JUDGMENT Maclean, C.J. - This is a suit for libel. The Plaintiff is an Inspector in the Calcutta Police: the Defendants are respectively the Editor and Proprietor of a newspaper called the Indian Daily News. The Plaintiff complains of two articles, which appeared in the issues of the said newspaper on the 17th and 19th July 1905, and of another article which appeared in such newspaper on the 19th July, being a reproduction of one which had previously appeared in a newspaper called The Statesman. These articles constitute the alleged libels. 2. The Plaintiff charges that the Defendants, by such publications, defamed him falsely and maliciously: in particular that the Defendants falsely and maliciously accused the Plaintiff and other Police officers of having conspired to charge an innocent man with murder though they knew him to be innocent, of having manufactured false evidence, of extorting confessions by torture, and of having accepted bribes to effect the above objects. 3. The Defendants deny that the articles referred to the Plaintiff, that they are not defamatory, and they do not bear the meaning attributed to them, and then they plead, in substance, that the publication was for the public benefit, and that the articles constituted fair and honest comment over matters of grave public interest, and that the object of the articles was to impress upon the Local Government the necessity of an impartial and searching enquiry into the matter. They deny malice and there is no plea of justification. They also set up the statute of limitation. 4. The case was tried at considerable length before Mr. Justice Chitty, who found for the Plaintiff, with Rs. 250 damages and costs. The Defendants have appealed. 5. The circumstances under which the impugned articles came to be written are these:-- 6. One Girish Goala stood indicted at the High Court Sessions for the murder of one Ganga, and abatement of such murder. The trial lasted for 4 days, when he was unanimously acquitted by a mixed jury, after a deliberation of only four minutes. 7. The trial excited great public interest, and the conduct of the police in the case elicited from practically the whole press of Calcutta and elsewhere, criticisms couched in language of considerable severity. The trial lasted for 4 days, when he was unanimously acquitted by a mixed jury, after a deliberation of only four minutes. 7. The trial excited great public interest, and the conduct of the police in the case elicited from practically the whole press of Calcutta and elsewhere, criticisms couched in language of considerable severity. The Englishman, The Pioneer, The Statesman, and The Bengalee, newspapers circulating in Calcutta, published articles in language of a decidedly strong description, relating to the disclosures on the trial. The proceedings in the trial have been placed before us, and it is clear from those proceedings that strong grounds existed for suspecting that the prosecution witnesses or, any way, some of them, had been tutored, and that the conduct of the police was open to very grave criticism. 8. Counsel for the defense did not hesitate to charge the police with a conspiracy against the accused to secure his conviction, in order to enable the person really guilty to escape. In his charge to the jury, the learned Judge told the jury it was for them to consider whether the whole story was concocted or not, in order to extricate the Kumar (a young man against whom it was imputed that he himself had committed the murder) and whether there was such a plot or not as has been suggested for the defense. The jury after only 4 minutes' deliberation, brought in a verdict of not guilty. It was in these circumstances that the impugned articles came to be written. In my opinion, such circumstances would justify the use of language of considerable severity, if it was by way of comment, fair and bon fide comment, and with a reasonable regard to the requirements of truth and of justice. 9. It was in these circumstances that the impugned articles came to be written. In my opinion, such circumstances would justify the use of language of considerable severity, if it was by way of comment, fair and bon fide comment, and with a reasonable regard to the requirements of truth and of justice. 9. And it is clear that the Government of Bengal were at once solicitous about the methods of the police in the case, for in their letter of the 20th July 1905, to the Commissioner of Police of Calcutta, that Government, within only three days after the publication of the first article complained of, referring to the case as reported in the daily press wrote:-- "It appears that the acquittal of the accused and the facts elicited at the trial tend to throw discredit and suspicion on the action and methods of the police in the matter," and asked for a full report and expression of the Commissioner's opinion on the case. The law applicable to a case of this class is clear: the difficulty arises in the application of the law to individual cases. I will state concisely what I understand the law to be. 10. The Administration of Justice is a matter for fair and bon fide discussion, and to quote the language of the Lord Chief Justice Cookburn, when charging the jury in Woodgate v Redout 4 F. and F. 202 at p. 223 (1865):-- That the Administration of Justice should be made a subject for the exercise of public discussion is a matter of the most essential importance. 