JUDGMENT Maclean, C.J. - Two appeals are now before us. No. 136 of 1904 and No. 67 of 1907. I will first deal with the former. The only question on that appeal is whether the suit is barred by sec. 244 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The short facts are as follows : On the 17th February 1888 one Srimati Panchcori Debi, the mother of the Plaintiffs, obtained a decree for Rs. 28,463 against one Baroda Sundari Debi. Panchcori Debi died intestate on the 26 September 1889, the present Respondents, the Plaintiffs in the suit, are her sole heirs. They are all minors, suing by their father as next friend and certificated guardian. Baroda Debi died on the 20th March 1890 : the Defendant is the executrix of her will and has obtained probate. The Plaintiffs have from time to time partially executed the above decree, but a large sum is still due to them under it. Failing in this endeavour to execute this decree, the Plaintiffs instituted this suit on the 17th August 1901 to administer the debtor's estate, and although the plaint is not very artistically drawn, the charges in effect amount to charge of mal-administration against the Defendant in the administration of the estate. The charges, doubtless, ought to have been more specific. The Defendant says that such a suit will not lie, having regard to sec. 244 of the Code of Civil Procedure. This is the only question we have to decide. 2. The District Judge overruled the objection, and the Defendant has appealed. 3. Is the question involved in the suit merely a "question between the parties to the suit relating to the execution of the decree 1 We think not. The real question involved in the suit is in substance whether or not the Defendant in administering the debtor's estate has been guilty of mal-administration, and whether the Plaintiffs, as creditors of that estate, are entitled to have the estate administered on that footing. This is a much wider question than one merely relating to the execution of the decree, and though, no doubt, the Judicial Committee, as the Courts of India, has placed a liberal construction upon the language of sec. 344, it would, we think, be going beyond anything yet decided to hold that a suit such as the present is barred by that section. 344, it would, we think, be going beyond anything yet decided to hold that a suit such as the present is barred by that section. It lies on the Defendant to substantiate that the Plaintiffs' prima facie right to bring such a suit, is barred by sec. 244. There is no machinery under the execution chapter (Chap. 19) of the Code which enables the Court, in executing the decree, to go into the question of whether or not the executor has been guilty of mal-administration of the estate. Sec. 234 no doubt enables the Court to call for an account of the property of the deceased which has come to the hands of the executor, but that section only applies to an account of the property which has actually come to the hand of the executor. If, as is alleged here, there has been mal-administration on the part of the Defendant, she cannot be held liable in execution proceedings under this section, but a regular suit must be brought, Khushrobhai v. Hormazsha ILR 11 Bom. 727 (1887). I agree in that view. There is no final decision of the point in this Court: it was touched upon, however, in the case of Jogemaya Dassi v. Thackomoni Dassi ILR 24 Cal. 473 (1896), but a final decision on the point was unnecessary for the purposes of that case. Again the administration suit there was not based on the footing of maladministration. For these reasons I agree with the District Judge and the appeal must be dismissed with costs. 4. The other appeal (67 of 1907) has reached a rather untoward position. The matter of the last appeal came before this Court on the 1st May 1905 when it was suggested by the Court and all parties acquiesced that the Appeal No. 136 of 1904 should stand over and that the Plaintiffs should apply for an account under sec. 234, it being pointed out that this account, if ordered, might afford the Plaintiffs all the information they wanted as to the estate. The appeal consequently stood over. The Plaintiffs did make an application for an account, but they were met, and successfully met, by a plea of limitation. 234, it being pointed out that this account, if ordered, might afford the Plaintiffs all the information they wanted as to the estate. The appeal consequently stood over. The Plaintiffs did make an application for an account, but they were met, and successfully met, by a plea of limitation. It was never mentioned when the suggestion of the Court was made on the 1st May 1905, that any question of limitation could arise; if so, it is improbable that the Court would have made the suggestion, but would, at once, have dealt with Appeal No. 136 of 1904. The Sub-Judge of Hooghly has dismissed the application on the ground of limitation and the Plaintiffs have appealed. In the view we have taken of the other appeal it becomes unnecessary to decide this one : and, in the circumstances, we dismiss it without costs though in so doing we do not wish to be understood as agreeing in the view of the Sub-Judge. We express no opinion. This unfortunate litigation has been going on for over 21 years: the parties were very near a settlement a few days ago, and I venture to suggest, in the interest of the minors, whether a real attempt to settle the matter should not now be advantageously made. We fix the hearing fee at 5 gold mohurs. Coxe, J. I agree.