a set off of Rs. 78 was permitted to be made on the 19th September 1902. Now, it is clear that, whether the application for leave to bid at the sale was a step in aid of execution or not, the application for a set off was a step in aid of execution. This has been held in the Full Bench case of Sujan Singh v. Hira Singh ILR 12 All. 399 (1889); and no ruling to the contrary effect, either by this Court or by any other Court, has been cited. We do not therefore think it necessary to refer the question as to the correctness of the ruling in Raghunandan v. Kallydut ILR 23 Cal. 690 (1896) to the Full Bench; and we must decree this appeal and remand the case to the lower Appellate Court so that execution of the decree may proceed. The Appellant is entitled to the costs of this appeal, which we assess at three gold mohurs.