11. But writers in public papers must be careful as to the language they use. 11. But writers in public papers must be careful as to the language they use. The same learned Judge in R. v. Tanfield 42 J.P.P. 424 is reported to have charged the jury as follows:-- Writers in public papers are of great utility, and do great benefit to the public interests by watching the proceedings of Courts of Justice, and fairly commenting on them, if there is any thing that calls for observation; but they should be careful in discharging that function, that they do not wantonly assail the character of others, or impute criminality to them, and if they do so, and do not bring to the performance of the duty they discharge that due regard for the interests of others which the assumption of so important a censorship necessarily requires, they must take the consequences. 12. In cases of this class, it is absolutely essential to differentiate between fair and bon fide comment, and allegations of fact. This is clearly pointed out, if at the present day, authority were needed, by Lord Herschell in Davies v. Shepstone 11 App. Cas. 187 at p. 190 (1886). That very distinguished Judge says, in delivering the advice of the Judicial Committee:-- There is no doubt that the public acts of a public man may lawfully be made the subject of fair comment or criticism not only by the Press, but by all members of the public. But the distinction cannot be too clearly borne in mind between comment or criticism and allegations of fact, such as, that disgraceful acts have been committed, or discreditable language used. It is one thing to comment upon or criticize, even with serverity, the acknowledged or proved acts of a public man, and "quite another to assert that he has been guilty of particular acts of misconduct. 13. Before, then, we proceed to discuss the question of comment, fair or otherwise, we must ascertain whether the language complained of is an allegation of fact, as merely comment. If the former, we must be satisfied either of its truth, or that it is privileged. 14. 13. Before, then, we proceed to discuss the question of comment, fair or otherwise, we must ascertain whether the language complained of is an allegation of fact, as merely comment. If the former, we must be satisfied either of its truth, or that it is privileged. 14. We must, of course, look at each article as a whole, and in the articles now under discussion there is doubtless much that is comment; but I do not think attaching to ordinary English words their ordinary English signification, there is any difficulty in distinguishing between that which is allegation of fact and that which is comment. Take the following passage: "Girish, however, starved and tortured as he was, proved stubborn." This is a statement that Girish was starved and tortured: it is not comment on the evidence given at the trial, or the expression of an inference fairly deducible from that evidence. Then:--"He refused to put his neck into the noose which the police and those behind them had so neatly tied for his accommodation." This is a statement of fact: and it is impossible not to understand what is intended, and what is the imputation conveyed. But stronger allegations are to be found in the article of the 19th July:--"The true story of this clumsy police conspiracy," is an allegation of fact that there was a "clumsy police conspiracy." And again: The police over-reached themselves badly, but it is only due to the "fine defense of the prisoner's counsel that this dastardly scheme to hang an innocent man did not succeed." This is tantamount to saying that there was a dastardly scheme to hang an innocent man : it is impossible to regard that as comment, and even if it had been, as fair comment. It is a charge of a heinous criminal offence : there is no plea of justification, and the Defendants have not pleaded that these allegations are true. 15. Then can it be said that the statements complained of are privileged ? 16. It is a charge of a heinous criminal offence : there is no plea of justification, and the Defendants have not pleaded that these allegations are true. 15. Then can it be said that the statements complained of are privileged ? 16. In support of this claim of privilege, much reliance has been placed upon some observations of Chief Justice Cockburn, when charging the Jury in Hunter v. Sharp 4 F. and F. 983 at p. 1006 (1866):-- The occasion is a privileged one and if the privilege is exercised honestly, faithfully, and with reasonable regard to what truth and justice require, then, though he may exceed the limits of what he can legally prove to be the truth, he is protected from liability. It is not, therefore, necessary that the justification should appear to you to be made out, if you think, that the Defendant, or the writer, was in the reasonable and honest exercise of his vocation as a public writer, even although he was not fully warranted in drawing the inferences he did as to the conduct of the Plaintiff, and though it may be that he was not entirely justified by the absolute truth. 