JUDGMENT 1. This is a second appeal in an execution case. The second Appellants are the judgment-debtors who when the decree-holders applied to execute two decrees obtained against them presented an application under secs. 244 and 313, C.P.C., alleging that the decree-holders' decrees had been satisfied by the execution of as mortgage bond by the principal judgment-debtor, Gadadhar Panda, on the 1st May 1903 in favor of Sadanunda, the father of the decree-holders. The decree-holders admitted execution of this bond, but alleged that the arrangement fell through owing to one of the judgment-debtors, Ganesh, refusing to ratify it, and that accordingly the bond was returned to the judgment-debtor, Gadadhar. 2. The Munsif held that the decree-holders had not been able to prove their allegations as to the return of the bond. He found that the decree-holders' decrees had been satisfied and disallowed the decree-holders' application for execution. 3. On appeal to the District Judge, the application for execution was allowed on the ground that the satisfaction of the decrees by the execution of the fresh mortgage bond of the 1st May 1903 had not been certified to the Court under sec. 258 and therefore could not be taken cognizance of by the executing Court. 4. The judgment-debtors now prefer this second appeal. It can only lie under sec. 244. There can be no second appeal against an order under sec. 313. 5. The grounds urged on behalf of the Appellants are (1) that no decree had been passed under sec. 90 of the Transfer of Property Act and so execution of the decrees against the other properties of the judgment-debtors should not be allowed : (2) That sec. 258 does not apply to mortgage decrees; and (3) that if sec. 258 does apply to mortgage decrees, then the judgment-debtors' present application is still maintainable under sec. 244, C.P.C. and should be allowed, as the decree-holders by fraud prevented the judgment-debtors from applying in time under sec. 258, C.P.C. 6. The first two grounds of appeal must fail. The decrees which it is now sought to execute are not mortgage decrees but money decrees passed under sec. 90 of the Transfer of Property Act. The decrees were decrees under secs. 258, C.P.C. 6. The first two grounds of appeal must fail. The decrees which it is now sought to execute are not mortgage decrees but money decrees passed under sec. 90 of the Transfer of Property Act. The decrees were decrees under secs. 88 and 90 of the Act, for it was provided in them that if the proceeds of the sale of the mortgaged properties were insufficient to satisfy the decrees, the decree-holders were at liberty to proceed against the other properties of the judgment-debtors. The mortgaged properties have been sold, The proceeds of the sale have not satisfied the decretal amounts. The decree-holders are now proceeding against the other properties of the judgment-debtors. The decrees which it is now sought to execute are therefore money decrees. 7. In support of his third ground of appeal, the pleader for the Appellants relies on the case of Dinobandhu Nundy v. Harimati Dassee 8 C.W.N. 395: s.c. ILR 31 Cal. 480 (1904), in which according to the head-note it has been ruled that sec. 258 of the Code does not restrict the operation of sec. 244. The pleader for the Appellants contends that according to this ruling when au application under sec. 244 is made to a Court executing a decree, such Court is not prevented by the provision of sec. 258 from taking cognizance of an uncertified adjustment of a decree. But though there are some observations in the judgment in this case, which lend support to this contention, we would observe (1) that what was decided in the case was only that a separate suit for a declaration that a decree has been satisfied by an uncertified agreement out of Court will not lie, and (2) that the learned Judges who decided that case do not dissent from or refer to a Full Bench decision in Ramdoyal v. Ram Hari ILR 20 Cal. 32 (1892), which lays down the contrary, and which appears to be in accord with the express terms of sec. 258. 8. The case of Bairgulu v. Bapanna ILR 15 Mad. 302 (1892), which is referred to in the judgment in Dinobandhu v. Harimati (1) is also to the effect that a separate suit for a declaration that a decree has been satisfied by an uncertified agreement is barred. In this case it is said: "The effect of sec. 258. 8. The case of Bairgulu v. Bapanna ILR 15 Mad. 302 (1892), which is referred to in the judgment in Dinobandhu v. Harimati (1) is also to the effect that a separate suit for a declaration that a decree has been satisfied by an uncertified agreement is barred. In this case it is said: "The effect of sec. 258 is only to exclude proof of an uncertified agreement in execution proceedings. It does not limit the operation of sec. 244." 9. It would seem therefore that the rule laid down in Dinobandhu v. Harimati 8 C.W.N. 395: s.c. ILR 31 Cal. 480 (1904) that sec. 258 does not restrict the operation of sec. 244 must be understood in this sense, and not, as interpreted by the pleader for the Appellants. The Appellant's pleader, however, urges that his clients raised a plea of fraud which the District Judge has taken no notice of. His clients complained that the decree-holders had by fraud kept them in ignorance till within a month of their application of the fact that the satisfaction of their decrees by the execution of a fresh bond had not been certified to the Court. He contends that the lower Court was bound to inquire into this matter. This argument in our opinion must prevail. It is in accordance with the views of the Privy Council as expressed in the case of Prasanna Kumar Sanyal v. Kalidas Sanyal L.L.R. 19 cal. 683 (1892). We must therefore remand the case to the lower Appellate Court to have the Appellants' allegation of fraud inquired into and determined. If the judgment-debtors do not establish their plea to this effect to the satisfaction of the District Judge, the execution should be allowed to proceed. If they do, then the District Judge should consider and determine whether or not the decrees have been satisfied and whether their satisfaction cannot be certified now. Costs will abide the result. We assess the costs of this hearing at 3 gold mohurs.