JUDGMENT 1. On the 11th January 1904, certain properties belonging to the judgment-debtor, Benode Lal Dhone, sold in execution of a decree obtained by one Puma Chandra Chowdhury who is one of the Respondents before us. The properties were described as lot Mirzapur, a two-storied house and lot Laskardighi. The judgment-debtor applied on the 9th February 1904 to have the sale set aside under the provisions of sec. 311, C. P. C. The application was opposed; but the lower Court held, on the 22nd May 1905, that the sale of the properties, NOS. 1 and 2, should be set aside and passed an order accordingly; it confirmed the sale of lot Laskardighi, (lot No. 3). The purchaser, M. Abdul Kasem, has appealed to this Court; but his appeal is confined to lot Mirzapur only and he has no objection to the sale of the house being set aside. The judgment-debtor has preferred a cross-appeal with respect to Laskardighi'; but his learned vakil has not pressed it. So that the sale with which we are concerned in the present appeal relates only to lot Mirzapur. The Subordinate Judge has held that there were irregularities in the publication of the sale-proclamation of lot Mirzapur, and that the price fetched at the sale, namely, Rs. 5,500 was inadequate. He was of opinion that the value of the property was about Rs. 8,250 and, though there was no direct evidence connecting the under-value with the irregularities complained of, he came to the conclusion that the sale was one that should be set aside under the provisions of sec. 311, C. P. C. 2. Now the first point taken before us on behalf of the judgment-debtor, Respondent, is that the notice contained a statement that the value of the property lot Mirzapur was Rs. 4,000, which was inadequate, and that such a statement was in itself an irregularity vitiating the sale. It was undoubtedly an irregularity; but we do not consider it to be material inasmuch as it is well known that purchasers in this province at least do not take serious notice of any statement in the sale-proclamation as to the value of the property to be sold. The value of the property is set down without much consideration and, as a matter of fact, in the present case, the purchaser's bid was Rs. The value of the property is set down without much consideration and, as a matter of fact, in the present case, the purchaser's bid was Rs. 5,500, that is, more than the value fixed in the sale-proclamation. There is also nothing on the record to indicate that any person would have bid higher if the property had been valued in the sale proclamation at a figure over Rs. 4,000. 3. The second point urged before us--a point which was pressed before the lower Court and was accepted by it as the basis of its judgment--is that the sale-proclamation was not stuck up in each of the villages. The putni taluk lot Mirzapur is within the zemindarl of the Maharaja of Burdwan, and was owned by the judgment-debtor. Five of the villages are let out in durputni to one Rajendra Lal Gossami and, it is said, that he pays the rent of the entire taluk receivable by the Maharaja of Burdwan and pays Rs. 500 as net profit to the judgment-debtor, whereas the sixth village Dhoba is held in durputni by one Chandrabati who pays Rs. 321. Dhoba is on the other side of the river, and is at a little distance from the other five villages. The contention, therefore, is raised that the sale-proclamation ought to have been served separately on each of the villages. The Subordinate Judge relying on two cases to which we shall presently refer, came to the conclusion that the non-publication of the sale-proclamation in each of the villages was an irregularity. Sec. 274 of the Code which is referred to in sec. 289 directs-- "publication at some place on or adjacent to such property by beat of drum or other customary mode." The word "property" in sec. 274 evidently refers to each lot to be sold separately from the rest. It cannot refer to different parts of a property which is advertised for sale. Of course, if the separate villages constituting a property be so far distant from each other that there is no likelihood of a knowledge of the sale-proclamation being carried from one village to another, it would be more judicious to have the sale-proclamation served in each of the villages. In Tripura Sundari v. Durga Churn Pal I. L.R. 11 Cal. Of course, if the separate villages constituting a property be so far distant from each other that there is no likelihood of a knowledge of the sale-proclamation being carried from one village to another, it would be more judicious to have the sale-proclamation served in each of the villages. In Tripura Sundari v. Durga Churn Pal I. L.R. 11 Cal. 74(1884), the learned Judges were of opinion that the words " on the spot where the property is attached " in sec. 289 of the Code refer to each property attached and not to each part of the property attached. They thought in that case that the sale-proclamation was irregular because there were several properties attached in the proceeding. Following, however, the decision of the Judicial Committee in the case of R. Olpherts v. Mahabir Pershad L. R. 10 I. A. 25 (1882), the learned Judges declined to set aside the sale on the ground of mere irregularity in the publication of the sale on each of the properties. In Pedro Antonio v. Jalbhoy Ardeshir I. L. R. 12 Bom. 368 (1887), the learned Judges of the Bombay High Court observed:-- A mere breaking up of an area into lots, however, does not necessarily make it several properties for the purpose of a procla- mation of attachment or sale. Where estates, though embraced in the same process, are really at such a distance that there is no