17. I have very carefully considered whether these observations can properly apply to a case like the present. There are no doubt a few cases in the books in which that which has been called "Licentious Comment" has been allowed. They are, however, of a very different character from the present, and no authority has been cited, nor do I think any authority can be cited, to show, that, when a grave criminal offence is alleged as a fact, anything short of proof of its truth can avail the Defendants in a libel action. In the same case of Hunter v. Sharp 4 F. and F. 983 at p. 1006 (1866), counsel for the Plaintiff claimed a verdict on the ground that the libel imputed to the Plaintiff that he was guilty of a criminal charge, when Cockburn, C.J., is reported to have said:--"If that were so, of course the Plaintiff would be entitled to a verdict as there was no evidence in support of it" (p. 992). And the learned Judge amplified this view in his Charge to the Jury at p. 995. 18. And the learned Judge amplified this view in his Charge to the Jury at p. 995. 18. I can find nothing in any reported case which even qualifies this view : nor was there any privilege on the occasion to justify this allegation as a fact of a most grave criminal offence. 19. I have cited somewhat freely from the charges of Chief Justice Cockburn, because there are few Judges who have had such a wide and varied experience in cases of this class, and because I can find no judicial utterances more favorable to the Defendants. 20. Another point is as to whether or not the articles apply to the Plaintiff. The law on this point is laid down in Le fanu v. Malcomson 1 H.L.C 637 (1848), and as regards the evidence, I do not think there can be any reasonable doubt that the articles were intended to apply to him. 21. There is only one other point: it is contended for the Appellant that the suit is barred by limitation. But the suit, with five other officers of the Calcutta Police as co-Plaintiffs, was instituted on the 26th January 1906, well within time. The names of those other five officers were struck out on the 22nd April 1907, on the ground of misjoinder of parties and of causes of action, but the present Plaintiff continued sole Plaintiff: that is sole Plaintiff in a suit commenced within time. I do not think the suit is barred. Sandes v. Wildsmith (6) is in point. 22. We have been invited to say whether or not the Police were guilty of the conspiracy charged : there is no plea of justification and we cannot go into this. We are not trying the murder case over again: we are not trying the Police; we cannot, nor do we, express any opinion upon their conduct, in relation to the murder case. We can only try the issue of libel or no libel. 23. I am unable to appreciate why, when there was no plea of justification, either party was allowed, in the Court of first instance, to go Into the evidence they did, which had the effect of substantially lengthening and increasing the costs of the proceedings. With the exception of the very small portion, connecting the libel with the present Plaintiff, that evidence has not been read to us. 24. With the exception of the very small portion, connecting the libel with the present Plaintiff, that evidence has not been read to us. 24. A good deal has been said about the Government of Bengal guaranteeing the Plaintiffs' costs. We cannot go into this question, though, I feel constrained to say that, if the Government possesses this power of unlimited indemnification, it is one which ought to be exercised with the greatest care and discrimination, for other-(6) (1893)1 Q.B. 771. wise, it might develop into a weapon of oppression. 25. And, I cannot part with the case without expressing my strong disapproval of the attack made by Superintendent Aldridge in his explanation, on the Counsel for the defense in the murder trial. 26. The appeal fails and must be dismissed with costs. 27. Harington, J.--In this case the Defendants appeal from judgment in favor of the Plaintiff in an action for libel published in the Defendants' newspaper. 28. No question arises as to publication: the Defendants do not justify: but plead that the articles complained of are fair comments on a matter of public interest and that they do not refer to the Plaintiff. 29. The matter of public interest to which the articles related was what is known as the Sova Bazar murder case--a case in which one Joggeswar Ahir alias Girish was indicted at Sessions for the murder of one Ganga, and was acquitted by the jury. 30. Ganga was last seen alive on May 24th, 1905. On May 28th, a dead body in an advanced stage of decomposition was discovered in a bath-room in a garden attached to the house of the Sova Bazar Raj family, where Ganga had at one time been employed. Death had been caused by injuries inflicted with a cutting instrument. 31. On the morning of May 30th, a tank near the bath-room was, under the superintendence of the Police, dragged by some fishermen in the presence of Girish and others and some clothing and a knife were discovered. After the discovery of these articles, Girish made a statement, in consequence of which, he was sent to the Magistrate to whom he stated that Ganga had been murdered in the bath-room by Sovendra Bahadur--that he had seen the murder committed--and that Sovendra had threatened to kill him if he mentioned what he had seen. On this statement Sovendra was arrested. 