JUDGMENT Mitra, J. - Harihar Pershad Singh and Bhaskar Pershad Singh are brothers, members of a joint family governed by the Mitakshara system of Hindu Law. Harihar Pershad is an adult and is the managing member; Bhaskar Pershad is a minor. The brothers instituted a suit against one of their tenant in the Court of the Munsif at Arrab, Bhaskar Pershad being represented in the suit by his brother as next friend. They obtained a decree for rent and the tenant, Defendant, deposited the amount of the decree in Court to their credit. Thereafter, they applied for the withdrawal of the amount but the Munsif declined to make an order for payment, on the ground that no order for payment could be made until the next friend of the minor Plaintiff had complied with the provisions of sec. 461 of the CPC by obtaining leave of the Court to receive the money and by filing a security bond for the protection of the minor's interest. The order of the Munsif was appealed from to the District Judge of Shahabad, but no appeal lay to him and he referred the matter to the Court in its administrative capacity for direction in this case and in similar cases which are of constant occurrence. The Court, however, declined in its administrative capacity to determine the correctness or otherwise of a judicial order and to give any general directions. 2. The present application was made under sec. 622 of the Code for revision of the order of the Munsif and a rule was issued. No cause has been shown. 3. Harihar Pershad is the managing member of the joint family, and he represents it; and though, according to the rules of procedure in this Province, his minor brother is a necessary party in suits for rent, and was properly added as a co Plaintiff in the present suit, his absence from it as a party would not, ac cording to the well-established principle of Hindu Law regarding joint families, detract from the right of the managing member, the accredited agent of the family, to do acts beneficial to and necessary for the family including the withdrawal of money deposited in Court to its credit. The introduction of the infant member of the family under the representation of the managing member as a next friend was merely formal, --a matter of procedure and was not necessary so far as the substantive rights were concerned. 4. The legal constitution under Hindu Law of a joint family governed by the Mitakshara system is such that a coparcener has no defined share in the family property; the co-parceners are in the nature of a body corporate with joint rights followed on the death of a member by survivorship. The interest of co-parcener is not capable of definition, it being under a constant liability to variation on the birth of a new member or the death of an existing member. In the case of the birth of a male member, he acquires an interest at once by birth, and supposing money were deposited in Court to the credit of the family represented at the date of the decree in a suit by the then living members, the new member would at once acquire an interest in it, thus decreasing the definable shares of the other co-parceners. On the other hand, the death of a coparcener increases the definable shares. Such variation, however, is not due to legal representation in the sense that the words are ordinarily used but owing to the rule of survivorship. 5. The fact that a minor member has no defined share, that it cannot be said at any time before partition what is the present interest of a minor Plaintiff in money deposited in Court when he has sued with the adult managing member, takes the case out of the purview of sec. 461. That section was not framed with an eye to the peculiar constitution of joint Hindu families. The minor Plaintiff's share in the amount deposited in Court being undetermined, the bond would have to be, if any were, executed for an indefinite amount; but such a contingency, as also, the execution of the bond itself for the benefit of a coparcener are opposed to the spirit and language of sec. 461. It would appear that in framing sec. 461, attention was not given to the preculiar constitution of joint Hindu families governed by the Mitakshara School. 6. In Sham Kuar v. Mahanunda Sahoy ILR 19 Cal. 461. It would appear that in framing sec. 461, attention was not given to the preculiar constitution of joint Hindu families governed by the Mitakshara School. 6. In Sham Kuar v. Mahanunda Sahoy ILR 19 Cal. 301 (1891), the Court held that a guardian under Act VIII of 1890 cannot be appointed of the property of a minor, who is a member of a joint Hindu family governed by the Mitakshara law and possessed of no separate estate, the reason of the decision being that the introduction of a guardian of a share which is unascertained and unspecified would tend to disorganise the family and being about a separation without a partition. The foundation on which families governed by the Mitakshara system rest as laid down in Appovier v. Rama Subba 11 M.I.A. 75 (1866), would be completly shaken, if the rules of procedure and practice intended to apply to persons and their rights and liabilities of an altogether different character were made applicable to the co-parceners of such families. The same principle was applied in Gharibullah v. Khalak Singh ILR 30 I.A. 165 (1903), by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council to a mortgage executed by the karta of a joint family governed by the Mitakshara system of Hindu Law for himself and a minor co-parcener notwithstanding that a guardian of the minor had been appointed by Court. The Privy Council ignored the status of the guardian appointed by Court and upheld a mortgage executed without the permission of the Court. 7. We, therefore, make the rule absolute and set aside the order of the Munsif and direct him to pass a payment order as asked for by the Petitioners. Caspersz, J. 8. The question for our decision in the rule is whether the managing member of a joint Hindu family, governed by the Mitakshara, who was appointed the guardian ad litem of his minor brother for the purpose of a rent suit in which both the brothers obtained a decree for arrears of rent against their tenant-, is exempt from the restrictions Imposed by sec. 461 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 9. 461 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 9. Sec. 461 (2) of the Code runs thus:-- When the next friend or guardian for the suit has not been appointed or declared by competent authority to be guardian of the property of the minor, or, having been so appointed or declared, is under any disability known to the Court to receive the money or other moveable property, the Court shall, If it grants him leave to receive the property, require such security and give such directions as will, in its opinion, sufficiently protect the property from waste and ensure its proper application. 10. The object of the section is to protect property received by guardians ad litem on behalf of the minors they represent. There is nothing in the words of the section from which any exceptions may be deduced. The language used is general and applicable to every case where property is received by a mere guardian ad litem on behalf of a minor. To read an exemption into the section must, therefore, be justified only by the clearest necessity. 11. Now, the facts upon which this rule has to be decided are not such as are contemplated by the section. The adult Plaintiff, who was the manager of the joint family, was never appointed or declared to be the guardian of his minor brother's property under the Guardian and Wards Act, VIII of 1890. But he could not be so appointed because, as is now settled law, the interest of the minor co-Plaintiff is not individual property at all. It may be said that, if the adult Plaintiff represented the joint family, the addition of his minor brother as a co-Plaintiff was either unnecessary or intended to imply that the minor had some separate interest in the arrears of rent to recover which was the object of the suit. It is, however too late to contend that, according to strict principles of Hindu law, the managing member of a Mitakshara family can sue without joining the other members as parties to the suit. See Kattusheri v. Vallotil I.LR 3 Mad, 234 (1881). There may be cases in which a manager alone can sue to recover rent: for example, if he has given a lease in his own name and the suit is for rent due in terms of the lessee. See Kattusheri v. Vallotil I.LR 3 Mad, 234 (1881). There may be cases in which a manager alone can sue to recover rent: for example, if he has given a lease in his own name and the suit is for rent due in terms of the lessee. This is not the case here, nor is there any thing to indicate that the minor co-Plaintiff is possessed of any separate property which might be the subject of proceedings under Act VIII of 1890. 12. On principle, also, joint brother cannot be sureties, one of another, in a Mitakshara family : therefore the adult Plaintiff cannot be called upon to furnish security in respect of money to be received by him on behalf of his minor brother who was made a co-Plaintiff in order to obtain a joint decree for rent. The adult Plaintiff represents the joint family, including the minor co-Plaintiff : the decretal amount belongs just as much to the joint family as to the minor brother. 13. It is not necessary to consider the case of mortgage suits or other cases where minor Plaintiffs are represented by guardians ad litem who are managing members under the Mitakshara system. For these reasons, I agree that this rule must be made absolute.