moral certainty of communication to persons on or interested in the one of what is publicly done on the other, there should, no doubt, be a separate proclamation on each, in order that full intimation may be given of what is to be done." This appears to us to be a sound principle to be followed. But it does not necessarily indicate that there is an infringement of the provisions of the section on account of the mere fact that separate processes were not served on each portion of the property advertised for sale. 4. The lower Court is obviously in error in thinking that, on account of the repeal of the words "on the spot where the property is attached" by Act VII of 1888, the original provisions were revived. But we have the words in sec. 274 quite clear and distinct, and the repeal did not affect the law as we now find in the Code. 5. But we have the words in sec. 274 quite clear and distinct, and the repeal did not affect the law as we now find in the Code. 5. But, assuming for the purposes of argument that the sale-proclamation should have been served at Dhoba which is on the other side of the river, it does not appear to us that the irregularity, if any, was material. None of the witnesses who have been examined in the case--and there are a good number of them--came forward to say that any of them would have bid for the property if they bad had knowledge of the publication of the sale in Dhoba. The absence of evidence on such a point is easily accountable because, as we shall presently show, there were other reasons which prevented the sale of the property at a higher price than Rs. 5,500. 6. The fact seems to be that notwithstanding these irregularities--if we may call them irregularities--the property would most likely have fetched its real price, if the judgment-debtor had not acted in such a way as to prevent its fetching such price. Before the sale took place, he caused two suits to be instituted for a declaration that the properties were debutter and asked for an injunction. Any person, therefore, who bid, would have a litigation and a litigation of a costly and serious character before him. The judgment-debtor himself had also declared the property to be debutter and not saleable in execution of a decree against him. Notwithstanding, therefore, that the sale might be confirmed under sec. 311, C. P. C., the litigation as to saleabillty would continue. The judgment-debtor himself, in his deposition, said that he had ceased to be the shebait of the thakurs, that his son Promodlal Dhone was the shebait, and that he had executed a trust-deed in his favour. Who would bid very high for a property with such a heavy litigation impending ? If there is any reason why the sale fetched Rs. 5,500 and not a higher amount--the Subordinate Judge finding that the value of the property would be Rs. 8,250 or it might be higher--it is quite clear to us that the acts and declarations of the judgment-debtor are the reasons for the under-value, and that the irregularities complained of did not lead to undervalue. 5,500 and not a higher amount--the Subordinate Judge finding that the value of the property would be Rs. 8,250 or it might be higher--it is quite clear to us that the acts and declarations of the judgment-debtor are the reasons for the under-value, and that the irregularities complained of did not lead to undervalue. Even in his petition for setting aside the sale which was presented on the 9th February 1904, the judgment-debtor, in para. 7, stated:-- " That of the properties sold, the tank called Laskardighi is a debutter property of Thakur Lakshmi Narain Jiu and lot Mirzapur and lakhiraj bastu house are debutter properties of Thakur Issur Kanta Lal Jiu. Consequently those properties could not be sold for the personal debts of this Petitioner." That is to say he himself as judgment debtor, disclaimed ownership of the property and asked the Court to come to the conclusion that the properties were not his properties. He made the same statement in his deposition In Court and his deposition opens with the statement "I have no personal right in lot Mirzapur but It is a putni mehal appertaining to debutter." In the face of the statements made by the judgment-debtor in his petition and in Court, one would be led to come to the conclusion that the judgment-debtor was not at all prejudiced by the sale or, to use the words of sec. 311, C. P. C, the judgment-debtor did not sustain substantial injury by reason of such irregularity. He disclaimed ownership of the property and said that some one else was its owner. He had, therefore, no locus standi and be did not Buffer from the irregularities complained of. 7. The purchaser has now to fight out his battle with Promod Lal Dhone who is now the constituted trustee of the property. It is, however, not necessary for us to go so far as to say that the judgment-debtor has no locus standi to ask the Court to set aside the sale. As judgment-debtor perhaps he has such a right; but it is quite clear that he did not suffer any Injury resulting from the irregularities complained of. 8. We are, therefore, of opinion that the Subordinate Judge was not correct in setting aside the sale of lot Mirzapur. As judgment-debtor perhaps he has such a right; but it is quite clear that he did not suffer any Injury resulting from the irregularities complained of. 8. We are, therefore, of opinion that the Subordinate Judge was not correct in setting aside the sale of lot Mirzapur. We accordingly set aside his order, so far as this property is concerned, and direct that the sale thereof be confirmed. The appeal is therefore decreed with costs, ten gold mohurs. The cross-objection is not pressed.