32. On this statement Sovendra was arrested. 32. After his arrest, it was observed that Girish had a cut on his hand which he first said was due to the breaking of a soda-water bottle. But he afterwards stated that he was holding Ganga when Sovendra stabbed him. In consequence, Girish was arrested and Sovendra released on bail. 33. Some property alleged to have belonged to Ganga was found at the house of Girish's mistress after his arrest. On 3rd June, he was again taken before the Magistrate where he made a statement to the effect that Sovendra murdered Ganga because of au intrigue which Ganga was carrying on and that he had caught hold of Ganga to prevent Sovendra striking him, and so had received the wounds on his hand. 34. Girish was placed on his trial on 13th July, the case concluded on the 15th, when he was acquitted. 35. The articles complained of as libels appeared in the Indian Daily News of 17th July and 19th July 1905, the latter issue reprinting and adopting an article which had appeared in the Statesman of the 18th July on the same subject. 36. The articles contained very vehement attack on the police engaged in the case, on the ground that they had entered into a conspiracy with other persons to get an innocent man convicted and executed for the purpose of screening the real murderer from justice. 37. The question is, was the Judge in the Court of the first instance right in holding that the articles published by the Defendant were not protected under the right which all the King's subjects enjoy of making fair comments on matter of public interest ? 38. The articles in question are three in number: they cover nearly 250 lines of printed matter. 39. The first contains a statement that the Judge in his summing up indicated that he did not believe that the whole fabric of the prosecutions evidence was a diabolical plot to hang an innocent man, but that the jury held other views and by their verdict said that it did not strain their credulity to believe that this case was a particularly diabolical conspiracy. 40. 40. The writer goes on to state that after Kumar Shovendra Krishna Deb was arrested, articles alleged to be the property of the murdered man were found in the possession or custody of Girish, and then quotes the speech of the learned Counsel for the defense, who suggested that the police, in conjunction with the dependents of the Kumar's family, got some sort of evidence against the accused. 41. Then follows an allegation that Girish was starved and tortured to make him confess and that there had been monetary transactions between the police and other persons with regard to the case. 42. The second article, after calling attention to the reprint from the Statesman, contains the following passage: "The true story of this clumsy police conspiracy is that the police thought that the unfortunate Joggeswar Ahir would be undefended and that this mass of trumpery evidence might throw dust in the eyes of the Judge and Jury, when backed by the hard swearing of the detective officers and policemen. The police over-reached themselves badly, but it is only due to the fine defense of the prisoner's counsel that this dastardly scheme to hang an Innocent man did not succeed." The writer then attacks a witness in whose presence some of the incriminating articles are said to have been found and suggests that though the man was the Bon of a prostitute living in a brothel, the police put him forward as a respectable zemindar. 43. The third article which originally appeared in the Statesman deals with the case more fully. The writer discusses the evidence and the character of the witnesses, draws the inference that Girish had been tortured by the police--and alleges that the trial has revealed the outlines of a scandalous conspiracy on the part of the police. 44. The article concludes with a demand that the guilty person or persons should be brought to justice and that a fearless and unsparing investigation should be made into every aspect, every stage, every fact of the case connected with the conduct of the police. not only entitled to publish in their newspaper a fair and accurate report of the case but were also entitled to discuss fully and openly the proceedings and to publish such criticism and comment as the case merited, provided only, they kept within the limits of fair comment. 45. not only entitled to publish in their newspaper a fair and accurate report of the case but were also entitled to discuss fully and openly the proceedings and to publish such criticism and comment as the case merited, provided only, they kept within the limits of fair comment. 45. The question whether the writing complained of is a libel or a fair comment on a matter of public interest is a question of fact which, England, is determined by a jury subject to the direction of the Judge as to what in law constitutes a libel. 46. In this country, the Judge dealing with both the law and the facts would first have to determine whether the matters complained of were defamatory of the Plaintiff or not; secondly, if defamatory of the Plaintiff, whether they were comments or assertions of fact. If he came to the conclusion that, though defamatory of the Plaintiff, they were comments on a matter of public interest, he would then be called upon to determine whether they were fair comments, made bon fide and without malice. 47. A Judge in this country exercising the functions of a (sic) before the Court false evidence in order to obtain the conviction of an innocent man, that such an imputation was defamatory. 48. Here, there can be no sort of question that, the imputations made are defamatory to the highest degree and constitute a very serious libel on the Plaintiff (assuming they apply to him) unless they can be excused on the ground that they are fair comment. 49. On this point, the Judge exercising the functions of a jury would be bound to read each of the articles complained of, and see whether they were only comments or whether there was to be found in them any allegation of fact defamatory of the Plaintiff as distinguished from defamatory comments on the Plaintiff's acts. There is, as is pointed out by Wilde, B., in Popham v. Pickburn (7), a strong distinction between alleging incorrectly that a man has committed a disgraceful act, and commenting on some act of his truly stated. 50. There is, as is pointed out by Wilde, B., in Popham v. Pickburn (7), a strong distinction between alleging incorrectly that a man has committed a disgraceful act, and commenting on some act of his truly stated. 50. Now, omitting the assertions of fact which are to be found in the first and third articles, it is impossible to read the (sic) spired to commit perjury and to produce false evidence to the end that they might procure the conviction and execution of an innocent man. 51. This is not a comment on any proved or admitted fact. It is a statement that the police have committed a crime of great heinousness, and of peculiar atrocity--a crime which, if proved against any members of the police force, would deservedly call down upon them the most severe punishment. It must be taken that this allegation that thin conspiracy has been entered into is untrue, because the Defendants have not asserted in their pleading that it is true--the presumption of law, therefore, that the libel is false arises. 52. In my opinion, although a writer may be excused even if in the course of a fair and temperate comment he do go a little beyond what he can strictly prove, yet if be take upon himself to publish as a fact to the world at large that the prosecutors or witnesses in a criminal trial have conspired to procure, by false evidence, the wrongful conviction of a man they know to be innocent, he will be answerable in damages for libel, unless he places on the record a plea of justification, (sic) enabled the Plaintiff to combat the truth of the libel, have always been considered under English law as a serious aggravation of the damages. 53. The learned Judge, in dealing with the case, has found as a fact that articles in question go beyond the limits of fair comment. This is the conclusion he has come to on the facts in the exercise of his functions as a Judge of fact. 54. Has the Appellant shown any ground for interfering with his finding ? It may be said, it is going too far to say that, if an article is per se libellous, nothing but a finding in favor of the Defendant on a plea of justification will avail as an answer to the action. 54. Has the Appellant shown any ground for interfering with his finding ? It may be said, it is going too far to say that, if an article is per se libellous, nothing but a finding in favor of the Defendant on a plea of justification will avail as an answer to the action. But if that passage in the judgment is read with what follows, it becomes clear that the learned Judge is dealing with the particular libels before him and not laying down a general proposition of universal application, for he goes on to point out that the articles state as a fact that the police have committed a criminal offence and having found that this is the effect of the articles, he holds that the allegation that the police have committed a criminal offence does not come under the head of fair comment. 55. In this I agree, and I think it would have been a proper direction to a jury to tell them that, if they were of opinion that the article asserted that the police had committed the offence of conspiracy, then they could not find that it was within the protection accorded to fair comment on matters of public interest. 56. The only other question which arises is "do the articles refer to the Plaintiff?" 57. The learned Judge has found that they do. They purport to be directed against the Calcutta Police in relation to the Sova Bazar murder case. 58. The Plaintiff was the Inspector In charge of the investigation; his name is mentioned in the article reprinted from the Statesman. It is idle to suggest that the articles directed against the police in reference to this murder do not apply to the only member of the police force mentioned in them by name--he being the Inspector in charge of the case. With regard to the questions of the guarantee for costs which the Plaintiff's employers have given, I agree with the observation of my Lord on this point. As the matter is not one which affect the issue of the appeal before us, I abstain from saying anything further with reference to it. I entirely concur In the observation which my Lord has made with reference to the attack on Mr. Ghosh. 59. As the matter is not one which affect the issue of the appeal before us, I abstain from saying anything further with reference to it. I entirely concur In the observation which my Lord has made with reference to the attack on Mr. Ghosh. 59. I am unable to see any reason for disturbing the judgment of the learned Judge of the Court of first instance and agree that the appeal should be dismissed with costs. 60. Fletcher, J.--I have had the opportunity of reading the judgment which has been delivered by my Lord. 61. It would have been sufficient for me to have expressed my concurrence therewith, but as the case is one of some public interest, I will state briefly the reasons that have led me to come to the same conclusion as my Lord and my brother Harington. Now the present case is to my mind a very simple one. We are not here trying the Sova Bazar murder case, nor the police. The only questions we have to decide are the Issues raised in the present suit. Now those issues are (1) Do the articles complained of refer to the Plaintiff? (2) Are such articles fair comment on a matter of public interest ? and (3) Is the present suit barred by limitation ? With regard to the first of these three issues, there can, to my mind, be no doubt but that the articles do and were intended to refer to the Plaintiff and the other members of the police investigating into the Sova Bazar murder case. 62. The second issue is the one that has been most strenuously argued on this appeal. Now, that the matter is one of public interest is not denied. 63. The publication therefore in a newspaper of articles referring to the proceedings of the police in investigating into and in conducting the prosecution in the Sova Bazar murder case is protected, provided that such articles fall within the limit of fair comment. Now, that the matter is one of public interest is not denied. 63. The publication therefore in a newspaper of articles referring to the proceedings of the police in investigating into and in conducting the prosecution in the Sova Bazar murder case is protected, provided that such articles fall within the limit of fair comment. Nor is this privilege to be put down solely on the ground that the writer of the articles has indulged in what has been described as "licentious comments." But if the writer, instead of limiting himself to fair and reasonable comment, goes out of his way to make statements of fact affecting the character or reputation of the Plaintiff, he cannot rely on the plea that the articles are fair comment on a matter of public interest but must justify the articles by proving the truth of the statements complained of. No plea of justification has been placed on the record in the present case. Are then the articles complained of fair comments on a matter of public interest or do they contain statements of fact which are defamatory on the Plaintiff? I have come to the conclusion that such articles contain defamatory statements which cannot in any view be justified as comments. 64. Take the article appearing in the Indian Daily News of the 19th of July 1905. There the public are told that there was "a police conspiracy," "hard swearing" on the part of the police and " a dastardly scheme to hang an innocent man." All these statements are per se libellous and unless they can be justified as fair comment, the present suit is really an undefended one. 65. Each of the above-mentioned statements charges the Plaintiff and the other investigating police with the commission of serious criminal offences and I am not aware of any case in which imputing to the Plaintiff the commission of a criminal offence has been held to come within the range of fair comment. 66. Moreover, in my opinion the writer of this article intended the above-mentioned statements to be statements of fact and not comment for he informs the public that these libellous statements are " the true story." 67. The Defendants having failed on the plea of fair comment, the Plaintiff is entitled to succeed, unless this suit is barred by limitation. 68. Moreover, in my opinion the writer of this article intended the above-mentioned statements to be statements of fact and not comment for he informs the public that these libellous statements are " the true story." 67. The Defendants having failed on the plea of fair comment, the Plaintiff is entitled to succeed, unless this suit is barred by limitation. 68. On this issue, it is sufficient for me to state that I entirely agree with the judgment. I also wish to express my concurrence with the remarks which have been made by my Lord as to the Government indemnifying parties to suits against costs to be incurred by them and as to the attack on Mr. Ghosh, Counsel for the defense, in the criminal trial by Superintendent Aldridge in his letter of explanation to the Bengal Government. I, therefore, agree that the judgment of Chitty, J., was correct and that this appeal fails and ought to be dismissed with costs.